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THE RIGHT TO SILENCE HELPS THE INNOCENT:
A GAME-THEORETIC ANALYSIS OF THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE*
Daniel J. Seidmann'" and Alex Stein-
This Article develops a consequentialist game-theoretic perspective for understanding the
right to silence. Professors Seidmann and Stein reveal that the conventional perception
of the right to silence - that it impedes the search for truth and thus helps only
criminals - is mistaken. Professors Seidmann and Stein demonstrate that the right to
silence can help triers of fact to distinguish between innocent and guilty suspects and
defendants. They argue that a guilty suspect's self-interested response to questioning can
impose externalities, in the form of wrongful conviction, on innocent suspects and
defendants who tell the truth but cannot corroborate their responses. Absent the right to
silence, guilty suspects and defendants would make false exculpatory statements if they
believed that their lies were unlikely to be exposed. Aware of these incentives, triers of
fact would rationally discount the probative value of uncorroborated exculpatory
statements at the expense of innocent defendants who could not corroborate their true
exculpatory statements. Because the right to silence is available, innocent defendants
still tell the truth while guilty defendants may rationally exercise the right. Thus, guilty
defendants do not pool with innocent defendants by lying, and as a result, triers of fact
do not wrongfully convict innocent defendants. Professors Seidmann and Stein contend
that the existing empirical data support their game-theoretic analysis. Furthermore,
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they argue that this anti-pooling rationale for the right to silence justifies and coherently
explains Fifth Amendment jurisprudence.
"[Aft one exquisitely ironic point in the narrative he is unable to publish a true
story about a Russian agent operating in the capital because a false story to the
same effect has already been circulated and then denied."'
I. INTRODUCTION
T he right to silence is under attack. In Dickerson v. United States,'
the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional I8 U.S.C. § 35oi, 3 an
attempt by Congress to repeal the exclusionary rule set forth in
Miranda v. Arizona.4 Specifically, the Court upheld the principle that
a violation of any of Miranda's warning requirements gives rise to an
irrebuttable presumption of involuntariness, thereby rendering inad-
missible any confession subsequently made by a defendant.' The
Court relied entirely on stare decisis grounds, without considering the
right to silence on its merits. As stated by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
who delivered the 7-2 majority opinion of the Court, "[w]hether or not
we would agree with Miranda's reasoning and its resulting rule, were
we addressing the issue in the first instance, the principles of stare de-
cisis weigh heavily against overruling it now."6
Hence, although Miranda survived, it did not do so on its merits,
and the fate of other doctrinal components of the right to silence re-
mains unclear. Many people argue that the criminal justice system
would do better without the right to silence. These opponents of the
right maintain that its abolition would impel more suspects to speak to
the police and would lead more criminals to confess to the crimes they
commit.7
I David Lodge, Waugh's Comic Waste Land, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, July 15, 1999, at 29, 32 (book
review).
2 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2o00).
3 i8 U.S.C. § 3501 (1994).
4 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
5 Dickerson, i2o S. Ct. at 2329-30.
6 Id. at 2336.
7 See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell, The Statute That Time Forgot: 18 U.S.C. § 35ot and the Overhaul-
ing of Miranda, 85 IOWA L. REV. 175 (1999) (arguing that determining confessions' voluntariness
on a case-by-case basis, as prescribed by i8 U.S.C. § 3501, is both constitutional and socially desir-
able as a vehicle for obtaining a greater number of voluntary confessions). Another commentator
writes:
Prosecutors believe that voluntary confessions are an essential tool for society, and fre-
quently [are] the evidence that ensures the conviction of dangerous criminals. Many
crimes are committed without eyewitnesses, or against victims such as children who can-
not testify. Where eyewitnesses are available, they are subject to increasing challenges by
the defense bar. There may be little or no physical evidence in many cases, and often
physical evidence is located because of voluntary statements by suspects. To the extent
[Vol. I I4:430
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The key question is whether this abolitionist proposal is good or
bad. Critical examination of this question goes to the very roots of the
right to silence. Miranda is undeniably an important manifestation of
that constitutional right, but it is still an offshoot of a rather large tree:
the right to silence manifests itself in numerous ways, and these mani-
festations all warrant consideration in formulating a sound policy deci-
sion. Why not return to Jeremy Bentham's suggestion and consider a
wholesale abolitionist program that would eliminate the right to si-
lence along with other allegedly irrational barriers to conviction?8
We must consequently rephrase the question as follows: Why not
change all the relevant rules to encourage more suspects to make vol-
untary statements during police interrogations and more defendants to
testify in court, instead of remaining silent? Specifically, why not al-
low factfinders to draw adverse inferences against silent suspects and
nontestifying defendants?
This question, which lies at the heart of Anglo-American criminal
justice systems, is the focus of the present Article. This Article chal-
lenges the traditional perception of the right-to-silence doctrine by
linking it to the fundamental requirement that the prosecution prove
its case beyond all reasonable doubt. This Article employs a game-
theoretic analysis to combine these two doctrines, and by so doing, it
proposes a new understanding of the right to silence.
This Article argues that the right to silence helps to distinguish the
guilty from the innocent by inducing an anti-pooling effect that en-
hances the credibility of innocent suspects. This effect occurs because
the right to silence affords a guilty suspect an attractive alternative to
imitating an innocent suspect through lies - an important feature that
the academic literature has largely ignored or underestimated. Such
lies obscure the differences between the guilty and the innocent and,
consequently, reduce the trustworthiness of accounts given by innocent
suspects. Equipped with the right to silence, many guilty suspects opt
for silence instead of lies. Guilty suspects fear that the police or the
prosecution will discover the truth and use their lies against them as
evidence of guilt. If the right to silence were unavailable, these sus-
pects would have a greater incentive to lie. The right to silence thus
operates as an anti-pooling device that motivates guilty suspects to
that Miranda excludes otherwise voluntary statements, and evidence which is obtained
because of those statements, it exacts a cost on society.
Stephen J. Johnson, Miranda Should Be Reconsidered, IND. LAW., Dec. 22, 1999, at 4.
8 See 5 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE I-8 (Fred B. Rothman & Co.
1995) (r827) (arguing against exclusionary rules and favoring admission of all relevant evidence,
subject to limitations relating to undue expense, delay, and vexation). For comprehensive analyses
of Bentham's evidence theory, see WILLIAM TWINING, THEORIES OF EVIDENCE: BENTHAM AND
WIGMORE 19-io8 (1985); and Andrew D.E. Lewis, The Background to Bentham on Evidence, 2
UTILITAS 195 (1990).
20001
HARVARD LAWREVIEW
separate from innocent ones. Alternatively, inducing guilty suspects to
confess would also lead to the desired separation; however, incentives
for confessing, such as reduction in punishment, generally incur
greater social costs than do incentives for silence.
This new understanding becomes possible due to the game-
theoretic methodology employed by this Article. The traditional per-
ception that the right-to-silence doctrine strikes a balance between
civil-libertarian values9 and utilitarian goals' 0 relies on a conspicuously
nonfactualist analysis." On its normative side, this analysis is con-
fined to the domain of moral and political philosophy. From this an-
gle, the desirability of the right to silence depends on the moral bal-
ance between the competing utilitarian goals and civil-libertarian
values.' 2  On its positive side, this analysis follows the traditional in-
terpretivist strategy. As such, it derives solutions to specific legal prob-
lems that arise in the application of the right to silence from the right's
accepted rationales. 13 At both levels, the analysis operates under pos-
9 Broadly speaking, civil libertarians seek to protect the accused from maltreatment by law
enforcement agencies.
10 In general, the utilitarian perspective considers the efficiency of the criminal justice machin-
ery in protecting society from crime.
I1 But see Eric Rasmusen, Mezzanatto and the Economics of Self-Incrimination, 19 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1541 (1998) (exhibiting a remarkable exception to this observation by analyzing an impor-
tant aspect of the self-incrimination privilege through game-theory lenses).
12 See generally Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective: The Right
to Remain Silent, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2625 (1996); Vincent Martin Bonventre, An Alternative to the
Constitutional Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 49 BROOK. L. REV. 31 (1982); Ian H. Dennis,
Instrumental Protection, Human Right or Functional Necessity? Reassessing the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination, 54 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 342 (1995); David Dolinko, Is There a Rationale for the
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination?, 33 UCLA L. REV. io63 (986); Donald A. Dripps, Self-
Incrimination and Self-Preservation: A Skeptical View, i99i U. ILL. L. REV. 329; D.J. Galligan,
The Right to Silence Reconsidered, 41 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 69 (1988); Robert S. Gerstein,
Privacy and Self-Incrimination, 80 ETHICS 87 (1970); R. Kent Greenawalt, Silence as a Moral and
Constitutional Right, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 15 (ig8i); Edwin Meese III, Promoting Truth in the
Courtroom, 40 VAND. L. REV. 271, 275-79 (1987); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Some Kind Words for the
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 311 (i9i); Richard K. Sherwin, Dialects
and Dominance: A Study of Rhetorical Fields in the Law of Confessions, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 729
(i988); William J. Stuntz, Lawyers, Deception, and Evidence Gathering, 79 VA. L. REV. 1903
(1993); William J. Stuntz, Self-Incrimination and Excuse, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1227 (I988) [herein-
after Stuntz, Self-Incrimination]; John H. Wigmore, Nemo Tenetur Seipsum Prodere, S HARV. L.
REV& 71 (T891). For a discussion of the privilege's history, see LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF
THE FIFTH AMENDMENT. THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION (r968). For expositions of
the many policy foundations of the privilege, see ERWIN N. GRISWOLD, THE 5TH AMENDMENT
TODAY (1955); and I MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §§ 114-1 i8, at 42 1-35 (John William Strong ed.,
4 th ed. 1992) [hereinafter MCCORMICK].
13 See generally OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL ON ADVERSE INFERENCE FROM SILENCE (1989), reprinted in 22 J.L.
REFORM ioo6 (1989) [hereinafter ADVERSE INFERENCE]; Akhil Reed Amar & Ren6e B. Lettow,
Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REV. 857 (1995);
Donald B. Ayer, The Fifth Amendment and the Inference of Guilt.from Silence: Griffin v. Califor-
nia After Fifteen Years, 78 MICH. L. REV. 841 (1980); Robert S. Gerstein, The Demise of Boyd. Self-
[Vol. 11I4:430
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tulated factual assumptions. Specifically, it assumes that the right
promotes civil-libertarian values by protecting guilty suspects from be-
ing compelled to assist in their own convictions and that the right does
not benefit innocent suspects and defendants. This confinement of the
inquiry is, indeed, necessary because of the inherently postulational
standpoint of both the moral and the interpretivist investigations.
Each of these investigations can operate only under given factual as-
sumptions. Moral investigation is possible only when the facts that de-
termine the relevant strengths and weaknesses lie ready on the scales.
The same holds true, in the case of interpretive investigation, with re-
gard to the relationship between the relevant legal doctrines and their
underlying justifications, generalized by Ronald Dworkin as "preinter-
pretive" data. 14
In the case of the right to silence, this confinement also has an in-
tuitive appeal. Factual assumptions traditionally ascribed to this right
correspond to the intuitions of many legal specialists. According to the
conventional wisdom, the right to silence helps only the guilty. Conse-
quently, many perceive the right to embody the overriding capacity of
its underlying civil-libertarian values, such as privacy (the right to be
let alone),' 5 individualism (the right not to facilitate the case of one's
adversary, especially when the latter happens to be the state), 16 and
Incrimination and Private Papers in the Burger Court, 27 UCLA L. REV. 343 (1979); Jane E. Notz,
Prearrest Silence as Evidence of Guilt: What You Don't Say Shouldn't Be Used Against You, 64 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1009 (997); Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Required Records Doctrine: Its Lessons for
the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 6 (1986); Henry T. Terry, Constitu-
tional Provisions Against Forcing Self-Incrimination, 15 YALE L.J. 127 (19o5).
14 RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 9o-91 (I986).
15 See Bonventre, supra note 12, at 56-59 (treating the privacy rationale as a plausible justifica-
tion for the right to silence); Galligan, supra note 12, at 88-89 (same); Gerstein, supra note 13, at
349-50 (same); Gerstein, supra note 12 (same); Erwin N. Griswold, The Right to be Let Alone, 55
NW. U. L. REV. 216 (1961) (same). But see Amar & Lettow, supra note 13, at 89o-91 (arguing that,
if the privacy rationale were sound, the privilege would require equal application in civil proceed-
ings); Dolinko, supra note 12, at 1107-37 (rejecting the privacy rationale); Schulhofer, supra note
12, at 317, 319-20 (casting doubts on the privacy rationale); Stuntz, Self-Incrimination, supra note
12, at 1234 ("If the privilege were sensibly designed to protect privacy . . . , its application would
turn on the nature of the disclosure the government wished to require, and yet settled fifth
amendment law focuses on the criminal consequences of disclosure.').
16 See 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 225 i, at 295-318
(John T. McNaughton ed., rev. ed. 1961) (treating the individualism rationale as plausible on moral
and historical grounds); Gerstein, supra note 13, at 349-52 (same); Griswold, supra note 15, at 222-
23 (same); John H. Langbein, The Historical Origins of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination at
Common Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1047, 1O66-71 (1994) (same); Notz, supra note 13, at O19, 1033-
34 (same); see also Michael S. Green, The Privilege's Last Stand: The Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination and the Right to Rebel Against the State, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 627 (1999) (justifying
the right to silence as an individual's entitlement to rebel against the state). But see Alschuler, su-
pra note 12, at 2635-38 (criticizing the individualism rationale); Bonventre, supra note 12, at 49-51
(same); Donald A. Dripps, Foreword: Against Police Interrogation - And the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 699, 717 (1988) (rejecting the individualism
rationale). The individualism rationale also surfaced in an important decision of the European
200]
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
free agency (the right not to be punished for resistance to questioning
out of fear of self-incrimination or perjury, which reduces the one's
freedom). 17 Thus, legal academics and practitioners commonly con-
clude that the right to silence trumps utility by subordinating the in-
terests of society to those of the criminal. Indeed, they argue that only
guilty offenders exercise this right: as observed long ago by Bentham,
an innocent suspect or defendant almost always prefers to speak out in
order to "dissipate the cloud which surrounds his conduct, and give
every explanation which may set it in its true light. ' 18 This preference
is the "highest interest, and . . . most ardent wish"'19 of virtually any
innocent suspect or defendant.
However intuitive they may appear, these factual assumptions are
too important to leave unscrutinized. Indeed, these assumptions are
crucial to the fate of the arguments favoring the abolition of the right
to silence and, alternatively, to its retention. If such arguments rest on
assumptions that are factually inaccurate, then they must be either
discarded or modified.
A factual examination of these assumptions may follow two princi-
pal routes. One of these routes is empirical. By gathering and analyz-
ing relevant empirical data, one can evaluate the workings of the right
to silence without relying on sheer intuition. Such an approach might
determine, statistically or by any other epistemologically plausible
standard, whether the right aids only the guilty. The alternative route,
which this Article follows, is behavioral modeling. Such modeling is
usually, but not exclusively, based on rational-choice theory. Because
reliable empirical evidence is often unavailable, the empirical approach
is often problematic, as is the case with the factual assumptions exam-
ined by this Article. For example, it is extremely difficult, if not alto-
gether impossible, to estimate the effect of the right to silence on the
rate of true and false confessions. A suspect may confess to a crime for
a variety of reasons. He may confess to a crime truthfully on finding
the incriminating evidence irresistible. Alternatively, he may make a
false or a truthful confession under the pressure of police questioning.
Court of Human Rights. See Saunders v. United Kingdom, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 313 (19 9 7)(invoking
this rationale). For an analysis of the impact of the privilege against self-incrimination on the do-
mestic laws of the European Union member states, see IAN H. DENNIS, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
15 1-56 (1999).
17 The free agency rationale is firmly rooted in Supreme Court jurisprudence. See Doe v.
United States, 487 U.S. 201, 212-13 (1988); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 76o-65 (1966).
But see Amar & Lettow, supra note 13, at 89o (claiming that the rationale is unsound); Bonventre,
supra note 12, at 53-56 (same); Dripps, supra note 6, at 712-15 (same); Schulhofer, supra note 12,
at 316-19 (same).
18 JEREMY BENTHAM, A TREATISE ON JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 241 (M. Dumont ed., Fred B.
Rothman & Co. i98i) (1825).
19 Id.
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He may also make a false confession to exonerate the actual guilty
party (for example, out of fear or love). A suspect deciding to remain
silent during his interrogation may do so regardless of the right to si-
lence: silence would be the best strategy for many guilty suspects even
in the absence of a right.20
An even greater problem inherent in the empirical approach lies in
its limited ability to produce determinate predictions when applied to
human actions and decisions. There is no good reason to believe that
uniformly observed actions and decisions will continue in the future.
Reliance on statistical generalizations in forecasting human actions
may prove perilous: recall Bertrand Russell's (in)famous chicken, con-
ditioned to expect its daily feeding until the day the farmer interrupted
this routine by butchering it for meat.21 One can make predictions
about human actions only within some theoretical framework that im-
poses order on the empirically gathered facts. Generalizations about
human actions acquire plausibility only by virtue of some explanatory
theory that connects actions to reasons.22 Theoretical lenses may be
microscopic or macroscopic, depending on the desired level of abstrac-
tion. In a search for a causal mechanism that explains numerous ac-
tions by their underlying motivations, theoretical lenses must be at a
relatively high level of abstraction. This form of reductionism is nec-
essary to tame "wild facts" and is, therefore, intrinsic to behavioral
modeling. The compromised accuracy resulting from this reduction-
ism is the price that any behavioral theory (and, perhaps, any theory)
exacts in order to attain determinacy.
The chosen theory must not only replace indeterminacy with de-
terminacy, but also generate predictions that are reasonably accurate.
2 3
The theory cannot disregard recalcitrant facts not squarely aligned
with it for the sake of attaining theoretical determinacy. In order to
accommodate these outliers, behavioral models must remain open to
adjustment and fine-tuning.2 4  This form of reflective equilibrium,
which adjusts to accommodate relevant models, facts, and intuitions,
20 Unlike true and false confessions, however, the confession rate itself is always a hard fact.
Therefore, one can attribute changes in the confession rate to the relevant enhancement (or weak-
ening) of the right to silence. Empirical research in this area would be more promising because the
relevant statistical inferences would be independent of the motives held by confessing and non-
confessing suspects (for which only soft data are available).
21 BERTRAND RUSSELL, THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 63 (Oxford Univ. Press 1997) (1912).
22 See generally KARL R. POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS: THE GROWTH OF SCI-
ENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 33-59, 215-22 (5 th ed. i989).
23 E.g., JON ELSTER, SOLOMONIC JUDGEMENTS: STUDIES IN THE LIMITATIONS OF RATION-
ALITY 1-3 (1989).
24 See, e.g., id. at 3; see also Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1484-85 (1998); Richard A. Posner, Ra-
tional Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 5o STAN. L. REV. 1551, 1560-61 (1998).
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can produce a defensible behavioral theory. The strength of a theory
depends on its determinacy, predictive capacity, and inner coherence.2 s
A theory's strength is also contingent on the strength of competing
theories. Indeed, a theory becomes stronger by virtue of being more
determinate, more predictive, and more coherent than its competitors.
Moreover, a coherent theory that is reasonably determinate and predic-
tive may gain strength by virtue of being the only theory available. To
quote a famous Chicago School saying: "[I]t takes a theory to beat a
theory. "26
This Article advances a game-theoretic model that addresses con-
siderations of determinacy, accuracy, and coherence and that offers a
tool for understanding the implications of the right to silence. As pre-
viously indicated, a desire to broaden the understanding of the right to
silence, which the right's traditional perception unduly restricts, moti-
vated the construction of this model. The nonfactualist moral inter-
pretivism that drives the traditional perception ignores important stra-
tegic interactions to which the right to silence gives rise and that,
presumably, occur "in the shadow of the law."27 More specifically, the
conventional wisdom fails to capture the dynamic aspect of the right
to silence, namely, its impact on strategic interactions (games) that oc-
cur between different suspects or defendants, on the one hand, and be-
tween each individual suspect or defendant and the administrators of
the criminal justice system (police, prosecution, and courts), on the
other hand. This failure is fatal. Thus, there is a substantial discrep-
ancy between the paradigmatic outcome of the relevant interactions
and the traditional wisdom. Not only does our game-theoretic model
confirm this conclusion, but some empirical findings, which we discuss
below, support it as well.
This Article proceeds in the following order. Part II explains the
game-theoretic methodology followed throughout the Article. It uses
this methodology to juxtapose the traditional intuitions about the right
to silence, combined with the criminal standard of proof, with a num-
ber of popular truths that most criminal law practitioners would con-
firm.
Part III refutes the argument, first made by Bentham, that the
right to silence helps only the guilty. This Part then provides a game-
theoretic analysis of paradigmatic interrogation settings. Our analysis
reveals that by making silence advantageous to guilty suspects, the
25 See POPPER, supra note 22, at 59-65.
26 Richard A. Epstein, Common Law, Labor Law, and Reality: A Rejoinder to Professors Get-
man and Kohler, 92 YALE L.J. 1435, 1435 (1983).
27 Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of
Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 997 (979). This phrase highlights the reality that incentives provided
by the relevant legal doctrine influence many strategic interactions. Id.
[Vol. I114:430
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right to silence helps the innocent as well as the guilty: without this
right, the guilty would lack an inducement to separate themselves
from the innocent; the unfortunate result would be a pooling of all
suspects, which would decrease the credibility of the exonerating ac-
counts of innocent suspects and defendants. This insight yields a new
rationale for the right to silence that is more satisfactory than the ra-
tionales offered by the existing caselaw and literature.
Part IV discusses the doctrinal aspects of the right to silence. This
Part demonstrates that our rationale for the right-to-silence doctrine
justifies the doctrine's scope more effectively than its competitors do.
In particular, our new rationale provides a compelling justification
why the right applies to "testimonial," as opposed to "physical," evi-
dence; to criminal, as opposed to civil and disciplinary, proceedings;
and to custodial, as opposed to noncustodial, interrogations. More-
over, our rationale justifies the same-sovereign limitation, which the
Supreme Court recently affixed to the right in United States v. Bal-
sys.28 An analysis of the relevant caselaw follows this discussion.2 9
The game-theoretic analysis, which we develop in Part III, begins with
the right to silence during interrogation, concentrating on Doyle v.
Ohio.30 From the same angle, we discuss in Part IV the right to si-
lence at trial, focusing first on Griffin v. California,3 1 the right's pri-
mary manifestation, and second on the Supreme Court's recent deci-
sion in Mitchell v. United States,32 which extended the application of
the right to sentencing proceedings. 33 This discussion also highlights
the important connection between the applications of the right to si-
lence at the pretrial and trial stages.
Part V tests our model against the existing empirical data. It dem-
onstrates that our model is sound not only normatively, in that it is de-
rived from a rational-choice analysis, and doctrinally, in that it is con-
sistent with the positive law, but also empirically, in that the choices
made by actual suspects and defendants largely correspond to our
model's predictions.
28 524 U.S. 666 (1998) (holding that concerns about foreign prosecution cannot activate the
Fifth Amendment privilege).
29 For the sake of brevity, we will focus primarily on Fifth Amendment jurisprudence and only
occasionally refer to non-American jurisdictions.
30 426 U.S. 6io (1976) (holding that, in general, a jury may not draw adverse inferences from
the fact that a defendant stood mute or claimed his Fifth Amendment privilege during custodial
interrogation); see also Miranda v. Arizona, 3 84 U.S. 436 (1966) (setting forth the principles of the
right to silence doctrine under the Fifth Amendment, including the ban on adverse inferences from
a defendant's silence).
31 380 U.S. 6og (1965) (holding that a jury generally may not draw adverse inferences from a
defendant's failure to testify in his defense).
32 525 U.S. 314 (I999).
33 Id. at321,330.
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Part VI summarizes our principal conclusions and is followed by an
Appendix, in which we present a formal analysis of the issues. This
analysis is not strictly necessary to understand our thesis, but may
benefit mathematically inclined readers.
Some preliminary groundwork must precede our discussion of these
issues. The right to silence branches into two doctrines, one of which
belongs to the law of contempt and the other to the law of evidence.
Under the law of contempt, a person who refuses to communicate with
an authorized tribunal or agency, such as a court or the police, is ex-
empt from the ordinarily applicable punishment in certain circum-
stances. This offshoot of the right-to-silence doctrine is the "contempt
exemption." The contempt exemption applies if the agency or tribunal
seeks to elicit communication that might contribute to the person's
conviction of a criminal offense. Under evidence law, neither a per-
son's invocation of the contempt exemption nor a person's refusal to
communicate with an authorized tribunal or agency can be used as
evidence against that person at her criminal trial. Consequently, the
factfinder may not draw any adverse inferences from the accused's de-
cision not to testify in her defense. 34 The factfinder also may not infer
guilt from the fact that the accused declined to answer questions dur-
ing police interrogation.3 5  Our subsequent discussion considers only
this evidentiary aspect of the right to silence. 36 This Article discusses
34 Griffin, 380 U.S. at 614-15.
35 Doyle, 426 U.S. at 617-18.
36 The contempt exemption is, indeed, easier to justify than the rule against adverse inferences.
One can easily derive good reasons for upholding this exemption from the civil-libertarian theory,
which sets appropriate limits to both the criminal sanction and its quasi-criminal derivatives. Un-
der this theory, individuals should be protected not only by, but alsofrom, the criminal justice ma-
chinery. Applications of criminal sanctions, therefore, must remain within the bounds of rational
deterrence and proportionate retribution. Assuming that a guilty person rationally would choose
the punishment for silence when it is less painful than the alternative, an appropriate adjustment
to the punishment for silence must accompany the removal of the contempt exemption. Any such
adjustment would involve some form of alignment of the punishment for silence with the punish-
ment ordinarily imposed for the underlying substantive offense. A deterrence-based approach to
the criminal sanction also would have to account for the probability that the relevant punishments
will be imposed. The undue severity and the floating character that the punishment for silence
must assume are plainly anomalous. It is, therefore, hardly surprising that even the most ardent
critics of the right to silence call only for removal of the rule against adverse inferences and do not
advocate the removal of the contempt exemption. See, e.g., ADVERSE INFERENCE, supra note 13,
at I 111-12 (arguing that the privilege against adverse inferences must be repealed without remov-
ing the contempt exemption); WALTER V. SCHAEFER, THE SUSPECT AND SOCIETY: CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE AND CONVERGING CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINES 59-71 (1967) (same); Henry J.
Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REV.
671, 701, 714 (1968) (same); Paul G. Kauper, Judicial Examination of the Accused - A Remedy for
the Third Degree, 30 MICH. L. REV. 1224, 1252, 1255 (1932) (same).
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the privilege against self-incrimination granted to a witness who is not
an accused only to the extent that it affects the pooling problem a
II. ZUGZWANG: 3 8 THE FIRST-MOVE DILEMMA OF A GUILTY
SUSPECT
Game-theoretic methodology is particularly suitable for analyzing
the rules that apply in criminal interrogation and trial: game theory fo-
cuses on a person's rational choice in a strategic situation, a game, in
which the person's welfare also depends on actions chosen by others.
These "others" become players in the game, and thus, an individual's
best choice in a strategic situation depends on her beliefs about the
choices that other players will make. A game-theoretic analysis is pre-
cise about the alternatives among which each player chooses, as well
as about the information available to each player in forming the requi-
site beliefs. Game theorists are particularly interested in exploring the
37 For a discussion of a witness's privilege against self-incrimination, see 1 MCCORMICK, supra
note i2, § 116, at 427-28, §§ 138-140, at 515-28. Indeed, as argued by the late Professor Glanville
Williams, it would be inaccurate to describe a compelled witness as possessing a right to silence, for
he must take the stand when subpoenaed and may only refuse to answer incriminating questions.
The right to silence, as a right not to utter a word, belongs only to criminal suspects and defen-
dants. GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, THE PROOF OF GUILr A STUDY OF THE ENGLISH CRIMINAL
TRIAL 37-38 (3 d ed. 1963). An assertion that criminal suspects and defendants have a privilege
against self-incrimination would be equally inaccurate: the right to silence, as it belongs to defend-
ants and suspects, is both broader and narrower than the privilege. For example, if a defendant
chooses to testify in his defense, "[hle cannot reasonably claim that the Fifth Amendment gives him
... an immunity from cross-examination on the matters he has himself put in dispute. It would
make of the Fifth Amendment not only a humane safeguard against judicially coerced self-
disclosure but a positive invitation to mutilate the truth a party offers to tell." Brown v. United
States, 356 U.S. 148, 155-56 (1958). See generally I MCCORMICK, supra note 12, § 134, at 493 (ar-
guing that an accused's decision to testimony at trial diminishes his rights under the privilege);
WILLIAMS, supra, at 63-66 (same).
38 The term "zugzwang," originally German, denotes a chess position in which a player whose
turn it is to make a move prefers not to make one because any move would worsen her position.
THE CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF CURRENT ENGLISH 1632 (Della Thompson ed., 9th ed.
1995). Outside of chess, the two-player game "Nim," involving several rows of circles, provides an
example of zugzwang. In Nim, each player removes, during her turn, any number of circles from
any row and tries to win the game by forcing her opponent to remove the last remaining circle. In
Nim, the simplest form of zugzwang is:
00
00
In this position, the player who must make a move is held in zugzwang: if she removes any
circle from the board, her opponent will remove two, and if she removes any two circles, her oppo-
nent will remove one. In chess, the following well-known position exemplifies zugzwang:
White: Kf8, Rhi, Pg6
Black: Kh8, Bg8, Ph7, Pg7. White to move.
In this position, White wins instantly by playing i. Rh6, which places Black in zugzwang. If
Black could pass, the game would end in a draw, but Black is not allowed to do so. Forced to
move, Black must now either take the rook or play with the bishop. In the former case, Black will
be checkmated by 2. Pg7, and in the latter, by 2. Rxh7.
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effects of changing the game's rules, namely: the available alternatives
(the action choices open to each player); the relevant payoffs (the con-
sequences of different combinations of the players' choices, framed in
utility units); and/or the information that each player can use to form
his requisite beliefs. In this way, game theory forces anyone who pro-
poses a rule change to take account of how players would respond to
the change. This practical contribution of game theory is of special
Value in the criminal justice process. All parties to this process are
aware of the strategic elements of criminal proceedings and know that
the interests at stake are important.
Criminal interrogation has a number of other features that are im-
portant from a game-theoretic standpoint but have received little at-
tention in the existing literature. The first of these features is the fun-
damental asymmetry of information between guilty suspects and other
players. Guilty suspects know, idiosyncratic exceptions aside, that they
have committed the crimes of which they are accused, whereas inno-
cent suspects know that they have not committed those crimes. The
police, in contrast, cannot always distinguish the guilty from the inno-
cent. Moreover, although the police may know both that a crime has
been committed and that a particular suspect is the perpetrator, inter-
rogation is still necessary because the trier of fact does not possess the
same knowledge. This asymmetry of information is one reason to al-
low the state, via the agency of the police, to infringe certain rights of
criminal suspects.
The second important feature of the interrogation process concerns
the various parties' knowledge of the availability of credible evidence.
In some cases, simply because they committed the investigated crimes,
guilty suspects may know more than any other party about the avail-
able or potentially available evidence. For example, knowledge that
she was observed committing the crime might give a guilty suspect an
advantage over innocent suspects who, by virtue of their innocence,
cannot anticipate what a witness will say. This point is critical be-
cause suspects typically cannot provide entirely credible alibis. Be-
cause virtually all suspects want to be exonerated, triers of fact will
tend not to believe proclamations of innocence that other evidence
does not corroborate.
Another feature of criminal interrogation that adapts easily to game
theory is the fact that suspects may not know what evidence the police
already have or are likely to acquire. Indeed, it might be extremely
difficult for the police to convince a suspect that they do in fact have
evidence. The police are skeptical of suspects' proclamations of inno-
cence - a rational response because guilty suspects also would make
such claims were the police to believe them. For similar reasons, sus-
pects are skeptical of interrogators' claims that they have evidence of
guilt - a rational response because the police have strong incentives
to induce confessions and close cases. In sum, interrogation is a com-
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plex game, in which players have information that they may or may
not be able to convey credibly to other players.
Experienced criminal defense attorneys and prosecutors both ac-
knowledge that a suspect's initial response to police questioning - a
game that the police may play without showing their hand to the sus-
pect - generally is crucial to the case. 39 Interrogation is a game with
asymmetric information. Virtually every suspect knows whether he
"did it." A guilty suspect is privately aware of his guilt and, like inno-
cent suspects, cannot credibly signal innocence to the police. Although
the police do not know with certainty whether the suspect "did it,"
they are privately aware of the evidence identifying him as a possible
perpetrator of the crime. Furthermore, the police have no obligation
to familiarize the suspect with this evidence; even if they had the dis-
cretion to do so, they might not be able credibly to convey to the sus-
pect that they have this - and only this - evidence. This game dis-
advantages the guilty suspect: he must bluff in order to signal
innocence, but the police might discover his bluff, which would furnish
further evidence of his guilt. In order to bluff successfully, the guilty
suspect must be aware of the cards that the police hold. Not surpris-
ingly, the police hold these cards close to their chests, while suspects
must nevertheless make their moves.
This observation holds true in almost all cases save those that are
exceptionally straightforward, in which conviction of the defendant
can proceed without difficulty based on evidence other than his testi-
mony. If this observation were untrue, we would not witness so many
fights over the admissibility of defendants' initial responses at interro-
gation, both under the common law "voluntariness" principle 4° and
under Miranda,41 or over which inferences the factfinder may draw
from defendants' silence42 and lies. 43 We also would not witness so
much controversy over the inferences that the factfinder may draw
from a defendant's initial withholding of an alibi or other innocent ac-
39 See, e.g., Kauper, supra note 36, at 1247.
40 See generally I MCCORMICK, supra note 12, § 147, at 573 (stating that many confessions are
contested on grounds of involuntariness).
41 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 440-42 (i966).
42 See I MCCORMICK, supra note 12, §§ i61-i62, at 653-65.
43 See, e.g., People v. Rodrigues, 885 P.2d 1, 42-43 (Cal. 1994) (allowing jury instructions that
referred to a defendant's efforts to fabricate evidence); People v. Lewis, 786 P.2d 892, 899-9oo (Cal.
199o) (stating that a defendant's false statements tended to show consciousness of guilt); People v.
Lang, 782 P.2d 627, 648 (Cal. 1989) (exhibiting fierce litigation over the use of defendants' false
statements as incriminating evidence); State v. Ham, 739 A.2d 1268, 1274-75 (Conn. 1999) (allow-
ing an inference adverse to a defendant to be drawn from his material misstatements); State v.
Smith, 592 A.2d 382, 385 (Conn. i991) (permitting jury instructions that mandated a negative in-
ference from a defendant's false statement).
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count of events.44 This unofficial "first-move principle" seems well en-
trenched in the practice of criminal law. Silence or false responses in
the face of criminal accusations usually signal guilt.45
The transformation of perceived signals of guilt into admissible
evidence is an entirely separate issue. Even when fully informed of
the relevant legal doctrines and rights arising therefrom, a guilty sus-
pect cannot adequately assess the evidentiary implications of his first
move. Because the suspect usually has no information about the evi-
dence in the police's possession, the evidentiary consequences of the
signals that he sends are unclear at this initial stage. The only things
that the suspect knows are that silence and lies usually indicate guilt
and that the law enforcement authorities - the police and prosecutors
- will utilize any such indications to the fullest extent that the law al-
lows. Only guilty suspects face this dilemma. In contrast, for innocent
suspects, telling a truthful story to the police can only improve (or at
least not worsen) their position. 46
The right to silence, as developed in Doyle and Griffin, imposes
constraints on commonsense reasoning by turning silent indications of
guilt into generally inadmissible evidence. These constraints are lim-
ited, however, and the extent to which a suspect will benefit from them
is impossible to determine at the first-move stage. At this stage, a sus-
pect has only limited knowledge of the current evidence against him
and is uncertain what evidence the police will obtain in the future.
47
For a guilty suspect, the choice between silence and lies, as his first-
move alternatives to self-incrimination, therefore amounts to a choice
between Scylla and Charybdis. Any such suspect is held in zugzwang,
both psychologically and from a purely rational viewpoint. He prefers
not to make any move because any move entails a substantial prob-
ability of worsening his position. On the one hand, if he were to opt
for silence, he would subsequently find it difficult to challenge the
prosecution's evidence. Moreover, the police and prosecution would
infer his factual guilt and would therefore devote more time and effort
to securing his conviction. On the other hand, the police might use
44 See, e.g., United States v. DeVore, 839 F.2d 1330, 1332 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding that a prosecu-
tor may not comment on a defendant's withholding of an alibi if the defendant's behavior impli-
cates the invocation of the right to silence but that a prosecutor rightfully may attack the inconsist-
ency between two alibis and introduce any prior statement inconsistent with the defendant's
testimony).
45 This observation may not hold true in a few special cases, such as when a suspect decides to
remain silent because he distrusts the criminal justice system. Such cases are far removed from a
typical criminal proceeding and have no bearing on our thesis. Our thesis holds, on rationalist
grounds, that the right to silence helps the innocent. If there are additional reasons for supporting
the same conclusion, we may well accept them.
46 Once again, this observation may not apply to very special cases, which we ignore for lack of
representativeness.
47 The police may also be unable to signal their evidence to the suspect credibly.
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evidence unknown to the suspect to expose a lie, increasing the likeli-
hood of conviction.
Furthermore, the first move made by a guilty suspect limits his
subsequent moves, thus affecting his entire trial strategy. If a suspect
came forward with an innocent account of the events and then refused
to answer the police's follow-up questions, he would expose himself to
adverse inferences at trial.4 8 Should the suspect's statement prove
false, he would find it difficult to provide an exonerating alternative
when confronted with probing questions. In addition, confronting the
suspect with his prior falsehood would undermine the credibility of his
later statement. At trial, the suspect would face impeachment as a
witness as well as the possibility that his false first statement might
contradict his testimony.49 Alternatively, the prosecutor could intro-
duce the defendant's first statement to impeach subsequent fabricated
testimony. The prosecution might use this statement to show that the
defendant did not provide important and potentially exonerating facts,
included in his testimony, at the earliest possible opportunity.5 0 If, in-
stead of testifying, the defendant tried to adduce a belated statement
as evidence, the prosecution might introduce the earlier statement to
attack the defendant's credibility"' Finally, the jury would likely con-
vict the defendant if the prosecution produced evidence that proved
convincingly that the defendant lied during police interrogation. 2
A suspect who chooses silence as a first move might also find it
damaging to furnish an exonerating statement at a later stage. The
police and the prosecution would view any such statement with dis-
trust and would question the suspect's motives for delay. This delay
would also impair the credibility of the suspect's belated statement
and could prove damaging at trial. Furthermore, the police might at-
tempt to refute the suspect's self-exonerating statement. If the police
succeeded in discrediting the suspect's statement, his lies would further
48 See, e.g., United States v. Davenport, 929 F.2d 169, 1174-75 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that the
Fifth Amendment privilege does not allow a defendant to gain an advantage by selective disclosure
and that there is no violation of the privilege if a police officer testifies about the gaps in the de-
fendant's statement left by the defendant's refusal to answer questions).
49 See, e.g., DeVore, 839 F.2d at 1332. See generally FED. R. EVID. 613 (stating the rules gov-
erning the impeachment of witnesses with prior inconsistent statements); i MCCORMICK, supra
note 12, § 34, at 113-16 (discussing the use of otherwise inadmissible prior inconsistent statements
for the purpose of impeaching witnesses).
50 This method of impeachment would not violate the accused's Fifth Amendment protection.
See, e.g., Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404, 408 (1q8o).
51 A self-exonerating statement would also constitute inadmissible hearsay if adduced by a non-
testifying defendant. See FED. R. EVID. 8Ol-8O4 (providing no hearsay exceptions for defendants'
self-serving statements).
52 See Stephen Moston, Geoffrey M. Stephenson & Thomas M. Williamson, The Effects of Case
Characteristics on Suspect Behaviour During Police Questioning, 32 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 23,
38-39 (1992)(finding that suspects normally do not change their original stories).
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erode his credibility. However, if the police failed to establish that the
suspect lied, convincing the factfinder of the suspect's guilt would be-
come much more difficult. In such a case, the prosecution generally
cannot use the suspect's silence and failure to provide a self-
exonerating account as evidence in his subsequent trial. Nevertheless,
the police and the prosecution would interpret these flaws in the sus-
pect's account as signals of guilt. These signals would lead the police
and the prosecution to concentrate their efforts on this particular sus-
pect, and the suspect's fate would therefore depend on whether the po-
lice and the prosecution managed to find enough evidence to convict
him.
Therefore, total silence is often the optimal choice for a guilty sus-
pect. However, the strategy of total silence exacts a virtually certain
price: the police and prosecution will believe that the suspect is guilty
and proceed accordingly. This belief prevails until the suspect pro-
vides a convincing story of his innocence and a credible explanation
for withholding the story. If the suspect does not provide an exculpa-
tory statement at or before trial, the factfinder will regard the prosecu-
tion's evidence as uncontradicted,5 3 substantially increasing the likeli-
hood of conviction. Moreover, the factfinder may draw adverse
inferences implicitly, even though the prosecution cannot suggest such
inferences explicitly.5 4 Faced with the possibility that his silence could
work against him, the suspect might therefore consider producing an
exonerating story at his trial. But if such a story first surfaced at trial,
the prosecutor would imply concoction during cross-examination
55
In sum, a suspect who opts for silence relies on uncertainty and
doubt to obtain release or exoneration. This "raise-a-doubt" strategy
distinguishes the suspect from those suspects who insist on their inno-
cence. Obviously, each strategy has advantages and disadvantages.
Assessing the situation properly is more difficult for a guilty suspect
who must devise his strategy before knowing the evidence against him.
53 See, e.g., United States v. Bright, 630 F.2d 804, 825 (5th Cir. 198o); People v. Garcia, 420
N.E.2d 482, 489 (Ill. App. Ct. i98i).
54 This is common sense. But see, e.g., CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK,
EVIDENCE 357 (1995) ("Parties should be expected to anticipate and litigate issues of privilege in a
manner that does not alert the jury.... If no adverse inference is permitted, the court should be
willing to instruct the jury to this effect, although the party asserting the privilege may forego such
an instruction to avoid highlighting the unwanted inference."). See generally Stephen A. Saltzburg,
A Special Aspect of Relevance: Countering Negative Inferences Associated with the Absence of
Evidence, 66 CAL. L. REV. 1o1 (978) (describing the significance of inferences that jurors draw
from the absence of evidence).
55 See Portuondo v. Agard, 120 S. Ct. i 119, 1127 (2000) (holding that no violation of the Fifth
Amendment occurs if a prosecutor challenges a defendant's credibility by calling the jury's atten-
tion to the fact that the defendant had the opportunity to hear all the other witnesses and thus to
tailor his self-exonerating testimony accordingly).
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By moving first, the suspect inevitably increases his chances of
conviction and thus worsens his position. Like the chess player in
zugzwang,5 6 the suspect prefers to pass but does not have this option.
A guilty suspect's first move is therefore a choice between two types of
damage: pretrial damage that the suspect will almost certainly incur if
he opts for total silence and trial damage that the suspect may incur if
he opts for lies at any stage of his interrogation.
The first type of damage is not as serious as the second, provided
that the prosecutor fails to transform it into trial damage. Neverthe-
less, the first type of damage is virtually certain. The second type of
damage (refuted lies as evidence of guilt), while less likely, is consid-
erably more serious than the first. The probability of incurring the
second type of damage depends on whether the police or prosecution
find evidence that exposes the suspect's lies. This risk is not negligi-
ble. The likelihood that the pre-existing evidence refutes the suspect's
story is relatively good given that it has already caused the police to
single out the suspect. Moreover, the pre-existing evidence may lead
the police to further evidence implicating the suspect. In addition, the
police may obtain independent evidence that contradicts the suspect's
statement. For example, a credible witness may surface and implicate
the suspect.
Choosing to lie at stage one does have some advantages for the
suspect, however. For example, the police may consequently shift their
focus to other suspects if the lie is facially credible. The police may
also release the suspect from custody, with or without bail, and he can
use this break in the interrogation to set up an alibi, to remove in-
criminating evidence, or to intimidate potential prosecution witnesses.
The pretrial damage incurred by opting for silence is far from neg-
ligible. It is obviously dangerous for a suspect to render himself guilty
in the eyes of the police and the prosecution. Making this move is tan-
tamount to admitting guilt and challenging the police to obtain evi-
dence that will convict. The police and prosecutors are likely to accept
this challenge, investing substantial efforts to obtain a conviction.
Such efforts will concentrate on the silent suspect (including accom-
plices) and will often succeed because the elimination of other suspects
56 There is one important difference between zugzwang positions in games like chess and a
suspect's first-move disadvantage. The latter is essentially an informational problem for a suspect,
who remains largely ignorant about the future development of the investigation. When a chess-
player is held in zugzwang, she is in a position to know with infallible accuracy how she will lose
the game once she moves in one way or another. The inability to pass instead of making a move is
her only problem. By contrast, a guilty suspect might be able to escape conviction if only he knew
the true facts. But the zugzwang analogy is still both valid and useful because a suspect's position,
with all its informational problems, would be much better were he able to pass instead of making
the first move. By moving first, the suspect will inevitably increase his chances of conviction and
thus will worsen his position.
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will conserve the police's resources for the focused task of proving the
silent suspect guilty.
From a guilty suspect's perspective, the two alternatives involve
indeterminate risks, making it difficult to choose between them. Si-
lence as a response to interrogation risks damaging the suspect's case,
but the suspect may further damage his case by lying. Although si-
lence is usually the better choice, suspects typically choose to lie for
two reasons. First, opting for silence is difficult because it portrays the
suspect as probably guilty in the eyes of the police and the prosecu-
tion.5 7  Second, the damage incurred by silence is a certain price that
the suspect pays to obtain immunity from the damage he might sustain
by lying. Because the trial damage is more severe than the pretrial
damage, rational guilty suspects perceive silence as less risky than ly-
ing. Many guilty suspects nevertheless take the riskier option, thus
committing the "out of sight, out of mind" fallacy, labeled by cognitive
psychologists as the "availability" heuristic that causes people to un-
derestimate risks they irrationally perceive as too remote.58 Like an
average person who underinsures against risk,5 9 a guilty suspect is
usually unwilling to signal his guilt by maintaining silence at the pre-
trial stage. As a result, suspects do not exercise the right to silence
very often either at interrogation or at trial.60 Therefore, the right to
silence cannot be responsible for many erroneous acquittals.
Contrary to the prevailing view, the proof-beyond-all-reasonable-
doubt requirement also does not contribute significantly to the inci-
dence of erroneous acquittals. First, innocent defendants are more
likely to be acquitted at trial than guilty defendants. Accounts fur-
57 To this obvious damage a guilty suspect might add the forfeiture of possible advantages as-
sociated with lying.
58 See Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 24, at 1477-78; Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S.
Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Econom-
ics, 88 CAL. L. REV. l051, 1085-90 (2000) (examining the impact of the availability heuristic on the
formation of legal policies); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judg-
ing Frequency and Probability, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES
163-78 (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982) (summarizing the results of ten
studies on the availability heuristic); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncer-
tainty: Heuristics and Biases. 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1127-28 (1974) (discussing the cognitive biases
that result from a reliance on availability).
59 See Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 24, at 1477-78; Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analy-
sis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1183 (1997).
60 See Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the I99os: An Empirical
Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REv 839, 869 tbl.4 (1996) (reporting that only 9.5%
of Mirandized suspects invoked their right to remain silent during police interrogations); Richard
A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 266, 275 tbl.2 (1996) (find-
ing that 2o.88% of questioned suspects invoked the right to silence, with 19.78% invoking the right
at the outset of their interrogation); see also SUSAN EASTON, THE CASE FOR THE RIGHT TO
SILENCE 133-43 (2d ed. 1998) (reporting and explaining the lower percentages of suspects in Eng-
land and Wales who choose to exercise the right).
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nished by innocent suspects are generally more credible than those
provided by guilty defendants. A guilty defendant who successfully
explains away incriminating evidence is either lucky or sophisticated
enough to fabricate convincing stories, and false exculpatory stories
gain credibility mainly from the scarcity of the incriminating evidence.
More importantly, although the proof-beyond-all-reasonable-doubt re-
quirement manifests a willingness to acquit numerous guilty defend-
ants to prevent a relatively small number of wrongful convictions, the
criminal justice system does not actually reach this outcome. The
first-move dilemma, which often forces a guilty suspect to make a
wrong move that contributes to his conviction, mitigates the potential
social cost of acquitting numerous criminals.
Arguably, replacing the proof-beyond-all-reasonable-doubt re-
quirement with a less demanding standard of proof would allow
prosecutors to discredit more false stories. This change would produce
more convictions and, correspondingly, more indictments of guilty sus-
pects. However, such a change is also bound to exact a price. This
price relates closely to our rationale for the right to silence.
A substantial reduction in the criminal proof standard would pro-
duce not only more convictions of innocent suspects,6 1 but also serious
indeterminacy in suspect identification and selection. A lower stan-
dard for conviction would modify the incentives for guilty suspects.
For example, a standard that guarantees conviction whenever the
prosecution's evidence is uncontroverted would signal to the suspect
that she can no longer rely on silence. More suspects would thus try to
escape conviction by lying and thereby pooling with innocent suspects.
There would be more cases in which innocent suspects would remove
suspicion from guilty ones and also more cases in which guilty suspects
would successfully divert suspicion to innocent people by fabricating
facially credible self-exonerating accounts.
Indeed, our rationale for the right to silence only applies to a legal
system with a proof-beyond-all-reasonable-doubt requirement. Be-
cause lies, unlike silence, are susceptible to refutation, this requirement
prompts a guilty suspect to prefer silence to lies. By enlarging the
spectrum of plausible stories from the accused, the proof-beyond-all-
reasonable-doubt requirement also motivates some innocent suspects
to come forward with their true stories, even those that extrinsic evi-
dence cannot corroborate. 6
61 Traditionally, civil libertarians have condemned this increase in convictions of innocent sus-
pects as part of their ongoing debate with supporters of law and order. A historical account of this
debate appears in TWINING, supra note 8, at ioo-o8.
62 In our rational-choice analysis, this incentive is only a side benefit, for it applies only to those
innocent suspects who might opt for exculpatory lies. Suspects may make such choices under a
semi-rational belief that a false account will appear more credible in the factfinder's eyes than the
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In Part III, we further identify and apply our new rationale for the
right to silence. We demonstrate that the abolition of this right - that
is, the introduction of adverse inferences against silent suspects and
nontestifying defendants - would produce a harmful externality al-
most identical to the one that we discuss in this Part. But before we
proceed, we remove a possible objection to our general approach.
Some might disagree with our treatment of a typical suspect as a ra-
tional maximizer of welfare. Arguably, this treatment fails to capture
the reality of police interrogation for neglected, alienated, weak,
strained, subdued, or feeble-minded suspects or for suspects who suffer
from drug and alcohol problems, personality disorders, or physical dis-
eases. The police intimidate many such suspects, some of whom are
juveniles, and often these suspects would say anything to please the in-
terrogator. Some of these suspects would confess to almost any crime
out of apathy. Police interrogate virtually all suspects in a hostile en-
vironment, subjecting them to physical and psychological pressures de-
signed to make the suspects' choices irrational. When these choices
become irrational, an abstract and cold-blooded game-theoretic
framework cannot capture them.
In our opinion, this objection is fair only to the extent that it raises
an important exception to the rationalist approach that this Article en-
dorses. Yet such extreme cases are rare. Rationality in its rudimen-
tary sense still appears to be the norm. This rationality is far from
perfect. It is both constrained and truncated, and our analysis takes
some of these limitations into account. But a typical suspect's behav-
ior, on which this Article focuses, is also far from grossly irrational.
63
Empirical evidence suggests that suspects generally seek release and
therefore attempt to be absolved of guilt. A typical suspect confesses
to a crime only when confronted with evidence that he believes to be
truth. This incentive will persist as long as some real-world actors are boundedly rational. In the
real world, the law must tell suspects unequivocally that true stories will satisfy reasonable doubt,
except in the most unusual circumstances. Consequently, under the proof-beyond-all-reasonable-
doubt requirement, more innocent suspects and defendants will tell the truth and expose it to inter-
rogation. Both fully and boundedly rational suspects will make this socially preferable choice. Cf.
BENTHAM, supra note 18; at 197 (introducing the "alarm" principle, under which the reduction of
the criminal proof standard might drive innocent suspects into socially sub-optimal and personally
irrational behavior); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, S i STAN.
L. REV. 1477, i5O5 (1999) (arguing that a reduction of the criminal proof standard would enable
the government to pursue predatory strategies by concentrating prosecutorial efforts on recalci-
trant defendants in order to extract guilty pleas from the rest).
63 Another response to the above objection is that suspects who are irrationally impelled to con-
fess are also unlikely to be in a position to exercise their rights even when they receive the Miranda
warnings. Consequently, any argument about the right's policy effects would apply only to the
remainder of the population of suspects.
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irrefutable64 or when offered a tempting deal by the police or the
prosecution. This empirical evidence is not the only factor justifying
the economic approach adopted by this Article. This approach is also
appropriate because we apply it to the most basic of economic instincts
- that of self-preservation. 65
III. THE MODEL
This Part of the Article demonstrates that the right to silence actu-
ally helps innocent suspects, even if they do not exercise this right
themselves. It also demonstrates that the exercise of this right by
guilty suspects and defendants may increase social welfare. We use
the word "may" because social welfare requires further analysis. Our
first claim, however, is much more emphatic. We claim that innocent
suspects and defendants decidedly benefit from the right to silence,
which also yields potential benefits for social welfare.66 We begin with
an analysis of Bentham's famous objection to the right to silence, also
endorsed by contemporary opponents of the right. According to this
objection, the right to silence benefits only guilty suspects. In what
follows, we demonstrate that this objection is wrong. We subsequently
present a game-theoretic model that substantiates our thesis and then
explore its implications for the criminal standard of proof.
A. Bentham's Objection to the Right to Silence
Our central claim rests on the breakdown of the principal objection
to the right to silence, originally leveled by Bentham and subsequently
espoused by present-day opponents of the right. This facially compel-
ling objection has attracted both lawyers and politicians, many of
whom are linked to the conservative "law-and-order" ideology. In ac-
cordance with its originalist tenor and for the sake of convenience, we
64 See MICHAEL MCCONVILLE, CORROBORATION AND CONFESSIONS: THE IMPACT OF A
RULE REQUIRING THAT No CONVICTION CAN BE SUSTAINED ON THE BASIS OF CONFESSION
EVIDENCE ALONE 29-32 (1993): Cassell & Hayman, supra note 6o, at 894 tbl.8; Moston, Stephen-
son & Williamson, supra note 52, at 34-37.
65 There is an additional reason why focusing on unsophisticated suspects would not change
our analysis: such a suspect would replicate the choices that a reasonably sophisticated criminal
would make. Suspects participating in our game might play equilibrium strategies either because
they have thought through the consequences of their alternative choices or because they have seen
what has happened when other suspects played the game and have learned from their mistakes. In
the present context, this interpretation is also empirically plausible: it is very likely that criminals
actually learn that silence is a good or bad idea from "word on the street" and from other "facts of
life" that constitute criminal subculture. For a discussion of this theme by evolutionary game theo-
rists, see DREW FUDENBERG & JEAN TIROLE, GAME THEORY § 1.2.5, at 23-29 (i99).
66 For a discussion of the right's impact on social welfare, see Daniel J. Seidmann, Miranda
Can Benefit Innocent Suspects Who Tell the Truth, and May Thereby Raise Social Welfare (Mar.
2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
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will refer to it as "Bentham's objection." This objection holds that,
subject to idiosyncratic exceptions, each person knows whether he
committed the crime. Guilty suspects know that they are guilty, and
innocent suspects know that they are innocent. As criminal conviction
and punishment entail harm that a rational person wants to avoid,
guilty suspects are eager to conceal the truth, whereas an innocent
suspect's "most ardent wish" is to "dissipate the cloud which surrounds
his conduct, and give every explanation which may set it in its true
light. '67 An innocent suspect therefore demands the right to speak out,
not the right to silence. Consequently, only the guilty demand the
right to silence. 68
Bentham's objection appeared so compelling that it forced the ad-
vocates of the right to silence to abandon the consequentialist terrain.
Indeed, moralism continues to permeate present-day justifications of
the right. Such justifications allude to privacy,69 as well as to the spiri-
tual sanctity of confessions and remorse.70 Some advocates of the right
to silence emphasize the adversarial or individualistic notion of fair-
ness, allegedly embedded in our criminal justice system7" and fiercely
denounced by Bentham as the "fox-hunter's reason. '7 2 These justifica-
tions also allude to the cruelty that would arguably result if criminal
suspects and defendants were to face the "trilemma" consisting of con-
fession, contempt, and perjury73 -- a point famously criticized by Ben-
tham, with a reproachable flavor of ageism and sexism, as "[t]he old
67 BENTHAM, supra note 18, at 241.
68 See id.
69 For writings discussing the privacy rationale, see sources cited supra note I5.
70 See generally Gerstein, supra note 12 (arguing that the privilege against self-incrimination
protects individual dignity). This idea has roots in the Judeo-Christian tradition in the form of
nemo tenetur prodere seipsum (the principle understood by canonist writers to prohibit forcing a
person to accuse himself publicly), see Stefan A. Riesenfeld, Law Making and Legislative Precedent
in American Legal History, 33 MINN. L. REV. 103, 1i8 (i949), and L7'1 g? 317? Z1't 1X1 InYY
S MV17 ITTRK ("Every man is considered a kinsman unto himself.., and no one can render him-
self a [villain]."), see AARON KIRSCHENBAUM, SELF-INCRIMINATION IN JEWISH LAW 50 (1970); see
also LEVY, supra note 12, at 433-41 (explaining the Judeo-Christian origins of the privilege).
71 For discussions of the individualistic rationale, see sources cited supra note 16. For a discus-
sion of the "fairness" rationale, see Bonventre, supra note 12, at 59-63; I.H. Dennis, Reconstructing
the Law of Criminal Evidence, 42 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 2 1, 34 (1989); Kevin R. Reitz, Clients,
Lawyers and the Fifth Amendment: The Need for a Projected Privilege, 41 DUKE L.J. 572, 583
(199I); and Sherwin, supra note 12, at 779.
72 5 BENTHAM, supra note 8, at 238. In Bentham's words:
In the mouth of the lawyer, this reason, were the nature of it to be seen to be what it is,
would be consistent and in character. Every villain let loose one term, that he may bring
custom the next, is a sort of bag-fox, nursed by the common hunt at Westminster.... To
different persons, both a fox and a criminal have their use: the use of a fox is to be
hunted; the use of a criminal is to be tried.
Id. at 239.
73 See sources cited supra note 13.
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woman's reason. '7 4 Although these justifications of the right to silence
are not devoid of merit, they leave a distinctive flavor of petitio prin-
cipii by begging at least some pressing questions. As Bentham pointed
out, what his fox-hunters and old women perceive to be "hard" and
"unfair" others may view rather differently.75 Thus, unless one em-
braces the dubious claim that a choice among several harmful out-
comes is more painful than the outcomes themselves, the ultimate sub-
ject matter of the trilemma rationale is the harm associated with
criminal punishment. But if a criminal punishment is rightfully im-
posed, why is it so harmful or cruel? A punishment is "cruel and un-
usual"76 when it is cruel and unusual in and of itself, regardless of the
right to silence. Indeed, any effective punishment must surely entail
hardship, which some may describe as cruelty; and yet we can hardly
consider eliminating criminal punishment.77 Why, then, draw the line
between permissible and impermissible hardness in a way that de-
pends on the existence of the right to silence? This question may have
a number of plausible answers, but none of these answers falls within
the trilemma rationale for the right. The trilemma rationale can con-
vincingly justify silence only in the form of the contempt exemption, so
that suspects and defendants may remain silent without being pun-
ished.78 This rationale cannot justify the rule against adverse infer-
ences: excusatory grounds justifying the contempt exemption do not
explain an additional evidentiary immunity.79
74 5 BENTHAM, supra note 8, at 230; see TWINING, supra note 8, at 84.
75 See TWINING, supra note 8, at 84-85.
76 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. As the Supreme Court held in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983),
the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clause requires that a "criminal sentence
must be proportionate to the crime for which the defendant has been convicted." Id. at 29o. The
objective factors regarding proportionality include "(i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness
of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the
sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions." Id. at 292. But see
Harmelin v. Michigan, 5o1 U.S. 957, 962-65 (igi) (stating, in a part of Justice Scalia's opinion
joined only by Chief Justice Rehnquist, that the Eighth Amendment does not require proportional-
ity).
77 See TWINING, supra note 8, at 84.
78 See Stuntz, Self-Incrimination, supra note 12, at 1245-46.
79 According to Professor William Stuntz, there are good reasons for excusing a defendant or a
suspect who resorts to perjury in order to escape conviction. Such a person's private benefit from
lying is very large in comparison to the harm caused. Therefore, as a matter of concession to hu-
man frailty, the state should not punish a perjurious defendant's lies. Consequently, silent defen-
dants and suspects should not be penalized by adverse inferences from their silence because other-
wise they will be forced to lie. See id. at 1242-80.
We disagree. Unlike Professor Stuntz, we do not see a good reason for excusing suspects' and
defendants' perjury. As this Article demonstrates, such lies harm not only "the system," but also
innocent suspects. Lies told by a guilty suspect assume a very particular form: they imitate the
account of an innocent suspect in order to enable the guilty to pool with the innocent. This pooling
undercuts the credibility of the stories told by innocent suspects. Therefore, this Article focuses
primarily on this particular type of lie, a type that the existing literature seems to have overlooked.
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The same critique applies, mutatis mutandis, to all other moralistic
justifications of the right to silence, such as privacy and the adversar-
ial or individualistic notion of "fairness."80 Although these values are
We support the rule against adverse inferences from silence because of this further damage rather
than on the excusatory grounds advanced by Professor Stuntz. To coin a phrase: perjury is perni-
cious rather than just morally distasteful or moderately harmful. We therefore endorse the rule
against adverse inferences to provide guilty suspects and defendants with a viable alternative to
perjury, which we believe should continue to be punishable rather than excusable. See 18 U.S.C.
§ ioo (1994) (imposing criminal liability for making a false statement "in any matter within the
jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United
States'); Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 408 (1998) (declining to recognize an "exculpatory
no" exception to criminal liability under 18 U.S.C. § iooi).
We disagree, however, with the rationales that have traditionally supported the rule against
adverse inferences from silence. In Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 61o (1976), the Supreme Court held
that drawing adverse inferences from a defendant's silence at interrogation violates the Due Pro-
cess Clause, if that silence was preceded by a Miranda warning. Id. at 619-2o. The Court based
its holding on a reliance theory, stating that, "while it is true that the Miranda warnings contain no
express assurance that silence will carry no penalty, such assurance is implicit to any person who
receives the warnings. In such circumstances, it would be fundamentally unfair as well as a depri-
vation of due process to allow the arrested person's silence to be used to impeach an explanation
subsequently offered at trial." Id. at 618. In the normative domain, however, this reliance theory
clearly suffers from petitio principii and thus is not convincing. The reliance interest of a suspect
can always be reshaped by modifying the Miranda warning in a way that notifies the suspect
about adverse inferences. This possibility is not merely hypothetical: it is the practice in countries
such as England and Israel. See Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, 1994, c. 34 (Eng.); Crimi-
nal Procedure Law (Enforcement Powers - Arrests), 1996, § 28(a) (Isr.). In Murray v. United
Kingdom, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 29 (1996), the European Court of Human Rights held that drawing an
adverse inference from silence is not a breach of the European Convention on Human Rights. Id.
at 47. However, in Saunders v. United Kingdom, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 313 (i997), the same court
held that forcing a defendant to testify would constitute a violation. Id. at 331. For a critical
examination of the switch to adverse inferences from silence, see DENNIS, supra note 16, at 143-56.
For a concise discussion of the British warning, see JENNY MCEWAN, EVIDENCE AND THE
ADVERSARIAL PROCESS 173-74 (2d ed. 1998).
80 Several commentators have also attempted to justify the right to silence as protecting inno-
cent defendants who decline to testify out of fear of poor performance on cross-examination. Spe-
cifically, they argue that defendants fearful of impeachment by their prior convictions might decide
not to take the stand. See Craig M. Bradley, Griffin v. California: Still Viable After All These
Years, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1290, 1294 (1981) [hereinafter Bradley, Griffin] (noting that innocents may
remain silent to avoid an adverse inference from their unconvincing demeanor, confusion, faulty
memory, or prior convictions); Craig M. Bradley, Silence at Sentencing, TRIAL, Nov. 1999, at 87,
88-89 [hereinafter Bradley, Silence] (arguing that defendants primarily choose not to testify at trial
because of fear of impeachment by prior convictions and suggesting that the Griffin doctrine pro-
hibiting adverse inference helps the innocent as well as the guilty); Schulhofer, supra note 12, at
330-31 (arguing that there are many reasons for an innocent defendant not to take the stand).
This justification for the right to silence depends primarily on the prosecution's ability to
impeach the defendant with his prior convictions. There would be no room for this justification in
a system that disallowed prior-conviction impeachment of defendants and effectively instructed
jurors that poor performance on the stand is not necessarily a sign of guilt or untrustworthiness.
See Alex Stein, The Refoundation of Evidence Law, 9 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 279, 332 n.218
(1996) (arguing that abolition of Griffin could occur as part of a wholesale reform that tightened the
criminal proof requirements and excluded the possibility of impeaching a testifying defendant with
prior convictions, save for cases in which he placed his own character at issue); see also Criminal
Procedure Law (Consolidated Version), 1982, § 163, 36 L.S.I. 65, (1981-82) (Isr.) (granting testifying
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undeniably important, no one claims that they possess universal
trumping capacity. Why, then, should these values override others in
cases involving silent defendants and suspects? There may well be
good reasons for holding that they should do so, but none of those rea-
sons can be supplied from within. There is nothing intrinsic in privacy
and other individualist values that should allow them to trump such
objectives of the criminal justice system as deterrence and retribution.
For example, the police could not detain or question suspects if privacy
were the overriding objective. Courts could not hold criminal or civil
trials if some extreme version of individualism trumped the duty to
testify. Finally, the police could not elicit confessions from suspects if
only remorseful suspects could validly confess. Bentham's claim that
petitio principii weakens moralistic justifications of the right to silence
therefore seems to have retained much of its force.
Supporters of the right to silence have apparently defended it in
moralistic terms because they lacked a solid consequentialist justifica-
tion. Those who firmly believe in something but cannot justify it on
consequentialist grounds tend to proceed deontologically by claiming
that it has an intrinsic value. More often than not, the success of such
formulations is predicated on the absence of moral meta-principles,
that is, on our general inability to resolve moral conflicts objectively.
Thus, one can claim almost anything to be intrinsically valuable.
However, in a world where any value can acquire this status and
where many values are mutually inconsistent, no value can actually
enjoy such status. These shortcomings of deontological reasoning bol-
ster the advantages of consequentialism, and the discussion that fol-
lows should be judged against this backdrop. 81
This discussion must begin with an issue that the existing literature
has neglected: Bentham's argument that the right to silence helps only
the guilty is, in fact, severely flawed in both form and substance. It
contains both a logical non sequitur and an economic miscalculation
that boil down to two substantive errors. As a matter of logic, inno-
cent suspects can benefit indirectly from the right's existence, even if
they do not exercise it themselves.8 2 Nothing logically excludes this
possibility, which therefore requires consideration. In terms of sub-
stance, Bentham (together with his followers, including the present-
defendants a privilege against prior-conviction impeachment). This justification is also unconvinc-
ing on its own terms. See infra pp. 494-95.
81 For a general discussion of the consequentialist line of reasoning, see JOHN C. SMART &
BERNARD WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST 82-93 (1973).
82 We accept Bentham's claim that innocents rarely exercise the right to silence, and ignore the
exceptional cases in which an innocent exercises the right. The existence of silent innocents does
not enter into our model, in which guilty defendants separate from testifying innocents by exercis-
ing the right to silence.
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day abolitionists 83 ) overlooks a substantial economic problem. Ben-
tham and his adherents treat the right to silence as if it were a private
consumption good: that is, one that only confers benefits on the person
who consumes it.84 This treatment, however, is the offspring of postu-
lation rather than proof, and it turns out to be wrong on examination.
In addition, Bentham and his followers fail to account for the intrinsi-
cally private nature of the information concerning guilt and innocence,
respectively held by guilty and innocent suspects. This neglected in-
sight immediately points to a host of signaling problems.
Finally, Bentham's argument blurs the crucial distinction between
an ex ante and an ex post perspective. From an ex post point of view,
Bentham's claim is irrefutable. Suppose that innocent suspects are
never silent and that guilty suspects may be. If we know that a given
suspect has been silent, then logic dictates that she must be guilty.
Furthermore, given that inference, the conviction of that suspect can-
not affect any innocent suspects. The problem with this argument is
that it assumes a pattern of behavior (talkative innocents, silent crimi-
nals) as an unmodifiable given. But because suspects are not simply
automata, they may change their behavior when the right to silence is
introduced or revoked. For example, if guilty suspects alone were si-
lent when the right to silence became available, then we could assess
the right's impact only by considering whether guilty suspects would
otherwise lie or confess. In short, we need an ex ante perspective to
assess the effects of the right to silence.
The logic of Bentham's argument follows the economic principle of
"revealed preference" that controls the consumption of private goods,
in which "private" means that the consumer only cares about her own
act of consumption. Economists have long argued that we can draw
valid inferences about a consumer's welfare by observing her choices.
For example, imagine a situation in which a consumer selects one of
two bundles of private goods, A and B. If she chooses A, then the re-
vealed preference principle states that her welfare would be un-
changed if bundle B became unavailable and that her welfare would
be at best unchanged, and possibly reduced, if bundle A became un-
available. Now suppose that a consumer always chooses bundle B
over some other bundle C. Any consumer who chose A in preference
83 See, e.g., Amar & Lettow, supra note 13, at 888-98; Dolinko, supra note 12, at io65-68;
Dripps, supra note 16, at 711-18; Friendly, supra note 36, at 679-95; John T. McNaughton, The
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Its Constitutional Affectation, Raison d'Etre and Miscella-
neous Implications, 51 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 138, 142-51 (i96o); see also
Green, supra note 6, at 628-29 (attesting to a broad consensus in the academic literature that the
self-incrimination privilege lacks a coherent justification).
84 The distinction between goods that do and do not entail benefits to others is important be-
cause Bentham glosses over a similar distinction between types of evidence.
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to B could be no worse off if, instead, she had to choose between bun-
dles A and C. However, a consumer who chose B from alternatives A
and B could be worse off if forced to choose between bundles A and C.
Finally, imagine that Consumers i and 2 could choose between A and
B and between B and C. If both consumers chose B in preference to
C, then a consumer who revealed her preference for bundle A over
bundle B would be no worse off if she had to choose between A and C
rather than between A and B.
By analogy to the consumption situation, an innocent suspect
chooses between the alternatives of speaking out (A) and remaining si-
lent, based on whether silence precludes an adverse inference (B) or al-
lows it (C). Bentham implies that innocent suspects reveal their pref-
erence for speaking out (A) absent any right to silence. He therefore
infers that the removal of the right to silence (that is, replacing B with
C) for all suspects would not affect an innocent suspect's welfare.
Conversely, guilty suspects who exercise the right (choose B over A)
may be harmed by its revocation (when they must choose between A
and C). Bentham then concludes that the right is undesirable because
evidentiary rules should endeavor to reduce the welfare of criminals.
According to Bentham and his followers, thieves and burglars must
not gain admittance to a supermarket of legal rights.
The revealed preference principle, however, is inapplicable when-
ever the good in question is not private - namely, if Consumer 2's
consumption decision affects Consumer i's welfare (in economic terms,
if consumption creates an externality)."' Under these circumstances,
Consumer i might care whether bundles B or C were available to
Consumer 2, even if Consumer i chose bundle A in preference to both
B and C. Suppose, for example, that someone likes the smell of ciga-
rette smoke but intensely dislikes to smoke. This person would reject
a proffered cigarette but would not favor a general ban on smoking, as
she may spend her leisure time in bars enjoying other people's ciga-
rette smoke. For that person, other people's consumption of cigarettes
brings about a positive externality. Therefore, the revealed preference
principle is inapplicable to that person's case.
We argue that this principle likewise does not apply to the right to
silence. The suspects and defendants who exercise this right are typi-
cally guilty, but the good that they consume is not private. By exercis-
ing the right to silence, a guilty suspect abandons the lying alternative
that would have involved perjurious pooling with innocents. Any such
pooling might impair the credibility of statements given by innocent
85 For a standard discussion of these economic concepts and phenomena, see ANTHONY B.
ATKINSON & JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, LECTURES ON PUBLIC ECONOMICS 482-87 (198o). See also
RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC GOODS, AND
CLUB GOODS 29-66 (1986).
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suspects. By refraining from perjuriously pooling with innocents, a
guilty suspect minimizes the risk of wrongful conviction faced by an
innocent suspect. Bentham's argument breaks down because it ig-
nores the fact that guilty suspects' perjured statements impose nega-
tive externalities on innocent suspects. These negative externalities are
avoided when guilty suspects exercise the right to silence and thus con-
fer positive externalities on innocent suspects. Innocent suspects, like
the passive smoker in our example, would oppose the removal of the
right to silence, even though they do not choose to exercise it.
To understand the pooling problem more fully, one must examine
another problem that Bentham overlooks. The private nature of the
information sought (also labeled the asymmetric information prob-
lem)8 6 creates an opportunity for lying and cheating, which guilty sus-
pects may exploit.87 Guilty suspects generally know that they are
guilty, while innocent suspects usually know that they are innocent.
However, since this information is not generally observable, it remains
hidden or private.8 8  Bentham proceeds on the supposition that the
more information one has, the more likely one is to reach a correct de-
cision, and therefore he denounces the right to silence, along with
other evidentiary rules that keep evidence out of factfinders' sight.8 9
This natural assumption is misleading whenever private information is
involved. In any such case, the critical issue is not whether one has,
quantitatively, more or less evidence, but whether the evidence pro-
vides more or less separation between false and true signals. Hence, to
ascribe credibility to any private information, factfinders require sec-
ond-order (separating) information. This second-order information
must, of course, itself be credible. Consequently, mere augmentation
of private information - that is, of any information with uncertain
credentials - could not increase the factfinder's accuracy.90 Factfind-
ers can only rely on private information if it is credibly transmitted;
that is, it must be transmitted in a way that, at worst, minimizes false
signaling.
Sellers of used cars present one example. These sellers typically
cannot credibly inform potential buyers about the quality of their cars.
Therefore, assuming that no other information is available, consumers
cannot accurately discriminate among used cars and will pay no more
56 See supra p. 443.
87 IAN MOLHO, THE EcONOMICS OF INFORMATION: LYING AND CHEATING IN MARKETS AND
ORGANIZATIONS I-1o (1997) (noting that the opportunity to lie and cheat arises when there is
asymmetric information).
88 For a lawyer-friendly discussion of private information and the consequent signaling prob-
lem, see id. at i-i6, 63-I I.
89 5 BENTHAM, supra note 8, at 1-8, 22 1-66.
90 See Stein, supra note 8o, at 279, 287-88 (uncovering the fallacy mentioned above in Ben-
tham's theory of evidence and examining its implications for the law of evidence).
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than the average price for any car offered for sale. Owners of the best
used cars may therefore decide not to sell them, thereby reducing the
average quality and price of secondhand cars. Faced with this situa-
tion, owners of the second-best used cars may also decide not to sell
their cars, thus dragging the average car quality and price further
down. This process will repeat itself until the market turns into a
"market for lemons," offering only the poorest quality cars. 91
Sellers who know that their cars are high quality but cannot back
up the true claims about the value of their product will face skepticism
from buyers; consumers will rationally ignore unsubstantiated claims
because dishonest car dealers can replicate such claims. Conversely, a
seller able to certify the quality of her car can credibly transmit this
private information, separating herself from other dealers.
This car-seller problem is analogous to the situation faced by inno-
cent suspects, who must decide whether to talk or to keep silent. Only
an innocent suspect can provide entirely credible exculpatory evidence
(for example, an ironclad alibi) to back up a proclamation of inno-
cence. In this way, an innocent suspect who can provide such an alibi
can separate herself from guilty suspects, just as a car seller might
separate herself by certifying quality. Moreover, the abolition of the
right to silence would not affect an innocent suspect with an ironclad
alibi, for her rational decision to provide this alibi would protect her
against any negative externalities that guilty suspects would produce
by making false exculpatory statements. Yet this happy outcome de-
pends on the innocent suspect's having an ironclad alibi. Absent such
evidence, an innocent suspect's proclamation of innocence might not
ensure acquittal, as guilty suspects could make exactly the same claim.
For example, the trier of a rape case would rationally discount an un-
substantiated claim of consent because rapists as well as innocent sus-
pects would make this claim if it were credible. In such cases, inno-
cent suspects would pool with guilty suspects, just as high quality car
sellers must pool with vendors of lower quality cars if they cannot cer-
tify the quality of their cars. If innocents and criminals pool, then,
contrary to Bentham's argument, the right to silence might also benefit
innocents.
The situation in most criminal cases involves neither the ironclad
alibi, nor a total lack of evidence, but falls somewhere in between.
The right to silence may induce innocent and guilty suspects to sepa-
rate (the former talking and the latter remaining silent, as Bentham
claimed); absent the right, guilty suspects might pool with innocent
91 See MOLHO, supra note 87, at 19-31. For the classic statement of the "market for lemons"
problem, see George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970).
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suspects and thereby reduce the innocent suspects' welfare. In short,
innocent suspects may gain from the right to silence without exercising
it.
We can easily imagine a market (a court) in which a potential buyer
(the factfinder) chooses between different exonerating statements of-
fered by different suspects, some honest and some dishonest, seeking
"to buy" only those statements that are true. In that market, the fact-
finder buys the suspects' statements, paying in the form of acquittal.
Those suspects who cannot sell their statements to the factfinder are
convicted, and therefore receive no payoff. This market for statements
and the used-car market are similar in an important respect, which we
already have mentioned. In both markets, the owners of quality goods
are eager to remove their goods from the market to avoid pooling with
owners of "lemons." The two markets, however, differ crucially: car
owners can choose not to trade their vehicles, while suspects cannot
opt out of the market for statements. Innocent suspects must trade
their valid exculpatory statements along with the "lemons," with the
result that factfinders will not buy some of those statements due to the
private information problem. Thus, in this pooling environment, in-
nocent suspects can neither remove true statements from the market
nor sell them for their real value. Consequently, a rapist who falsely
alleges consent reduces the credibility of any true claim of consent, a
harm that is even more immediate in a setting involving numerous
suspects. Measures, therefore, are necessary to drive false statements
out of the market.
One possible measure is to increase the punishment for lies. How-
ever, such a measure would hardly be feasible. To deter perjury, the
punishment for lies must exceed the punishment imposed for the un-
derlying substantive crime.9 2 To the extent that people tell lies when
they are likely to go undetected, the probability of detecting and suc-
cessfully prosecuting liars is not very high. Hence, the punishment for
lies would have to be even greater to ensure deterrence. The enormous
92 The following analysis by Professor Stuntz implies this result:
First, the threat [of being convicted of and punished for self-protective perjury] is fre-
quently derivative: often the defendant will be convicted of perjury only if the govern-
ment has enough evidence to convict him of the offense he denied committing. There-
fore, the threat of punishment for perjury is primarily a threat of punishment in addition
to that imposed for the underlying crime. Such a threat must be far less powerful than a
threat of initial punishment because the marginal costs of criminal punishment to those
already being punished decline steeply. Second, even if the government does have
enough evidence to convict for perjury, the perjury conviction is not a certainty. The
prosecutor or jury may show mercy, or the defendant may be able to win an acquittal on
some now-unknown ground unrelated to his factual guilt. The defendant's choice thus
boils down to nearly certain punishment for the underlying crime now versus potential
punishment for perjury later.
Stuntz, Self-Incrimination, supra note 12, at 1253 (emphasis omitted) (footnotes omitted).
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social costs involved in detecting and prosecuting liars would further
aggravate this impractical solution.
Another possible measure is to pay the potential producers of false
self-exonerating statements for verifiably true statements. Indeed,
prosecutors routinely make such purchases through plea bargains and
state-witness agreements.9 3 Such purchases are also made by mitigat-
ing defendants' sentences when they enter guilty pleas.94 In each of
those cases, however, the price paid by the state may be quite substan-
tial, depending on the value of the purchased true statement.
A much cheaper and therefore often preferable course of action is
to purge the "lemons" without purchasing an expensive true statement.
One can accomplish this result by buying off the potential producers of
false statements - that is, by paying them an appropriate price for
their non-participation in the statement market. This price is paid by
allowing the potential producers of false statements (consisting pre-
dominantly of guilty suspects and defendants) to remain silent at their
interrogations and trials without sustaining punishment or adverse in-
ferences. Indeed, as we now make clear, one might consider this ex-
pense money well spent whenever it is incurred.
B. Formal Analysis
"And, after all, what is a lie? 'Tis but
The truth in masquerade .... 95
In this section, we describe our simplified model of interrogation
and explain why and when the right to silence benefits innocent sus-
pects. Our argument, in brief, is that the fate of innocent suspects de-
pends on the credibility of their true stories because innocents tell the
truth at equilibrium (as Bentham claimed). If the evidence pointing to
a suspect's guilt is weak, our model predicts that there will be no need
to protect innocent suspects by providing a right to silence: Bentham's
claim that the right helps only guilty suspects would then be correct.
Our model also predicts that the right will be irrelevant when the in-
criminating evidence is sufficiently strong: the guilty suspect will then
prefer to confess rather than seek refuge in silence. Most importantly,
however, our model predicts that, if the evidence pointing to a sus-
93 See Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1471,
1489-97 (i993).
94 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3Ei.i(a) (1998); see also Criminal Justice
and Public Order Act, 1994, c. 33, § 48 (Eng.) (noting that, in determining what sentence to impose
on an offender who pleads guilty, the court must take into account the stage in the proceedings at
which the offender indicated his intention to plead guilty and the circumstances in which this indi-
cation was given).
95 GEORGE GORDON LORD BYRON, DON JUAN 366 (Modern Library 1949) (i823).
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pect's guilt is of intermediate strength, then guilty suspects will sepa-
rate themselves from innocent suspects by exercising the right to si-
lence. In the absence of that right, guilty suspects would pool with in-
nocents by falsely replicating their exculpatory statements and would
thereby reduce the credibility of all suspects' statements. If disinter-
ested witnesses did not exonerate suspects, then factfinders might (ra-
tionally) convict suspects who made such discredited statements, and
innocent suspects might be wrongfully convicted. After presenting our
model, we explain the equilibrium-solution concept (namely, how we
propose to analyze the model). We then describe the strategies of an
innocent suspect and of a guilty suspect, in each case with and without
the right to silence. We conclude this section by specifying the model's
testable implications.
We now focus on the right to silence at interrogation and present
our argument with the help of a simplified, but nonetheless realistic,
interrogation scenario. A crime has been committed, and the police
detain someone (the suspect, S) on the basis of some circumstantial
evidence. The police also have an eyewitness, W, who has met S once,
and S can recall this occasion exactly. There are several possible occa-
sions for the encounter, which we list as t,, t2, . . . through to t. and
t'. 96 Each of these occasions is noncriminal, except for occasion t,. In
what follows, we assume for the sake of simplicity97 that the suspects
and the factfinder are all aware of these basic facts. We can represent
the circumstantial evidence by a list of prior probabilities, each repre-
senting the chance that S met W on a given occasion.
The police show S to W, who reports the occasions on which he
might have met S. We assume that W is potentially confused but reli-
able. W is potentially confused in that he may not be able to identify
S and because he -may not be able to identify exactly the occasion on
which he met S; however, W is reliable because he always speaks the
truth. Hence, his reports may be inconclusive, but he never falsely
identifies any suspect. We suppose that W confuses the actual perpe-
trator of the crime with an innocent suspect whom he met on occasion
t,. Thus, W would exonerate S if the two had met on any innocent oc-
casion other than t, and would report, "I met the suspect either at the
scene of the crime or on occasion t,," if W indeed had met S on one of
those two occasions.
The police (and subsequently the prosecution and the court) will
consider the account provided by W in light of the account provided
96 One could think of each "occasion" as a number of meetings, and one occasion could be "no
meeting." The crucial assumptions are that all possible meetings are included in some occasion
and that no meeting is listed in more than one occasion.
97 Otherwise, the model would unnecessarily involve complex probability measurements.
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by each suspect, and vice versa. 98 Note that W need not be a witness;
W could be any piece of circumstantial evidence that links the suspect
to the crime.
W's reliability and his sincere confusion imply that the guilty sus-
pect can only be acquitted if she claims to have met W on the occasion
that W confuses with the crime (t,). We assume, critically,99 that the
guilty suspect is uncertain of the identity of the innocent suspect with
whom W confuses her. For example, the guilty suspect may not know
whether W confuses her with the suspect he met on occasion t,, be-
cause both suspects have red hair, or with the suspect he met on occa-
sion t,, because both suspects wear glasses. 100 The police now question
98 Readers can vary the story above by imagining that the police suspect several people of the
crime and that the suspect of the story is the one they choose to interrogate. The argument that we
have made would also apply if the police interrogated some, but not all, of the suspects for a given
crime. However, the argument would not work if the prosecution could prove to the jury that the
police interrogated all of the possible suspects before charging the defendant. In that case, the
prosecution could prove the charge against a defendant who had remained silent under interroga-
tion by providing evidence that every other possible suspect had spoken to the police. Putting the
hearsay issue aside, one could argue that the Fifth Amendment protection would allow the jury to
draw an appropriate inference from the statements made by other suspects, rather than from the
defendant's silence. Under such circumstances, it would not be in the interest of a guilty suspect to
exercise her right, as this exercise would be equivalent to a confession. The right to silence would
then be irrelevant.
Our model would remain unmodified if, instead of dealing with a single investigation, it ad-
dressed a series of unrelated investigations. Take, for example, a series of violent assault investiga-
tions that involve a number of guilty and a few innocent suspects. In each case, credible evidence
(E) establishes that violence (a v-occasion) took place between each complainant and the relevant
suspect. Each complainant claims that she was assaulted by the suspect without assaulting him
first, an allegation that is true in most, but not all, cases. Each suspect considers the possibility of
claiming that he acted in self-defense. As in our model, this scenario presents us with a series of v-
occasions and with a distribution of prior probabilities that point to both the guilt and the inno-
cence of the suspects. In the absence of the right to silence, innocent suspects will naturally claim
self-defense, while guilty suspects will attempt to imitate innocent suspects by contending self-
defense, in order to be acquitted. The police, the prosecution, and the courts will act against this
backdrop. As in our model, the prior probabilities of guilt and innocence might therefore remain
unchanged, to the detriment of innocents, because the credibility of stories told by the innocent
would be diminished. This scenario admittedly involves some additional complexities, but, in the
absence of offsetting methodological benefits, discussing them would be unduly laborious.
99 This assumption is also realistic, given police interrogation practices and the virtual absence
of disclosure rights prior to indictment and related proceedings. See FED. R. CRIM. P. i6; Crump
v. Anderson, 352 F.2d 649, 654-55 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (noting that discovery rules apply only to pro-
ceedings following indictment); In re Grand Jury Proceedings Involving Berkley & Co., 466 F.
Supp. 863, 867 (D. Minn. 1979) (discussing discovery rights bestowed on defendants, which exclude
discovery prior to indictment), aff'd as modified, 629 F.2d 54 8 (8th Cir. i98o). See generally United
States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996) (defining the scope of defendants' discovery rights under
Rule 16); David Aaron, Note, Ethics, Law Enforcement, and Fair Dealing: A Prosecutor's Duty to
Disclose Nonevidentiary Information, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 3005, 3018-2I (1999) (reviewing
prosecutors' statutory and regulatory disclosure obligations).
10o Indeed, if she were certain about it, the guilty suspect would do better to lie about meeting W
on that particular occasion instead of exercising the right to silence. This contingency, however, is
largely irrelevant to the debate about the right to silence.
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the guilty suspect, whose identity is unknown to others, forcing her to
decide on her move. The guilty suspect's expectations with regard to
her future trial crucially affect this decision.
At trial, the kind of evidence presented to the factfinder (henceforth
the jury) depends on the legal regime. More specifically, it depends on
whether the right to silence (in the form of immunity against adverse
inferences, properly enforced) is available or not. If the right is avail-
able and the suspect exercises it by not replying to police questioning,
then the jury will observe the circumstantial evidence and W's report
alone. Otherwise, the jury will consider the circumstantial evidence,
the report, and the suspect's statement. The jury will use all the ad-
missible evidence to form a (posterior) probability that the suspect is
guilty. The jury will convict the suspect if this probability satisfies the
controlling standard of proof. The jury will acquit the suspect if the
probability falls below that standard. In other words, we make an-
other, normatively correct, assumption that the jury will act as a faith-
ful agent for society in accordance with the law. We also assume that
the controlling standard of proof properly balances the social costs of
the two miscarriages of justice: acquittal of the guilty and conviction
of the innocent.
We exclude from consideration a number of other potentially realis-
tic situations in which suspects are boundedly rational. As mentioned
at the outset, an innocent suspect may exercise the right to silence if
she thinks the jury will disbelieve her story because it is idiosyncratic,
uncorroborated, or otherwise incredible. An innocent suspect may also
exercise this right to protect a loved one or an accomplice who com-
mitted a more serious crime. An innocent suspect may even irration-
ally confess to a crime. Innocent suspects are not the only ones who
may make choices induced by rational fears or choices that are plainly
irrational or not strictly self-interested. As explained in Part II, a
guilty suspect is held in zugzwang because she must choose among dif-
ferent moves (silence, lies, or confession), each of which worsens her
position. Because such moves are typically made in the context of
asymmetric information and stressful interrogation, guilty suspects of-
ten choose the worst possible move, which brings about the worse pos-
sible outcome. A guilty suspect may also decide not to exercise the
right to silence on the theory that the jury would interpret her silence
as evidence of guilt, thus ignoring the prohibition against adverse in-
ferences. Finally, a guilty suspect may rationally confess to a crime in
exchange for a reduction in punishment or on finding the incriminat-
ing evidence irresistible. More often than not, a guilty suspect con-
fesses to a crime for both reasons, whether she calculates those reasons
correctly or not. Confessions can also be made on irrational grounds;
the confessor in these instances gains nothing from confessing to a
crime. Confessing without receiving any premium is obviously disad-
vantageous to a self-interested guilty suspect unless the suspect hap-
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pens to resemble Dostoevsky's Raskolnikov;' 0 if a good can be sold, it
would be plainly irrational to give it away for free.
We recognize the possibility that suspects may make irrational
choices. However, empirical evidence that points to a strong correla-
tion between exercise of the right to silence and representation by legal
counsel supports our assumption that most suspects who exercise the
right to silence do so in a rational way.102 We should add that irra-
tional possibilities are also largely irrelevant to a normative inquiry
into the virtues and vices of the right to silence.
It is arguable that a jury will always become aware of the suspect's
silence under Miranda and draw an adverse inference, contrary to the
judge's instructions. If this were true, then silence would almost never
avail a guilty suspect, who would be better off confessing (or lying, in
appropriate circumstances). This supposition implies that variations in
the legal regime, which would either allow or prohibit adverse infer-
ences from silence, have no significant effect on interrogation out-
comes. However, as demonstrated in Part V, the available empirical
data decisively reject this implication. Accordingly, we proceed on the
assumption that juries are either unaware of the suspect's silence dur-
ing interrogation or ignore its implications when reaching their ver-
dicts.
In light of the above assumptions, we can now examine the moves
made by the players in the game, both the suspects and the jury. This
examination combines the players' rationally formed expectations and
motivations: each of the suspects, whether guilty or innocent, attempts
to minimize (or totally eliminate) her sentence, while the jury tries to
convict the guilty and acquit the innocent. This framework enables us
to use the conventional game-theoretic tool known as Bayesian Nash
Equilibrium (or equilibrium, for short).'0 3 This tool identifies the
combinations of players' strategies that produce maximal payoffs for
each player in the sense that none of the players can do better with
another strategy, given her beliefs about the choices made by all the
other players. Moreover, we presume these beliefs to be correct. Spe-
cifically, each suspect holds correct beliefs about how the jury responds
to the available evidence, and the jury holds correct beliefs about the
type of suspect who would make any particular statement. In sum,
101 See FYODOR M. DOSTOEVSKY, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 536-41 (Constance Garnett trans.,
P.F. Collier& Son 1917) (1866).
102 See THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE REPORT 54 (1993); see also Leo, supra
note 6o, at 286-87 (reporting that experienced suspects are more likely to invoke the right to si-
lence).
103 See generally DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ROBERT H. GERTNER & RANDAL C. PICKER, GAME
THEORY AND THE LAW 21, 202-08 (1994); FUDENBERG & TIROLE, supra note 65, § 8.1, at 321.
For a philosophical appraisal of this approach, see Martin Hollis & Robert Sugden, Rationality in
Action, 102 MIND I (1993).
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each player's strategy is that player's best move in light of the strate-
gies actually chosen by the other players.'
0 4
i. The Innocent Suspect's Strategy. - It is in the innocent sus-
pect's interest to tell the police the truth. The suspect's private infor-
mation consists solely of her knowledge of the occasion on which she
met our witness, W; thus we can think of her interrogation as the ques-
tion "When did you meet W?" and can therefore treat her statement
simply as a claimed occasion on which she encountered W. If the in-
nocent suspect, S, met W on a noncriminal occasion, her true state-
ment will be consistent with W's report, since W is reliable. An inno-
cent suspect knows this information. She also knows that any false
exculpatory statement will be inconsistent with W's report and that
the jury will draw an adverse inference at equilibrium. Hence, an in-
nocent suspect is better off telling the truth than making a false excul-
patory statement. An innocent suspect is also at least as well off tell-
ing the truth as exercising the right to silence. Recall that the jury will
rely on W's report and the circumstantial evidence if S exercises the
right. In the jury's eyes, the report and the circumstantial evidence
imply that S is either sufficiently or insufficiently likely to have com-
mitted the crime. In the former case, the jury would convict a silent S;
however, if the jury expected a guilty suspect to be silent, the jury
would draw a favorable inference from any statement that is consistent
with W's report. In the latter case, in which W's report and the cir-
cumstantial evidence are insufficient to convict, the jury would acquit
a silent S, but the jury would also acquit her if she told the truth.
If juries could draw adverse inferences from defendants' silence,
they would convict silent suspects at equilibrium; otherwise guilty sus-
pects would choose to be silent. Hence, an innocent suspect also has
no incentive to be silent when there is no right to silence.
The last possibility is that an innocent suspect might falsely confess
to the crime. This choice would be rational if confession secured a suf-
ficiently large remission of sentence relative to conviction, if W were
sufficiently likely to confuse S with the guilty party, and if the jury
would then regard S as sufficiently likely to be guilty and convict.
However, the first of these conditions is empirically implausible: in
most criminal cases, the premium for confession is negligible. This
condition is also undesirable from a normative viewpoint; any substan-
tial increase in the sentencing premium for confessions would under-
mine deterrence, and if the premium were not substantial, then a ra-
tional self-interested suspect (guilty or otherwise) would not confess to
the crime. Therefore, under reasonable conditions on sentence remis-
104 For a formal analysis of this example, see infra the Appendix. For a formal presentation of
the entire model, see Seidmann, supra note 66.
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sion, an innocent suspect would rationally tell the truth, irrespective of
the evidentiary regime.
2. The Guilty Suspect's Strategy. - The guilty suspect's rational
response to interrogation is more intricately tied to the model's pa-
rameters. We start by explaining why it may be in a guilty suspect's
interest to seek asylum in the right to silence.
Suppose that S is, in fact, guilty. Before knowing the content of
W's report, S must choose whether to confess, be silent, or make an
exculpatory statement by falsely claiming to have met W on some
other t-occasion. If S makes a false statement, the jury will be in-
formed of the statement, in addition to hearing W's report and the cir-
cumstantial evidence. If S claims to have met W on an innocent occa-
sion, but W tells the jury that he met S on a different occasion,
perhaps even at the scene of the crime, the resulting inconsistency will
induce the jury to consider S a liar and convict her. This risk gener-
ates a possible reason for exercising the right to silence. Given S's si-
lence and W's report, however, the jury will still convict S if the cir-
cumstantial evidence against her is sufficiently strong. If this outcome
is likely enough, S may have an incentive to risk a false statement in
the hope that it will be consistent with W's report and that the jury
will draw a favorable inference from her cooperation with the police.
In sum, S's decision whether to exercise the right to silence depends on
a balance of considerations that determine her chances of acquittal.
The options open to S in each evidentiary regime can be summa-
rized by juxtaposing the circumstantial evidence with the controlling
standard of proof. There is a taxonomy of cases relevant to those op-
tions, each of which depends on the strength of the circumstantial evi-
dence and on the probability that W confuses the crime with each of
the other t-occasions. We begin with cases in which the circumstantial
evidence is relatively weak, and then we consider what happens as the
evidence becomes stronger. We assume throughout that confessions
secure a small but positive remission of sentence.
We suppose that W is more prone to confuse the crime with some
t-occasions than with others. We refer to the occasion that W is most
likely to confuse with the crime as the "suspicious" occasion, and we
refer to the innocent suspect who met W on the suspicious occasion as
the "suspicious suspect." We show that the right to silence may protect
the suspicious innocent suspect.
Imagine that the circumstantial evidence is weak enough that the
jury would not convict a suspect if the jurors knew that the suspect
was either the guilty or the suspicious suspect. Absent the right to si-
lence, the guilty suspect would claim to have met W on one of the in-
nocent occasions. The jury would acquit her if her statement was con-
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sistent with W's report, and would convict her otherwise.105 Under
these circumstances, juries always acquit innocent suspects; a jury
would draw a favorable inference from any exculpatory statement,
which the guilty suspect would not make, and hence all innocents
other than the suspicious suspect would be acquitted. Additionally, by
assumption, the circumstantial evidence is weak enough that the jury
would acquit a suspect as long as her statement did not contradict W's
report; thus the jury would also acquit the suspicious suspect.
Now suppose that the right to silence is available. If the circum-
stantial evidence is weak enough, the guilty suspect could not do better
than exercising the right to silence, thereby separating herself from in-
nocent suspects. The jury would therefore draw a favorable inference
from any exculpatory statement, knowing that a guilty suspect would
be silent; thus the jury would always acquit innocent suspects both
with and without the right. By contrast, the guilty suspect might gain
from exercising her right to silence, as she could thereby avoid the risk
that an exculpatory statement would be inconsistent with W's report:
the jury would acquit a silent suspect whenever W confuses her with
the suspicious suspect (and also when W confuses her with other inno-
cent suspects). In sum, if the circumstantial evidence is weak enough,
then the right to silence helps the guilty alone, just as Bentham
claimed.
Now suppose the circumstantial evidence is strong enough that the
jury will convict if W cannot tell whether S is the guilty or the suspi-
cious suspect. There are two cases to consider on that assumption. In
the first case, which we call "intermediate strength," the circumstantial
evidence is sufficiently weak that the jury will acquit when W confuses
the crime with some (unsuspicious) occasions. In the second case,
which we call "strong evidence," the jury will convict when it hears
that W has not exonerated S.
Consider the first case, in which the circumstantial evidence is of
intermediate strength. Absent the right to silence, it is irrational for
the guilty suspect to be silent (because the jury would draw an adverse
inference) or to confess (because of the small remission of sentence).
Therefore, the guilty suspect must always lie. The equilibrium re-
quirement that the jury's beliefs are correct implies that the guilty sus-
pect would choose randomly between exculpatory statements. In other
words, the guilty suspect will sometimes claim to be the suspicious in-
nocent suspect and will sometimes contend that she is another (non-
suspicious) innocent suspect. The jury, in turn, will sometimes convict
105 This option would be the guilty suspect's optimal choice because, by definition, any other
false statement is less likely to be consistent with W's report, because the jury would draw an ad-
verse inference from silence and because confessions secure only a small remission of sentence.
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if the statement is consistent with W's report that the suspect is either
suspicious or guilty. On the one hand, if the guilty suspect always
claims to be the suspicious suspect, then she will always be convicted,
as the circumstantial evidence is of intermediate strength, and she
would thus do better to confess. On the other hand, if the jury expects
that the perpetrator of the crime would never claim to be the suspi-
cious suspect, then the jurors will draw a favorable inference from
such a statement, and the guilty suspect would do better by claiming
to be the suspicious suspect. Finally, at equilibrium, the jury will
sometimes convict any suspect if S's statement is consistent with W's
report that the suspect is either suspicious or guilty. If the jury did not
do so, the guilty suspect would not rationally choose to mix between
exculpatory statements.
In sum, in the absence of the right to silence, the guilty suspect
would pool with the suspicious suspect, as when the circumstantial
evidence is weak. In contrast to the weak case, however, in the case in
which the prosecution's evidence is of intermediate strength, pooling
imposes a negative externality on the suspicious innocent suspect, who
would sometimes be convicted when W does not exonerate her.
If, however, the right to silence is available and the circumstantial
evidence is of intermediate strength, the guilty suspect would once
again choose silence. The guilty suspect exercises the right because the
jury will acquit her if W confuses the crime with any innocent occa-
sion, given that the joint probability of such occasions is large enough.
Thus, the guilty suspect has no incentive to lie. By remaining silent,
the guilty suspect therefore separates herself from the suspicious (and
all other) innocent suspects. As a result, the jury draws a favorable in-
ference from any exculpatory statement, and innocent suspects (who
alone make such statements) are thus acquitted, regardless whether W
exonerates them. Consequently, if the circumstantial evidence is of in-
termediate strength, the right to silence protects the suspicious inno-
cent suspect from the negative externality (possible conviction) that en-
sues when the guilty suspect pools with her by replicating her (true)
statement that she met W on the suspicious (but innocent) occasion.
Therefore, contrary to Bentham's argument, the right to silence can
protect innocent suspects who tell the truth.
Now consider the second case, in which the circumstantial evidence
is so strong that the jury will convict whenever it knows that W has
not exonerated S. The guilty suspect would never be silent, with or
without the right to silence, as the jury will assuredly convict her. She
would therefore do better to confess and enjoy the small but positive
remission of sentence. The right to silence thus becomes irrelevant to
behavior. In either evidentiary regime, the guilty suspect makes the
same statement, sometimes confessing to the crime.
In sum, Bentham's conclusion that only criminals gain from the
right to silence is correct only in cases in which the circumstantial evi-
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dence presented by the prosecution is weak. In such cases, the guilty
suspect gains by exercising the right without affecting the fate of any
innocent suspect. Bentham's conclusion is wrong when the circum-
stantial evidence is of intermediate strength. In these cases, the guilty
suspect exercises the right to silence and thereby helps the suspicious
innocent suspect to avoid wrongful conviction.
These arguments are not directly susceptible to testing without sec-
ond-guessing the judicial process by identifying miscarriages of justice.
However, these arguments have implications that we can test against
the available data. Recall that when the circumstantial evidence is not
strong, the guilty suspect would choose silence if given the right and
would make false exculpatory statements in the absence of the right.
Additionally, when the circumstantial evidence is strong, the right to
silence does not affect behavior. Thus, under the right-to-silence re-
gime, those guilty suspects who would otherwise make false statements
are induced to remain silent. Many other suspects might confess, as
cross-national empirical evidence shows, 10 6 but these suspects would
not switch to silence were the latter to become privileged.
This result depends on our assumption that confessions secure a
small remission of sentence. As already indicated, this assumption de-
rives from positive law. If, on the contrary, confessions secured a large
enough remission, then we could show that abolition of the right to si-
lence would induce some silent guilty suspects to confess. We return to
this point in Part V, in which we compare our model's testable impli-
cations with the empirical data.
C. The Role of the Criminal Proof Standard
Our analysis thus far has fixed the standard of proof and varied the
strength of the circumstantial evidence. We can also fix the strength of
the circumstantial evidence and vary the standard of proof. For ex-
ample, a stringent standard of proof will sufficiently protect innocent
suspects, obviating the need for any ancillary protection offered by the
right to silence. 07 In contrast, if there is a lax standard of proof, then
guilty suspects would not exercise the right to silence, for it would not
protect them from necessarily unfavorable witness reports. The right
106 See infra Part V.
107 Perhaps we are too charitable toward Bentham with regard to this point as well. In his time,
proof beyond all reasonable doubt was far from an entrenched requirement. See generally George
P. Fletcher, 7wo Kinds of Legal Rules: A Comparative Study of Burden-of-Persuasion Practices in
Criminal Cases, 77 YALE L.J. 880 (1968) (discussing the different criminal proof requirements at
common law together with their origins and rationales); Alex Stein, From Blackstone to Woolming-
ton: On the Development of a Legal Doctrine, 14 J. LEGAL HIST. 14 (1993) (same); Theodore
Waldman, Origins of the Legal Doctrine of Reasonable Doubt, 20 J. HIST. IDEAS 299 (I959) (same).
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to silence can therefore protect innocent suspects only when the stan-
dard of proof is set at an intermediate level.
In our model (as in any adjudicative setting), changes in the stan-
dard of proof affect the functional strength of the relevant evidence. If
the standard of proof is lowered, all incriminating evidence would be-
come functionally stronger. If the standard is raised, all incriminating
evidence would become functionally weaker. Thus, in this latter case,
evidence previously considered strong would become evidence of in-
termediate strength. In other words, we can move a case from one
category to another and thereby determine the desirability of the right
to silence.
This observation suggests a potentially damaging critique of our
defense of the right. In our analysis, the right to silence helps an inno-
cent suspect only in those cases in which the circumstantial evidence
that points to her guilt is of intermediate strength. In cases in which
such evidence is overwhelmingly strong, the right to silence becomes
irrelevant; in cases based on weak circumstantial evidence, the right to
silence can only help guilty suspects. Arguably, a case falling into the
intermediate category can be transferred into one of the other catego-
ries, in which the right does not benefit the innocent, by adjusting the
controlling standard of proof. Technically, that adjustment can be
achieved either by introducing a new standard of proof or by confer-
ring the appropriate discretion on judges and juries.
We believe, however, that this argument is mistaken. Our refuta-
tion begins with the argument's less appealing alternative, a weaker
standard of proof. One reason to reject this alternative is that its en-
dorsement would increase the rate of wrongful convictions. Another,
less obvious reason to reject this alternative focuses on other implica-
tions of turning weak evidence into functionally strong evidence. Evi-
dence does not become stronger simply because one deems it strong for
reasons that are unrelated to factfinding and that reduce the control-
ling standard of proof. Factual indeterminacy is an inherently epis-
temic factor. It does not disappear by virtue of a judgment certifying
the existence of evidentiary sufficiency on non-epistemic grounds.
Consequently, the relevant incentives of a guilty suspect in a system
that softens the standard of proof would depend not only on her in-
creased chances of conviction, but also on her prospects of being re-
placed by an innocent suspect and thus exonerated. In a system with
a lower standard of proof, the possibility that evidentiary indetermi-
nacy would lead to the conviction of an innocent suspect is far from
negligible. This possibility would add to the guilty suspect's incentive
to imitate the innocent by making a false self-exonerating statement.
In the absence of the right to silence, this pooling strategy would be-
come a guilty suspect's best alternative. Furthermore, even if the right
to silence is available, guilty suspects would prefer this strategy in a
large number of cases - for example, cases in which the suspect con-
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siders it too risky to leave the circumstantial evidence unexplained. A
guilty suspect's incentive to pool with the innocent would thus become
rational. Because any substantial relaxation of the criminal proof
standard would cause the pooling of the innocent with the guilty, it
would both help and motivate the guilty to pool with the innocent.
The benefits of such a relaxation (more convictions of the guilty) are
sometimes claimed to justify its costs (more convictions of the inno-
cent). 08 This claim, however, ignores the additional damage inflicted
by the wrongful convictions that would occur in a pooling environ-
ment. This damage and its potentially negative impact on deterrence
would further offset the benefits of relaxing the standard. 10 9
It therefore seems more appealing to raise, rather than to lower, the
criminal proof standard. This alternative might provide an argument
against the right to silence. Arguably, raising the standard would ade-
quately protect the innocent from the risk of wrongful conviction. The
cost of this benefit would be the functional weakening of incriminating
evidence and the subsequent acquittal of more guilty suspects. Abol-
ishing the right to silence, on the ground that the innocent no longer
need it, could mitigate this result. Indeed, our own model has con-
firmed the validity of Bentham's abolitionist claim when applied to
weak-evidence cases.
Our critics might argue along these lines and tell us that our model
is vulnerable to the same argument that Bentham mounted against the
theory that the right to silence protects suspects against oppressive in-
terrogation. Bentham famously noted that the medicine is wrong even
if the diagnosis is right. The correct social response to oppressive in-
terrogation, he argued, is to reform interrogation procedures - for ex-
ample, by introducing and meaningfully enforcing both disciplinary
and criminal sanctions against police officers found guilty of oppres-
sive behavior - rather than to give suspects a right that is otherwise
undesirable.1 0
108 See Alan Wertheimer, Punishing the Innocent - Unintentionally, 20 INQUIRY 45 (1977).
109 For models of civil verdicts with this property (false positives reduce deterrence), see I.P.L.
Png, Optimal Subsidies and Damages in the Presence of Judicial Error, 6 INT'L REV. L. & ECON.
10, 103 (1986); and A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Economic Theory of Public En-
forcement of Law, 38 J. ECON. LITERATURE 45, 6o-62 (2000). For models in which wrongful con-
victions do not harm deterrence, see Daniel J. Seidmann, Deterrence v. A Reasonable Level of
Doubt (Nov. 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
110 See 5 BENTHAM, supra note 8, at 240-43; see also Richard A. Posner, Excessive Sanctions for
Governmental Misconduct in Criminal Cases, 57 WASH. L. REV. 635, 639-43 (1982) (criticizing the
exclusionary rule under which evidence obtained in violation of a suspect's rights is rendered in-
admissible to deter future police misconduct); cf Posner, supra note 62, at 1533 (arguing that sub-
stitution of the exclusionary rule with nonexclusionary sanctions would not contribute to adjudica-
tive accuracy because, if the new sanctions adequately deterred the police, the police would not
obtain evidence presently subject to the exclusionary rule).
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This argument calls for a comprehensive assessment of the relevant
utilities and disutilities that determine social welfare. We have demon-
strated that the right to silence reduces convictions of both innocent
and guilty defendants. The right would therefore be desirable if the
social benefits of fewer wrongful convictions exceeded the social costs
of more erroneous acquittals. The requisite cost-benefit calculation is
beyond the scope of this Article. Nevertheless, we end this Part with
some observations about this issue.
The formulation of a plausible social welfare function that balances
the two miscarriages of justice is the principal task that an economic
analysis of this issue would discharge. We now sketch two possible
approaches to this problem.
Thus far, we have treated the standard of proof as an exogenous
variable in our analysis and have assumed that whether the admissible
evidence meets this fixed standard will determine the verdict. The
more complete model that one of the present authors uses in a separate
article can replace this approach to the criminal proof standard. This
model treats the jury as a player whose preferences reflect the social
tradeoff between wrongful convictions and wrongful acquittals.1 1' It
is therefore possible to calculate the social welfare effect of the right to
silence by comparing the jury's payoffs in two legal regimes, one with
a right to silence and the other without it. Under this model, the right
is not socially justifiable because the social costs incurred due to the
increased number of wrongful acquittals exceed the social benefits
from any reduction in wrongful convictions. Such an appraisal, how-
ever, is not robust with respect to changes in the model. This conclu-
sion is reached by analyzing a related model, in which the severity of
the relevant crimes (one a felony and the other a misdemeanor) and the
criminal's identity are both uncertain. In this model, the right to si-
lence separates misdemeanants from felons, as well as both types of
criminals from innocent suspects. Specifically, at equilibrium, felons
exercise the right to silence and misdemeanants credibly confess. Con-
sequently, the jury rationally believes innocent suspects' true state-
ments. Absent the right to silence, the jury might not believe the mis-
demeanant's confession, for if it were credible, then the felon - whose
only option is to give a statement to the police and subsequently to tes-
tify in court - would have an incentive to confess falsely to the mis-
demeanor. At equilibrium, both types of criminals would therefore
make exculpatory statements. Thus, it is possible that innocent sus-
pects would be wrongfully convicted of misdemeanors and that mis-
demeanants would be wrongfully convicted of felonies. In this model,
I I See Seidmann, supra note 66, at 9-2 I.
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the net effect of the right to silence is an increase in the jury's payoff,
that is, an augmentation of social welfare. 112
The existing law-and-economics literature offers an alternative ap-
proach to calculating the right's social benefits. Following Professor
Gary Becker,'" 3 this literature defines social welfare in terms of the
harm suffered by the victims of crime, on the one hand, and the costs
of detecting and punishing crime, on the other hand. The optimal
criminal justice system deters crime subject to these costs. 1 14  The
adoption of a similar approach could help to evaluate the effects of the
right to silence. The law-and-economics literature contains various
examples of how to assess evidentiary rules employing this ap-
proach.' 15
Finally, assuming that the right to silence can increase social wel-
fare, the right's desirability still depends on empirical questions such
as how many innocent suspects would otherwise be convicted. We
note throughout this Article that this figure is inherently unquantifi-
able.
IV. THE DOCTRINAL FIT
This part of the Article demonstrates that our rationale for the
right to silence provides the most plausible explanation for the right
and its doctrinal ramifications. Our discussion begins with the princi-
ple that confines the right to compelled testimonial activities, as op-
posed to the compelled production of physical evidence. We demon-
strate that the traditional distinction between testimonial and physical
evidence fails to account for the Supreme Court's jurisprudence and
argue that our anti-pooling rationale fully explains this jurisprudence.
We then show how our approach justifies the same-sovereign limita-
tion of the Fifth Amendment privilege. Next, we describe how our
anti-pooling rationale supports the doctrines that confine the privilege
to criminal proceedings and to custodial interrogation. Finally, we
112 Note that the abolition of the right to silence would also reduce the confession rate by under-
cutting the credibility of misdemeanants' confessions.
113 Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169
(1968).
114 For a recent survey of this literature, see Polinsky & Shavell, supra note iog.
115 See, e.g., Chris William Sanchirico, Relying on the Information of Interested - and Poten-
tially Dishonest - Parties, 3 AM. L. & ECON. REV. (forthcoming 2001) (on file with the Harvard
Law School Library) (demonstrating how optimal deterrence can be achieved by directly condi-
tioning damages on the evidence that parties choose to present); Joel Schrag & Suzanne Scotchmer,
Crime and Prejudice: The Use of Character Evidence in Criminal Trials, io J.L. ECON. & ORG.
319 (1994) (explaining how rules for restricting character evidence inform the observation that, if
the jury is prejudiced against habitual criminals, the subjective cost of wrongful convictions will
decline, and thus, the jury may impede deterrence by its punitiveness). See generally Posner, supra
note 62.
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analyze Griffin v. California,1 16 which forbids triers of fact from draw-
ing adverse inferences from the defendant's failure to testify in court,
as well as Mitchell v. United States,'17 which extended Griffin to sen-
tencing proceedings."" This analysis further exhibits the strength of
our rationale as an explanatory tool.
A. The Schmerber Doctrine: Confining the Right to Compelled
Testimonial Activities
The Fifth Amendment privilege protects suspects and defendants
only from the compelled production of testimonial evidence against
themselves; the privilege does not restrict compelled production of
physical evidence. 1 9 However, both the meaning of this limitation
and its underlying rationale are problematic. As the Supreme Court
has acknowledged, both the production and the nonproduction of
physical evidence have certain communicative aspects that are func-
tionally similar to testimony.120 In some cases, this acknowledgment
has led to an expansion of the privilege.' 2 1 In other cases, however, os-
tensibly similar expansionist attempts have failed. 122 The Court thus
has gradually eroded the distinction between testimonial and physical
evidence and replaced it with a complex doctrine. This doctrine has
lacked an organizing principle. We now demonstrate that our anti-
pooling rationale provides such a principle.
Consider a suspect whom the police ask to submit to a breathalyzer
examination for blood alcohol. Is her refusal to undergo this examina-
tion testimonial evidence? Apparently, it is: refusal to undergo the ex-
amination communicates the suspect's guilty conscience. Do the pri-
vacy, free agency, and individualism rationales for the privilege apply
to this type of evidence? Apparently, they do: because the suspect was
compelled either tacitly to acknowledge her guilt by divulging her pri-
vate thoughts or to produce self-incriminating physical evidence, there
seems to be no difference between her case and the case of ordinary
116 380 U.S. 6o9 (1965).
117 526 U.S. 314 ('999).
118 Our preceding discussion fully justifies Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 6io (1976), which forbids tri-
ers of fact from drawing adverse inferences from the defendant's silence at interrogation, id. at
617-18.
119 See Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 589 (i99o); Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 210
(r988); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966); Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252
(I910).
120 See, e.g., United States v. Hubbell, 120 S. Ct. 2037, 2043 (2000): Muniz, 496 U.S. at 594-98.
121 See, e.g., Hubbell, 120 S. Ct. at 2048 (hoiding that the act of producing documents may be
testimonial); United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 612-14 (1984) (same).
122 See, e.g., Muniz, 496 U.S. at 592 (defining "testimonial" evidence restrictively); Doe, 487 U.S.
at 2 10-i1 (same); South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 564 (1983) (same).
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testimonial compulsion.1 23 The Supreme Court, nonetheless, has re-
peatedly answered the above questions in the negative. 124 Following
Wigmore 12- and, presumably, the accepted definition of hearsay,
2 6 it
has held that conduct evidence counts as testimonial only when it is
intentionally assertive, that is, when it indicates the person's inten-
tional expression of her thoughts concerning factual matters. 2 7 But
the Court has also explicitly acknowledged that the issue is difficult
28
and that the outer boundaries of the testimonial category - as op-
posed to its core notion - are unclear.
129
Employing the anti-pooling rationale for the Fifth Amendment
privilege can resolve the problem of distinguishing between physical
evidence and testimonial evidence. According to this rationale, the
privilege would apply if the pooling-through-lying alternative is avail-
able to a guilty suspect. In other words, when a suspect is required to
provide evidence that can reduce the credibility of an innocent sus-
pect's evidence, the privilege would apply. Only such externality-laden
evidence would be testimonial for Fifth Amendment purposes. Verbal
statements and their nonverbal equivalents, such as the nodding of
one's head to communicate assent, would be testimonial. In addition,
evidence would be testimonial if the suspect who produced it could
shape its content. Thus, handwriting samples that a suspect produces
at the police station would be testimonial because a criminal might
replicate an innocent person's handwriting. Past samples of the sus-
pect's handwriting, however, would constitute physical evidence. The
present production of a handwriting sample by a suspect, unlike preex-
isting handwriting samples, is always coupled with an explicit or im-
plicit testimonial confirmation, namely, "This is my handwriting." The
probative value of preexisting handwriting samples that the suspect
allegedly wrote does not depend on the suspect's explicit or implicit
confirmation; any qualified expert witness or nonexpert witness per-
sonally familiar with the suspect's handwriting can authenticate such
123 See EASTON, supra note 60, at 207-35 (denouncing the testimonial/physical evidence distinc-
tion as a functionally unsuitable rationale for the privilege and as based on a philosophically ques-
tionable dualism between "mind" and "body'); Peter Arenella, Schmerber and the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination: A Reappraisal, 2o AM. CRIM. L. REV. 31, 36-42 (1982) (criticizing the testimo-
nial/physical evidence distinction as unsuitable for determining the limits of the privilege).
124 See Neville, 459 U.S. at 564; see also Muniz, 496 U.S. at 592; Doe, 487 U.S. at 217-19.
125 8 WIGMORE, supra note i6, § 2265, at 386.
126 See FED. R. EVID. 8oi(c). In England, the definition of hearsay covers every implied asser-
tion, both intended and unintended. See R v. Kearley, 2 All E.R. 345, 348-49 (H.L. 1992); Wright
v. Tatham, 112 Eng. Rep. 488, 500 (K.B. 1837).
127 Muniz, 496 U.S. at590-92.
128 See Doe, 487 U.S. at 214-15.
129 See Muniz, 496 U.S. at 589. For a recent discussion and critique of this approach, see Krys-
ten M. Kimmett, Fifth Amendment at Trial, 87 GEO. L.J. 1627 (1999).
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samples.1 30 A police request to provide a handwriting sample amounts
to testimonial compulsion that the Fifth Amendment privilege should
prohibit.
This distinction between handwriting samples is admittedly incon-
gruent with existing caselaw. In Gilbert v. California,13' the Supreme
Court held that compelling suspects to provide handwriting samples is
not prohibited by the privilege.132 Various federal courts of appeals
have applied Gilbert's holding,' 33 including the Third Circuit, which
effectively rejected the "tacit acknowledgment theory."' 34 The tacit
acknowledgment theory maintains that the production of handwriting
samples by a suspect entails testimonial confirmation and is thus
equivalent to stating, "This is my handwriting." We believe that those
holdings are not only unjustifiable, but are also inconsistent with the
"act-of-production" doctrine that the Supreme Court established to
cover the compelled production of documents. According to the act-
of-production doctrine, preexisting documents do not count as testimo-
nial for purposes of the privilege; yet the compelled production of
documents is testimonial when it entails the person's admission that
the records exist, that they are in his possession or control, and that
they are authentic.'13  Based on the facts of United States v. Doe,136
the Supreme Court classified the act of production as testimonial evi-
dence that required "use immunity."'' 37 The holding in Doe is mani-
festly inconsistent with Gilbert.
The Court's recent decision in United States v. Hubbell3 1 reveals
that our anti-pooling rationale for the Fifth Amendment privilege ex-
130 See FED. R. EVID. 9oi(b)(2H3).
131 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
132 Id. at 266-67.
133 See, e.g., United States v. McDougal, 137 F.3 d 547, 559 (8th Cir. i998) (holding that com-
pelled production of a handwriting sample is not a violation of the Fifth Amendment because
handwriting is physical, rather than testimonial, evidence); United States v. Tanoue, 94 Fd 1342,
1345 (9th Cir. 1996) (same); United States v. Stone, 9 F 3 d 9 3 4 , 942 (iIth Cir. 1993) (holding that the
Fifth Amendment does not prohibit adverse inferences drawn from a defendant's refusal to pro-
vide handwriting samples).
134 In re Special Fed. Grand Jury Empanelled October 31, 1985, 8o9 F.2d 1023, 1026 (3d Cir.
1987) (holding that compelling a witness to provide "normal" handwriting samples with a "back-
ward slant," when such a slant was concededly not his normal writing style, did not constitute a
testimonial admission).
135 United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 613 n.ii (1984) (citing In re Grand Jury Empanelled
March ig, r98o, 541 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D.N.J. 1981)).
136 465 U.S. 605 (1984).
137 Id. at 66. The Court also decided that this immunity can be granted only on a statutory
request and cannot be imposed judicially. Id. Under the "use immunity" provided for in 18 U.S.C.
§ 6002 (1994), although the government may use the subpoenaed documents, it may not use any
information directly or indirectly derived from the act of their production in any criminal proceed-
ing against the person (except a prosecution for perjury, for giving a false statement, or for failing
to comply with the document production order). Id.
138 120 S. Ct. 2037 (2000).
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plains the "act-of-production" doctrine. In that case, the government
subpoenaed Hubbell to produce a large number of unspecified docu-
ments relating to the "Whitewater" criminal investigation before a
grand jury.139 Hubbell invoked the privilege against self-incrimination
in response to the subpoena.' 40 The government was unable to de-
scribe the subpoenaed documents with reasonable particularity but
nevertheless obtained an order issued under i8 U.S.C. § 6003(a)14 1
forcing Hubbell to produce the documents subject to "use immu-
nity. 1 42 The government then used these documents in an investiga-
tion that led to tax and fraud charges against Hubbell. 43 Hubbell
contended that the charges should have been dismissed because their
substantiation required reliance on the immunized testimonial aspects
of his production of the documents. 144 The government agreed with
the principle behind this contention and accepted that a mandatory
dismissal of the indictment against Hubbell would result if a violation
of his privilege had indeed occurred. 45 However, the government dis-
puted the alleged violation of the privilege on the ground that Hub-
bell's act of production was insufficiently testimonial. 146 The govern-
ment cited Fisher v. United States 47 to support its proposition. The
Fisher Court had held that a taxpayer's response to a subpoena for
documents did not represent a substantial threat of self-incrimination
because the "taxpayer did not prepare the papers and could not vouch
for their accuracy. '"148
The Hubbell Court rejected the government's interpretation of
Fisher in an 8-i decision. Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens
stated:
The assembly of literally hundreds of pages of material in response to a
request for "any and all documents reflecting, referring, or relating to any
direct or indirect sources of money or other things of value received by or
provided to" an individual or members of his family during a 3-year pe-
riod . . . is the functional equivalent of the preparation of an answer to ei-
ther a detailed written interrogatory or a series of oral questions at a dis-
covery deposition.
139 Id. at 2040.
140 Id.
141 i8 U.S.C. § 6003(a) (1994).
142 Hubbell, 120 S. Ct. at 2040.
143 Id. at 2041.
144 Id.
145 Id. at 2047.
146 Id.
147 425 U.S. 39, (1976).
148 Id. at 4 3.
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... It was only through respondent's truthful reply to the subpoena
that the Government received the incriminating documents ....
•.. The assembly of those documents was like telling an inquisitor the
combination to a wall safe, not like being forced to surrender the key to a
strongbox.
... While in Fisher the Government already knew that the documents
were in the attorneys' possession and could independently confirm their
existence and authenticity through the accountants who created them, here
the Government has not shown that it had any prior knowledge of either
the existence or the whereabouts of the 13,120 pages of documents ulti-
mately produced by respondent. 149
The Court therefore ordered the dismissal of the indictment against
Hubbell.150
As the Court effectively acknowledged, the doctrinal web accom-
modating both Fisher and Hubbell cannot also accommodate the dis-
tinction between testimonial and physical evidence. "Testimony," as a
concept, does not accommodate different degrees. The question
whether a piece of evidence is testimonial must be answered "yes or
no," rather than "more or less." For this reason, the Court confirmed
that the act of production rightfully sought by the government in
Fisher was testimonial in the same way that "being forced to surrender
the key to a strongbox"'' is tantamount to being forced to say "this is
the strongbox's key." Acknowledgment of this testimonial property
does not, however, end the story. Following the logic of the Fisher and
Hubbell Courts, Fisher's act of production was only trivially testimo-
nial, and therefore unprotected by the privilege against self-
incrimination, because the subpoenaed documents were known to ex-
ist. The act of production elicited from Hubbell, however, was non-
trivially testimonial and therefore protected by privilege and "use im-
munity."
What criterion should courts use to distinguish between trivially
and nontrivially testimonial acts of document production? The Hub-
bell decision supplies the necessary criterion: in Hubbell, the govern-
ment relied on the truthtelling of the person forced to produce subpoe-
naed documents, but in Fisher, it did not.'5 2 In other words, the
person's ability to choose between truth and falsehood distinguishes
149 Hubbell, 120 S. Ct. at 2046-48 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
150 Id. at 2048.
1s1 Id. at 2047.
152 Id.
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the two cases and delineates the boundaries between the protected and
the unprotected acts of production.
The truthtelling criterion is consistent with our anti-pooling ration-
ale for the privilege. According to our rationale, a suspect's ability to
tell uncontradicted lies can impose externalities because guilty suspects
might harm innocent suspects by pooling with them through fabrica-
tions, lies, or omissions. Thus, guilty suspects in Hubbell's position
can fabricate the assembly of subpoenaed documents, which would in-
evitably reduce the credibility of document assembly conducted by
their innocent counterparts. Immunizing the act of production in
Fisher was unnecessary because the ability to tell uncontradicted lies
did not exist.15 3
Applied to the compelled production of documents and samples,
our anti-pooling rationale imposes order on self-incrimination doctrine.
Under this approach, evidence known to exist at the time of its com-
pelled production would not be testimonial. Thus, the privilege
against self-incrimination would not extend to a suspect's refusal to
provide incriminating evidence by participating in a lineup or by pro-
viding bodily samples. The privilege would also afford no protection
to a suspect required, for example, to take a breathalyzer test. If a
guilty suspect agrees to undergo a breathalyzer examination, she
would be separated from innocent suspects because the breathalyzer
cannot lie. If guilty suspects cannot fabricate evidence in a way that
harms the innocent, then they should not be exempted from potential
self-incrimination. Only the existence of a meaningful fabrication al-
ternative should therefore activate the privilege. If a person ordered to
produce an existing document, a sample, or other physical evidence
has such an alternative, then the privilege should protect her act of
production. Otherwise, the privilege should be set aside.
In some respects, this approach parallels the Supreme Court's dis-
tinction between testimonial and physical evidence. Our rationale,
however, is not merely semantic; it derives from the consequences of
the compelled act of production. These consequences, which must
have affected the Court's jurisprudence in this area, explain the ac-
knowledged breakdown of the official distinction. Our approach
therefore better accounts for this jurisprudence.15 4
153 In Fisher, the taxpayer could not have forged the subpoenaed documents prior to their pro-
duction and was not required to vouch for their authenticity. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 413. Forgery is
more easily uncovered and thus more risky than selective production of previously unknown
documents (an equivalent of perjury). In addition, forgery increases the chance that the document
will appear suspicious, differentiating it from unsuspicious-looking documents surrendered by in-
nocent suspects. Large-scale pooling of forged and authentic documents therefore seems unlikely.
154 A possible critique of our rationale for the privilege is that, even in the physical evidence con-
text, one can still imagine a situation in which, analogous to the lying-alternative settings, an evi-
dentiary ambiguity reminiscent of pooling might occur. The argument can be made as follows: if
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physical evidence sought from a suspect is ambiguous, then both innocent and guilty suspects
would prefer to provide it rather than to risk adverse inferences resulting from withholding the
evidence. As adverse inferences are plainly damaging to a guilty suspect, she might prefer to relin-
quish physical evidence when she is unaware of its contents, especially if the evidence is more
likely to be ambiguous than incriminating.
Judge Posner's recent formulation provides a helpful model: p=p,x,+(i-t)p,+tp,x. In this
formulation, p is the overall probability that the suspect will be found guilty, as determined by the
sum of the three probabilities mentioned below: p, is the probability of guilt generated by already
existing evidence x,; p, is the probability of guilt inferred from the suspect's refusal to relinquish
physical evidence x.; p. is the probability of guilt derived from that evidence (x,); and t is the sus-
pect's decision whether to relinquish the evidence (t equals o if the suspect does not relinquish the
evidence, and t equals i if he does). See Posner, supra note 62, at 1535. If the suspect relinquishes
the evidence, the probability of his conviction would equal p,x,+px,. If he refuses to relinquish it,
then the probability of his conviction would equal p,x,+p,. The suspect's decision whether to re-
linquish the evidence would therefore crucially depend on the difference between p,x, and p.: if
px.>p,, the suspect would withhold the evidence; if p,,x<p,, the suspect would relinquish it; and if
pTX=p,, the suspect would be indifferent as between withholding or relinquishing the evidence. It
would thus be rational for a guilty suspect to release physical evidence rather than retain it when-
ever he expects the evidence to be ambiguous enough to pool him with innocent persons.
Our critics might argue that, when a suspect relinquishes ambiguous physical evidence, a
jury could rationally convict the suspect on the basis of this evidence and might therefore wrongly
convict an innocent defendant. This miscarriage of justice might not occur if the privilege were
extended to physical-evidence settings. If so, this possibility would substantially reduce our ration-
ale's capacity to distinguish between types of evidence to which the privilege should apply.
This line of critique is misdirected. From the anti-pooling viewpoint, ambiguous physical
evidence differs crucially from false testimony. A guilty suspect's ability to imitate the innocent
through testimony is incomparably better than her ability to pool with innocent persons with the
help of ambiguous physical evidence. A person has no control over physical evidence, and as the
saying goes, "[clircumstances cannot lie." ALEXANDER WELSH, STRONG REPRESENTATIONS:
NARRATIVE AND CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN ENGLAND 24 (1992) (internal quotation marks
omitted). By contrast, because a person can control his words or handwriting sample, a guilty sus-
pect can pool with innocent suspects.
This analysis suggests that physical evidence sought from a suspect need not be protected by
the self-incrimination privilege even when the evidence's probative capacity is uncertain ex ante:
in other words, when it may turn out to be either probative or ambiguous. Such evidence might be
useful, and the ambiguity risk associated with its extraction and use is relatively insignificant:
when physical evidence turns out to be ambiguous and is thus incapable of distinguishing between
the guilty and the innocent, the evidence does not affect the probability of accounts given by inno-
cent suspects.
This point can be made more vividly with the help of Bayes' Rule, under which:
P(G) = the prior probability of a suspect's guilt, derived from the evidence gathered
by the police at initial investigation stages and after considering the account given by the
suspect.
P(E) = the general probability of finding physical evidence (E) similar to that ex-
tracted from the suspect; that is, the probability of finding such evidence in cases of guilt
and innocence alike. This probability equals the probability of finding evidence, given ei-
ther guilt or innocence: P(EIG)+P(Elnot G).
P(EIG) = the probability of finding such evidence when the suspect actually commit-
ted the crime (probability of evidence, given guilt).
P(GIE) = the probability that the suspect is guilty as charged, given the finding of
the above evidence.
Bayes' Rule is based on the ordinary multiplication rule for conjunctive events:
P(G&E) = P(GIE) x P(E);
P(E&G) = P(EIG) x P(G);
P(GIE) x P(E) = P(EIG) x P(G); hence, P(GIE) = P(G) x P(EIG) / P(E).
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B. The Balsys Doctrine: The Same-Sovereign Limitation of the
Privilege
In United States v. Balsys, 5 5 the Supreme Court confined the
privilege against self-incrimination to same-sovereign cases by holding
that a suspect's concerns about prosecution in a foreign country do not
activate Fifth Amendment protection.1 5 6 For obvious reasons, this
limitation is difficult to align with such traditional rationales for the
privilege as privacy, free agency, and individualism. The dissenting
opinion in Balsys, written by Justice Breyer, rightly emphasized this
point. 157  Moreover, as the dissenting opinion noted, 158 the same-
sovereign limitation seems inconsistent with the Court's holding in
Murphy v. Waterfront Commission. 59 In Murphy, the Court decided
that the privilege would apply when a witness in a state proceeding
invokes it out of concern regarding a potential federal prosecution, and
In other words, the posterior probability of an event (the suspect is guilty as charged, given the
evidence in question) equals the product of the prior probability of that event (the suspect is guilty
as charged, regardless of that evidence) and the percentage of guilt cases in which evidence similar
to the evidence in question was found in the total number of both guilt and no-guilt cases featuring
such evidence. This ratio is the "relevancy quotient" signifying the probativeness of evidence E,
that is, its capacity to change the prior probability. See, e.g., RICHARD JEFFREY, PROBABILITY
AND THE ART OF JUDGMENT 109 (1992). The assumption that E is ambiguous implies, roughly,
that the probability of finding such evidence in all types of cases equals the probability of finding it
in cases of guilt: P(EIG) = P(E). As the relevancy quotient equals i, the posterior probability
P(GIE) remains unchanged. Hence, no innocent suspect can be harmed by the admission of E.
When the evidence sought from a suspect is known to be ambiguous, however, the imposition
of a ban on drawing adverse inferences from the suspect's refusal to give that evidence away is jus-
tified. If such inferences were allowed, then both guilty and innocent suspects would provide evi-
dence known to be ambiguous. Extracting and using such evidence would waste resources, so an
evidentiary privilege akin to the right to silence should apply. In the domain of positive law, this
privilege can be anchored to Federal Rule of Evidence 403 and its cost-benefit formula. Under this
rule, evidence may be excluded when its probative value (the benefit) is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice or of confusion of the issues or considerations of undue delay or
waste of time (the costs). See FED. R. EVID. 403; Posner, supra note 62, at 1522-24. This residual
rule of exclusion would therefore supplement the self-incrimination privilege, just as it supple-
ments other admissibility rules. Note, however, that it would supplement the privilege by acting
on the general cost-benefit analysis that involves no special harm to innocent suspects. By con-
trast, the self-incrimination privilege is based on a context-specific cost-benefit analysis in which
this harm, or more precisely, its abatement, plays a central role. Under general Rule 403 analysis, a
suspect's refusal to relinquish ambiguous physical evidence should normally be held inadmissible
due to its inability to distinguish the guilty from the innocent. Adverse inferences prohibited by
the self-incrimination privilege would have a positive function: they would prevent pooling and
thus help to attain the desired separation. In the former case, adverse inferences would be banned
for being unable to tackle the ambiguity and redundancy problems and for wasting resources. In
the latter case, prohibition of adverse inferences would function as an important anti-pooling in-
centive.
155 524 U.S. 666 (1998).
156 Id. at 689-700.
157 Id. at 712-19 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
158 Id. at 702-17.
159 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
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vice versa. 160 The principle underlying Murphy also requires the
privilege to apply when claimed by a witness in a state proceeding
with regard to fear of prosecution in another state. 161 The Court's de-
cision in Murphy was grounded primarily on the traditional rationales
for the privilege. If carried to its logical conclusion, this decision
would therefore support the dissenting opinion in Balsys.162
The anti-pooling rationale for the privilege against self-
incrimination resolves these difficulties and justifies the same-
sovereign limitation. The Balsys constraint produces no pooling
within the American legal system and therefore imposes no risk of
wrongful conviction on innocent defendants who are tried domesti-
cally. Thus, if a person in Balsys's position chooses to lie, his lies
would affect the innocents tried in Lithuania (a country where Balsys
could be prosecuted) 163 but not in the United States. The same-
sovereign limitation of the privilege therefore efficiently generates pro-
bative evidence for proceedings taking place in the United States, such
as the deportation proceedings conducted against Balsys. 164 As for the
foreign innocents who might be affected by the pooling that might oc-
cur overseas, their own legal systems should take care of them.
We do not reach this conclusion for cynical or myopically national-
ist reasons. We simply believe that each legal system should use evi-
dentiary standards that accord with its own objectives and values.
Any attempt to affect those objectives and values from outside would
be both presumptuous and economically inefficient. As the Balsys
Court acknowledged, an applicable international norm that provided
for cooperative law enforcement between the United States and the
foreign country might alter this conclusion. 165 An international norm
that demanded uniform observance of the self-incrimination privilege
would, presumably, have a similar result. However, absent such spe-
cial relationships, the same-sovereign limitation to the privilege should
remain intact.' 66
160 Id. at 79-80.
161 1 MCCORMICK, supra note 12, § 123, at 447; see also Balsys, 524 U.S. at 671-72 (implying
unequivocally that Murphy applies uniformly in the United States).
162 Indeed, as Chief Justice Burger remarked almost a decade and a half ago, an eventual ex-
tension of the privilege to foreign incrimination can be fairly implied from Murphy. Araneta v.
United States, 478 U.S. 1301, 1304 (1986).
163 See Balsys, 524 U.S. at 670. Balsys, a resident alien, was subpoenaed pursuant to deporta-
tion proceedings to testify regarding his activities during World War II, prior to his immigration to
the United States. Id. Balsys claimed that his testimony could subject him to criminal prosecution
in Lithuania, Israel, or Germany. Id.
164 Note that these proceedings are not criminal. If they were criminal, the right to silence
would apply domestically with full force.
165 Balsys, 524 U.S. at698-99.
166 This point has a solid economic justification: when cooperation among countries with regard
to their self-incrimination rules would be mutually beneficial, the countries should be able to bar-
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This analysis justifies not only the confinement of the Murphy
principle to the United States, 167 but also the extension of the principle
nationwide. The need to reduce the extent of the pooling problem in
American criminal proceedings justifies the extension. This reduction
in pooling would, in turn, reduce the risk of erroneous conviction of
American defendants. Cooperation between federal and state courts in
this endeavor is not only natural, but also efficient.
168
C. The Baxter Principle: Adverse Inferences in Noncriminal
Proceedings
In a noncriminal federal proceeding, such as a civil trial or an ad-
ministrative hearing, a defendant may only invoke the self-
incrimination privilege as a contempt exemption and may not claim
the privilege against adverse inferences. In Baxter v. Palmigiano,
169
the Court held that the Fifth Amendment did not forbid "adverse in-
ferences against parties to civil actions when they refuse to testify in
response to probative evidence offered against them." 170 This constitu-
tional license, known as the Baxter principle, has been applied widely,
with the repeated blessing of the circuit courts of appeals.17 1 The Bax-
gain successfully. Bargaining in this area does not involve substantial transaction costs. Moreover,
because any country can unilaterally protect its innocents from pooling by introducing appropriate
provisions into its evidence law, no harmful externalities are involved. These translucent factors
almost eliminate countries' incentives for strategic behavior. Therefore, countries will cooperate
by agreement when it is mutually beneficial: a familiar Coasean trade will likely take place. See
generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 8-9 (5th ed. 1998) (explaining the
Coase theorem). Absent such an agreement, one can safely infer that cooperation between the
countries would be economically inefficient. Cf Eyal Benvenisti, Collective Action in the Utiliza-
tion of Shared Freshwater: The Challenges of International Water Resources Law, 9o AM. J. INT'L
L. 384 (1996) (pioneering the application of this economic methodology to public international law
problems).
167 For a recent decision based on the Bals ys principle, see In Re Impounded, 178 F.3d 15o, 155-
56 (3d Cir. 1999), which discussed what proof witnesses who assert the privilege might have to of-
fer if a cooperative law enforcement effort were found to enable a claim under the Fifth Amend-
ment.
168 There is an obvious economic difference between the interaction of sovereign states and the
relationship between state and federal courts. Sovereign relations require that each state agree to
all terms of the relationship (and the Coase theorem states that the bargained outcome is efficient,
net of transaction costs). By contrast, the Constitution gives the Supreme Court a dominant role in
defining the relations between state and federal courts. We would therefore expect the Court's de-
cisions to implement an efficient relationship between the two levels. Also, the Court is best situ-
ated for implementing nationwide criminal law policies. See POSNER, supra note I66, at 696-98.
169 425 U.S. 3o8 0976) (allowing the factfinder to draw an adverse inference against a non-
testifying inmate in a prison disciplinary proceeding).
170 Id. at318.
171 See, e.g., LiButti v. United States, 107 R 3 d o, 124 (2d Cir. 1997); FDIC v. Fid. & Deposit
Co. of Md., 45 F.3d 969, 977 (5th Cir. I995); Koester v. Am. Republic Invs., Inc., 1, F.3d 818, 823-
24 (8th Cir. 1993); Daniels v. Pipefitters' Ass'n Local Union No. 597, 983 F.2d 8oo, 802 (7th Cir.
1993); RAD Servs., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 8o8 F.2d 271, 274-75, 277 (3 d Cir. 1986); Brink's
Inc. v. City of New York, 717 F.d 700, 709 (2d Cir. 1983); Hoover v. Knight, 678 F.d 578, 581-82
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ter principle reflects the prevailing view in federal and state law, al-
though there are a few states that refuse to apply it."'
The Baxter principle is also difficult to reconcile with the tradi-
tional rationales for the privilege. For obvious reasons, the principle
appears to be at odds with the privacy and the free agency rationales.
In civil litigation - but certainly not in administrative hearings, such
as prison disciplinary proceedings - the Baxter principle's clash with
the individualism rationale is less apparent. Arguably, as long as the
individual benefits from the contempt exemption, revocation of the
privilege in a civil trial does not amount to an impermissible state-
biased transgression into the state-individual balance of power. How-
ever, the Baxter principle is only facially consistent with this rationale:
civil revocation of the evidentiary privilege in the form of a judicial (or
juridical) license to draw adverse inferences is a legal rule that comes
from the state. The resulting compulsion of the Fifth Amendment
privilege-holder is, therefore, attributable to the state.
The anti-pooling rationale, which justifies the privilege as a
mechanism for preventing wrongful convictions, provides a more
straightforward explanation for Baxter: the self-incrimination privilege
is irrelevant in civil proceedings; civil proceedings do not involve inno-
cents who face possible wrongful conviction as a result of pooling.
Consequently, the harm that the privilege seeks to prevent does not ex-
ist in civil and other noncriminal proceedings. To be sure, revocation
(5th Cir. I982); United States v. White, 589 F.2d 1283, 1286-87 (5th Cir. 1979); see also Nat'l Accep-
tance Co. of Am. v. Bathalter, 705 F.2d 924, 929-32 (7th Cir. 198 3 )("After Baxter there is no longer
any doubt that at trial a civil defendant's silence may be used against him, even if that silence is an
exercise of his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination."). For a summary of the control-
ling principle, see Lasalle Bank Lake View v. Seguban, 54 F 3d 387, 389-92 (7th Cir. 1995), which
held that, although the circuit courts of appeals have widely recognized the rule allowing the fact-
finder to draw adverse inferences from Fifth Amendment silence in civil proceedings, even in a
civil case a summary judgment imposing liability cannot rest solely on an assertion of the privilege,
id. at 394. See also SEC v. Colello, 139 F 3 d 674, 677-78 (9 th Cir. 1998) (affirming summary judg-
ment against a defendant when there was some evidence in addition to an adverse inference from
silence); U.S. Election Corp. v. Microvote Corp., No. 94-2532, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 7918, at *13-
*14 (7th Cir. Apr. 7, 1995) (stating that an adverse inference may be drawn from a civil defendant's
silence at trial), reh'g denied, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 21687 (7th Cir. Aug. i1, 1995). The Baxter
principle also applies in clemency proceedings. See, e.g., Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523
U.S. 272, 285-88 (1998).
172 The Baxter principle does not apply in states that have adopted Uniform Rule of Evidence
512 (an equivalent of the proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 513, so far rejected by Congress).
Uniform Rule 512 provides that no adverse inferences may be drawn from an invocation of a le-
gally recognized privilege. Some states, such as Alaska, Texas, Wisconsin, and (seemingly) Maine,
have adopted provisions that allow a civil defendant's Fifth Amendment silence to be used as evi-
dence against him. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 54, at 356-5 7 & nn.7 & io. For dis-
cussions of these issues, see Deborah Stavile Bartel, Drawing Negative Inferences upon a Claim of
the Attorney-Client Privilege, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 1355 (i995); Robert Heidt, The Conjurer's Circle
- The Fifth Amendment Privilege in Civil Cases, 91 YALE L.J. io62 (1982); and John H. Mans-
field, Evidential Use of Litigation Activity of the Parties, 43 SYRACUSE L. REv. 695, 740-45 (1992).
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of the privilege in noncriminal settings may generate a noncriminal
type of pooling. In devising a rule that either removes or retains the
privilege against adverse inferences, this factor should count as harm.
But this type of pooling and the corresponding increase in the inci-
dence of error are less harmful than the conviction of an innocent per-
son.
Civil and criminal cases should, and indeed do, treat the risk of er-
ror differently. Evidentiary policies for civil litigation are commonly
grounded on the equality-of-error principle, which deems "false posi-
tives" and "false negatives" to be equal: wrongful loss of the defen-
dant's dollar is as regrettable as wrongful loss of the plaintiff's dol-
lar.173  The preponderance-of-the-evidence requirement, which is
generally endorsed as the controlling standard of proof in civil litiga-
tion, reflects the equality-of-error principle. Standing alone, however,
that requirement would fail to maintain the principle, were it not ac-
companied by the relatively evenhanded system of rules that governs
the admission and exclusion of evidence. Under this system of rules,
the exclusion of evidence cannot be biased in favor of one party at the
expense of her opponent. "Evidence," said Bentham, "is the basis of
justice: exclude evidence, you exclude justice. ' 174  As a purportedly
universal proposition, this statement is, of course, remarkably over-
stated. 175 However, its core wisdom is true: if you exclude probative
evidence tendered against one party, you necessarily impose the risk of
error on the other party, and if you have no justification for that impo-
sition of risk, you' must admit the evidence rather than exclude it.176
Avoiding the risk of error might justify the exclusion of evidence, but
the avoided risk must be demonstrably greater than the risk imposed.
In a system of civil litigation governed by the equality-of-error
principle, this situation would rarely occur.177 The assumption that
the two potential errors are equally harmful must shift the focus of the
admissibility analysis to the errors' respective probabilities: the error
more likely to spoil the verdict is the one that must be avoided at the
price of exposure to the other possible error. Hence, if an error is more
likely to occur when an item of evidence is admitted than when it is
excluded, that item should be excluded; if the opposite is the case, it
should be admitted; and if the probabilities of the two types of error
are equal, exclusion of the item would seem to be the best policy in
view of the costs incurred to process the item through litigation.
173 See Stein, supra note 8o, at 333-42. For a recent economic analysis, see Posner, supra note
62, at 1504-07.
174 5 BENTHAM, supra note 8, at .
175 See TWINING, supra note 8, at 69-75; Stein, supra note 80, at 296-322.
176 See Stein, supra note 8o, at 338.
177 See id.
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This admissibility analysis, like the cost-benefit analysis implied by
Federal Rule of Evidence 403, can only be conducted on a case-by-
case basis.17 8 Adverse inferences from silence cannot therefore be
banned in advance. Even the most ardent opponent of such inferences
would not argue that their admission and use as evidence necessarily
entail a greater probability of error than their exclusion. In fact, quite
the opposite is the case: silence in the face of accusations is largely a
reliable signal of guilt. Therefore, by consistently drawing adverse in-
ferences from silence, triers of fact would reach more correct decisions
than incorrect ones. The benefits to deserving parties would conse-
quently offset the harms to litigants whose factual accounts appear less
credible because of pooling. Thus, adverse inferences from silence
should generally be permissible in civil trials, at least from an eco-
nomic point of view.
Matters are markedly different in criminal adjudication, in which
the difference between the two types of error is a constant value-based
determinant, rather than a probability-dependent, case-specific factor.
The wrongful conviction of an innocent defendant (a "false positive") is
much costlier than the wrongful acquittal of a criminal (a "false nega-
tive").17 9 Therefore, in contrast to civil case errors, a reduction in
criminal false negatives cannot offset false positives. 180
Our justification of the Baxter principle faces a seemingly powerful
objection. Fearful of adverse inferences, a defendant in a civil case
might decide to testify. If the defendant were actually guilty, she
would testify untruthfully. The higher the stakes, the more she would
prefer false testimony over silence. Fearing impeachment at her sub-
sequent criminal interrogation and trial, the defendant might then re-
peat her false testimony. Consequently, the Baxter principle might in-
tensify the pooling problem in a criminal proceeding when the
defendant decides to repeat her false civil testimony. Arguably, this
possibility runs against our rationalization of the Baxter principle.
This objection has an undeniable superficial appeal but ultimately
fails. Under the Baxter principle, as developed by federal courts, civil
liability cannot rest solely on adverse inferences drawn from the de-
fendant's Fifth Amendment silence. Adverse inferences do not consti-
178 See, e.g., United States v. Layton, 767 F.2d 549, 554 (9th Cir. 1985) (noting that considera-
tions that arise under Rule 403 are susceptible only to case-by-case determinations).
179 SeePosner, supra note 62, at 1504-07; see also Stein, supra note 8o, at 322-42.
180 Ultimately, of course, any such tradeoff depends on one's values, and one might imagine a
criminal justice system in which the two types of errors are treated as equally harmful. In states of
emergency, when the rate of criminality is unbearably high, this scenario may not be a mere theo-
retical possibility. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 96-ioi (1974) (examin-
ing the issue from a perspective that rejects thoroughgoing utilitarianism and thus leads to a con-
clusion favorable to defendants); Wertheimer, supra note io8, at 59-64 (criticizing the assumption
that it is never justified to permit the innocent to be punished).
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tute independent evidence; they can merely corroborate other evidence
that already implicates the defendant. 18 1 Under the rules of civil dis-
covery, this other evidence must be known to a guilty defendant when
she decides whether to testify at her civil trial. When the stakes are
high, the defendant exercises her discovery rights to their fullest extent.
If she found the plaintiff's evidence weak, she would remain silent. If
she found this evidence overwhelmingly strong, she would also remain
silent to avoid undermining her chances of acquittal in the subsequent
criminal proceeding. If she found that the plaintiff's evidence is of in-
termediate strength, her decision would fluctuate between silence and
perjury. Furthermore, the criminal pooling problem would intensify
only in cases in which the defendant opted for perjury and subse-
quently repeated her perjurious testimony at her criminal proceeding.
This circumstance would arise only in the fraction of cases in which
the defendant's civil perjury both was promising ex ante and proved
successful ex post. One must subtract those cases in which the defen-
dant had good reasons to believe that her self-exonerating lies would
go unimpeached in both civil and criminal proceedings from the cate-
gory of cases in which the defendant lied in both civil and criminal
proceedings. In cases in which lies were thought to be unimpeachable,
the criminal pooling problem would already be present, and thus the
attendant miscarriages of justice would not be attributable to the Bax-
ter principle. Therefore, this principle's effect on pooling in criminal
proceedings is insignificant. 182
D. The Jenkins-Fletcher Doctrine: Permitting Adverse Inferences from
Pre-Arrest Silence
In two landmark decisions, Jenkins v. Anderson 83 and Fletcher v.
Weir,184 the Supreme Court held that there are circumstances in which
adverse inferences may be drawn from a defendant's silence prior to
her arrest and Miranda warnings. Such inferences are appropriate
when a defendant had an adequate opportunity to report her exonerat-
ing story to the police but did not do so. These inferences are permis-
sible for impeachment purposes in a criminal trial if a defendant takes
the stand and testifies to her innocence. 8 5
181 SEC v. Colello, 139 F.3d 674, 678 (gth Cir. 1998); Lasalle Bank Lake View v. Seguban, 54
F.3d 387, 390 (7th Cir. i995).
182 This effect would be further offset by the civil cases that guilty defendants would lose after
resorting to perjurious testimony. At least some of those defendants would then conclude, contrary
to their previous expectations, that their lies do not work and can even backfire.
183 447 U.S. 231 (r98o).
184 455 U.S. 603 (1982).
18s Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 6o6-o7;Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 238.
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The Jenkins-Fletcher doctrine aligns with the free agency rationale
for the self-incrimination privilege; the defendant experienced no com-
pulsion on the part of the government when she decided to remain si-
lent. The other traditional rationales for the privilege, individualism
and privacy, are too vague either to justify or to critique the doctrine.
The Jenkins-Fletcher doctrine is markedly easier to explain using the
anti-pooling rationale. First, the Jenkins-Fletcher doctrine allows ad-
verse inferences from silence to impeach a testifying defendant. This
purpose is anti-pooling in nature; a defendant who decides to withhold
her exonerating story prior to trial but testifies to her innocence in
court rightfully appears suspicious. If such a defendant is innocent,
then she must come forward at her trial with a convincing explanation
of her prior withholding of the story. If she offers such an explanation,
then she can protect herself from adverse inferences. However, if the
defendant is guilty and has no satisfactory explanation, she risks im-
peachment. Thus, the Jenkins-Fletcher doctrine motivates guilty de-
fendants not to testify falsely in their defense, thus preserving the in-
tegrity of the pool of innocent defendants.
More importantly, the doctrine only allows silence to impeach a tes-
tifying defendant under conditions similar to res gestae. Under Jen-
kins-Fletcher circumstances, the defendant's silence is typically a
product of a spontaneous decision made in the absence of a viable ly-
ing alternative. In non-spontaneous situations, the self-incrimination
privilege is necessary as an incentive for guilty suspects to separate
themselves from innocent ones through silence. In spontaneous cir-
cumstances, by contrast, in which a shortage of time and other pres-
sures curtail the suspect's ability to fabricate a self-exonerating ac-
count, the right to silence serves no useful purpose. In other words,
the abolition of the Jenkins-Fletcher doctrine would not affect a crimi-
nal's behavior in spontaneous circumstances, and the doctrine does not
therefore intensify the pooling problem. In cases in which Jenkins-
Fletcher applies, loss of evidence attendant on full recognition of the
right to silence would be unacceptable.
E. The Griffin Doctrine: Prohibiting Adverse Inferences from a
Defendant's Refusal to Testify in Court
Under Griffin v. California,s 6 adverse inferences may not be drawn
from a defendant's choice not to testify in her defense.', 7 A defen-
dant's failure to testify in her defense can be valuable evidence of
guilt; therefore, loss of that evidence must be justifiable. Recently, the
186 380 U.S. 609 (i965).
187 Id. at 614-15.
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four dissenting Justices in Mitchell v. United States1 88 questioned Grif-
fin's holding, contending that nothing justifies this loss of potentially
valuable evidence.'8 9 In such countries as England and Israel, an ac-
cused may refuse to testify in her defense, but the prosecution may
comment on her failure to testify, and courts are generally allowed to
draw adverse inferences from that silence. 190  Adverse inferences
against a nontestifying defendant have also received some support in
the academic literature. 9 1 As noted, the traditional rationales for the
self-incrimination privilege do not adequately explain the Griffin doc-
trine (as opposed to the contempt exemption). This problem casts
doubt on the doctrine's desirability.
However, the anti-pooling rationale demonstrates that the Griffin
doctrine is in fact justified. Our main justification of Griffin rests on
arguments similar to the ones we set forth in Part Ill in support of
Doyle. The revocation of the privilege against adverse inferences
would force more defendants to lie, and pooling would occur because
both guilty and innocent defendants alike would prefer to take the
stand (with a few exceptions). As a result, the plausibility of accounts
given by innocent defendants would be reduced, and innocents would
face an increased risk of conviction. 192
188 526 U.S. 314 (i999).
189 See id. at 331-41 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 341-43 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
190 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, 1994, c. 33, § 37 (Eng.); Criminal Procedure Law
(Consolidated Version), 1982, § 62, 36 L.S.I. 65, (198i-82) (Isr.). For a discussion of the English
law, see McEWAN, supra note 79, at 179-82. For a broader comparative study, see Gordon Van
Kessel, European Perspectives on the Accused as a Source of Testimonial Evidence, roo W. VA. L.
REV. 799 (1998). One might argue that American jurors draw adverse inferences regardless of
Griffin and of any instruction given on its basis. According to the Supreme Court, however, "[i]t is
reasonable enough to expect a jury to comply with that instruction since, as we observed in Griffin,
the inference of guilt from silence is not always 'natural or irresistible."' Portuondo v. Agard, 120
S. Ct. II19, 1124 (2000) (quoting Griffin, 380 U.S. at 615). Our Article proceeds on this doctrinal
assumption, which we believe to be correct. Indeed, if jurors habitually disregarded Griffin, we
would then witness virtually no defendants who decide not to testify in their defense.
19t See Posner, supra note 62, at 1533-35; see also Stein, supra note 8o, at 323-32 (supporting the
introduction of similar inferences, provided that the whole body of the criminal evidence law is
reformed in tune with the principle of "Maximal Inferential Individualization").
192 This argument is related to Professor William Stuntz's claim that, absent the privilege, the
law would have to recognize an excusatory defense, akin to either duress or necessity, that would
be available to a guilty defendant compelled to testify and perjure herself. See Stuntz, Self-
Incrimination, supra note 12, at 1252-56. The resulting "privilege to lie" would make innocent
defendants worse off; if the jury knew that perjury would not be punished, then it would place less
faith in any defendant's testimony, including the testimony of innocent defendants. In our view,
the abolition of the right to silence would result in the pooling of innocent and guilty defendants
either with or without a "privilege to lie." If all defendants took the stand, then guilty defendants
would attempt to pool with innocent defendants by imitating the latter group's testimonial ac-
counts. In contrast to Professor Stuntz, we therefore argue that pooling would result not from the
jury's treatment of the "privilege to lie" as a credibility-reducing factor (as this problem is rectifi-
able); rather, it would result from the successful imitation of innocents by criminals.
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Arguably, our justification of Griffin is weaker than our parallel
justification of Doyle: an indicted defendant is generally aware of the
evidence that she will face at trial and decides whether to testify when
the prosecution has already presented its case-in-chief. Therefore, a
guilty defendant would seek refuge in lies, rather than in silence,
whenever the prosecution could not refute her lies easily. An interro-
gated suspect has no such option because she is largely unaware of the
evidence thus far gathered by the police, and she does not know what
evidence against her the police might obtain in the future. Hence, the
right to silence, in the form of an evidentiary privilege against adverse
inferences, would be considerably more successful in diverting suspects
from lying during custodial interrogation than in diverting defendants
from perjuriously testifying at trial.
There are two lines of defense against this critique. First, a suspect
who confesses and subsequently pleads guilty is likely to receive a
lesser sentence than a defendant who switches to a guilty plea during
trial. 193 Consequently, there is less of an incentive for a defendant to
change her plea after hearing the prosecution's evidence; under Griffin,
she would prefer either silence or lies. By removing the option to re-
main silent, the legal system would therefore encourage defendants to
lie. Admittedly, this line of defense would not hold if the premium for
true confessions were at a level high enough to induce criminals to
confess and plead guilty. Under these conditions, guilty defendants
would then voluntarily separate themselves from innocents by confess-
ing to the crimes they committed. These confessions, however, would
come at a high cost; therefore, the right to silence could still serve as a
socially cheaper device for attaining the desired separation.
Second, the prosecution's rebuttal opportunity offsets the difference
between a suspect's and an indicted defendant's incentives to lie. As
rebuttal evidence is not subject to pretrial disclosure, 194 a guilty defen-
In our view, the law would properly achieve the required separation by allowing criminals to
opt for silence costlessly or cheaply instead of testifying. Unlike Professor Stuntz, we find it hard
to believe in the deterrent capacity of perjury penalties; even if the latter could be effectively im-
plemented, such penalties would still be less severe than the punishment for the underlying sub-
stantive crime. Furthermore, we disagree with Professor Stuntz's contention that defendants who
commit perjury should be exempted from those penalties. See supra note 79; see also Schulhofer,
supra note 12, at 322-23 (arguing that penalties for perjury would not deter guilty defendants from
perjuriously testifying in their defense). Additionally, we reject Professor Stuntz's assertion that
perjury per se is economically detrimental to the legal system. If guilty defendants' false testimo-
nial accounts did not affect innocent defendants, then we would say that perjury is socially worse
than confession. Perjury, however, could be better than silence because its proof establishes guilt
more easily than does silence.
193 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3 EI.I (1998).
194 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(a) (limiting disclosure of prosecution materials, except certain records of
the defendant's own statements, to evidence to be presented during its case-in-chief and to infor-
mation material to defense preparation); United States v. Delia, 944 F.2d lOlO, ioi8 (2d Cir. 1991)
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dant contemplating perjury will be uncertain of the nature of such
evidence. Therefore, she may decide not to risk rebuttal and instead to
opt for silence. Her decision will depend on the ex ante probability of
rebuttal. This decision parallels a guilty suspect's choice between si-
lence and lies during interrogation. Hence, our model applies to this
decision as well, though not always with the same force.
Another offsetting factor is the rational conjecture that a jury will
take more notice of a defendant's poor performance on the stand than
at the police station. A jury directly observes the defendant's de-
meanor during cross-examination, whereas her demeanor at interroga-
tion is largely inadmissible as evidence in court' 95 and is easily attrib-
utable to factors such as fear and anxiety. Poor trial performance is
therefore much riskier for defendants than poor performance during
interrogation. 196 Because a guilty defendant runs the risk of perform-
ing poorly at trial, she would often be better off sheltering herself with
silence. In the absence of the right to silence, a guilty defendant would
have no choice but to imitate an innocent defendant by lying.
Griffin also affects a guilty suspect's choice between silence and lies
at interrogation. To understand this point, suppose that the Griffin
privilege did not exist, so that the Doyle privilege and the contempt
exemption exhausted the right to silence. Knowing that she would
have to testify at trial, a guilty suspect would find it hard to remain si-
lent at interrogation. Her silence would immediately mark her as a
likely offender, which would impel the police to focus their investiga-
tion on her. A suspect would instead elect to develop perjurious testi-
mony for her subsequent trial. In anticipation of a false defense, the
police and the prosecution would invest effort to secure rebuttal evi-
dence. The suspect would therefore also consider making a false self-
(holding that rebuttal evidence is a recognized exception to pretrial disclosure requirements);
United States v. DiCarlantonio, 870 F.2d io58, io63 (6th Cir. 1989) (same); United States v. Wind-
ham, 489 F.2d 1389, 1392 (5th Cir. 1974) (same).
195 See, e.g., State v. Welch, 490 N.W.2d 216, 220 (Neb. 1992) (holding inadmissible opinion tes-
timony about a defendant's demeanor at interrogation, which included "lack of eye contact," "lint
picking, crossed-arm posture, evasion, and jumping to a different topic."). But see State v. Lam-
bert, 46o S.E.2d 123, 131-32 (N.C. 1995) (upholding the admissibility of opinion evidence about a
defendant's demeanor at the scene of the crime). See generally Olin Guy Wellborn III, Demeanor,
76 CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 1078-91 (1991) (arguing that defendants' demeanors often mislead ju-
ries rather than enlighten them).
196 Even innocent defendants may face this risk, a fact that some commentators use to justify
the right to silence. See Schulhofer, supra note 12, at 330-33; see also Susan Easton, Legal Advice,
Common Sense and the Right to Silence, 2 INT'L J. EVIDENCE & PROOF io9, 114 (1998) (arguing
that silence may be motivated by "fear, anxiety, confusion, the desire to protect someone else, em-
barrassment, outrage and anger" and that therefore juries cannot easily distinguish between silent
innocents and silent criminals). In our view, the revocation of the right to silence can only
strengthen the desire to testify for those few innocents who would prefer exercising this right to
testifying under the present regime. We therefore find Professor Schulhofer's and Professor
Easton's justifications of the right unconvincing.
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exonerating statement to the police. However, because the police
might discover her lies as the investigation proceeded, her choice
would be difficult.
In the absence of Griffin, a guilty suspect's ultimate choice between
lies and silence at interrogation would depend on two probabilities: the
probability that her lies will be refuted at interrogation (RI) and the
probability that they will be rebutted at trial (RT). If RT>RI, then the
interrogated suspect would opt for lies. Alternatively, if RI>RT, the
suspect would remain silent. Finally, if RI=RT, she would be indiffer-
ent between lies and silence.
The suspect's choice in the first situation, in which RT>RI, is most
important for the present discussion. If RT and RI are both non-
negligible probabilities and both trial and interrogation lies are peril-
ous to the suspect, why should the suspect lie during her interrogation
when she can still remain silent? The answer to this question relates
to the overlap between the suspect's interrogation and trial lies and the
consequent overlap between her interrogation and trial risks. Bound
to testify at trial, the suspect would not risk impeachment by her pre-
trial statement. Therefore, she would either use her Fifth Amendment
privilege at her interrogation or stick to a single perjurious story that
she thinks would exonerate her. If, on the one hand, she decides to
remain silent, she would almost certainly be tried and thus face a seri-
ous risk. If, on the other hand, she opts for lies at her interrogation,
she may divert suspicion to another suspect and thus avoid the trial
altogether. At this stage, the worst that can happen to the suspect is
that the police discover her lies. In this case, it would mean that those
lies would not have withstood their more probable rebuttal at trial;
hence there is no substantial worsening of the suspect's position.
This scenario might even give the suspect an opportunity to seek
shelter in a different trial tactic. At trial, the suspect might produce
better exonerating testimony and try to explain away her lies at the po-
lice station by claiming confusion, intimidation, and the like. This op-
portunity would not be available to the suspect if her lies are discov-
ered during her trial testimony. Alternatively, if the police fail to
refute the suspect's exonerating statement and her case goes to trial,
then, in appropriate circumstances, the suspect would be able to use
the statement to bolster the credibility of her trial testimony.197
With Griffin, a suspect in the first situation, in which RT>RI and
both RT and RI are relatively substantial probabilities, would often
197 See FED. R. EVID. 8oi(d)(x)(B); Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. i5o, 156-67 (i995) (inter-
preting the hearsay exception of Federal Rule of Evidence Soi(d)(i)(B) to apply only to out-of-court
statements made before the alleged fabrication, motive, or influence); see also RONALD J. ALLEN,
RICHARD B. KUHNS & ELEANOR SWIFT, EVIDENCE: TEXT, CASES, AND PROBLEMS 460-62 (2d
ed. 1997) (discussing interpretations and illustrations of Rule 8oi(d)(i)(B)).
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choose silence over lies. As the suspect has no obligation to testify at
trial, there is no risk that she necessarily must assume. When RT and
RI are insignificant, the suspect's best option would be to lie, but a
suspect would resort to this option with or without Griffin. The sec-
ond situation (RI>RT) is irrelevant to our present comparison because
a suspect would opt for silence at interrogation with or without Grif-
fin. In the third situation (RI=RT), the suspect's choice would be simi-
lar to that in the first and would thus depend on the absolute strengths
of RT and RI. Hence, the abolition of Griffin would force a fraction of
previously silent guilty suspects to lie. These lies would result in a
dangerous pooling of the guilty and the innocent.
The desirability of abolishing Griffin thus depends on the same
cost-benefit calculus that applies to Doyle. The abolition of Griffin
would produce obvious benefits in all three situations; it would force
guilty suspects to plead guilty, to lie and to face rebuttal, or to risk ad-
verse inferences from silence, thereby increasing the rate of correct
convictions. The costs of eliminating Griffin, however, would under-
mine these benefits. The abolition of Griffin would intensify the pool-
ing problem, increasing the rate of wrongful convictions. If the pre-
vention of wrongful convictions is of immensely greater value to
society than the prevention of wrongful acquittals, then the retention
of the Griffin doctrine together with the Doyle doctrine would be the
socially optimal choice.
An alternative justification of Griffin links the doctrine to the prior-
conviction impeachment risk. 198 Facing that risk, innocent defendants
with prior criminal records may decide not to testify in their own de-
fense. Arguably, Griffin should protect such defendants. 199 This justi-
fication is premised on two highly questionable assumptions: that the
jury will underestimate the proportion of nontestifying innocents or
that the jury will underestimate the cost of wrongful convictions and
misapply the reasonable doubt standard. There is, however, no reason
to believe that either of those assumptions is correct. In a rational
world, in which jurors properly determine the reasonable level of
doubt,20 0 innocents with prior criminal records do not require Griffin
protection. Imagine that a significant proportion of innocents do not
testify because they fear impeachment by prior convictions. If the jury
is aware of their motives for not testifying, then it would also not draw
198 See FED. R. EVID. 609 (broadly allowing impeachment of testifying defendants with their
prior convictions).
199 See Bradley, Griffin, supra note 8o, at 1294. This justification of Griffin has no impact on
our model. Our model explains how the right to silence helps testifying innocents by inducing
criminals to elect silence. Inducing more innocents to testify is beyond its ambition.
200 For a sustained argument that we do indeed live in such a world, see L. Jonathan Cohen,
Freedom of Proof, in FACTS IN LAW i (William Twining ed., 1983).
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adverse inferences in the absence of Griffin. Moreover, even if the
above assumptions held true, the appropriate remedy would not be the
establishment of the Griffin right. Modification of the judge's instruc-
tions to the jury and of the criminal proof standard would do a far
better job.
F The Mitchell Doctrine: The Function of the Privilege in Sentencing
Proceedings
In Mitchell v. United States,201 Amanda Mitchell pleaded guilty to
drug charges but contested the quantity of the drug (cocaine) involved
in her offenses. 20 2  This quantity was crucial to her sentencing:
Mitchell faced a mandatory minimum of one year in prison for dis-
tributing cocaine near a playground and a range of punishments for
conspiring to distribute the drug. But if the prosecution could prove
that the amount of cocaine was at least five kilograms, then the man-
datory minimum would be ten years in prison.20 3 The trial judge ad-
vised Mitchell that the quantity of the drug would be determined at
her sentencing hearing. At this hearing, three of Mitchell's co-
defendants, who previously pleaded guilty and agreed to cooperate
with the prosecution, testified against her.2 0 4 One of them told the
court that Mitchell had sold different quantities of cocaine over a pe-
riod of almost two years, placing her over the five-kilogram threshold;
however, on cross-examination, he conceded that he had not seen
Mitchell on a regular basis during this period.20 5  Mitchell, for her
part, invoked the privilege against self-incrimination.20 6 The trial
judge ruled that Mitchell did not retain this privilege after pleading
guilty.20 7 Nevertheless, Mitchell decided to remain silent.208 In accord
with his ruling, the trial judge held it against Mitchell that she "didn't
come forward today and tell [the judge] that [she] really only did this a
couple of times. '20 9 The judge explicitly mentioned in his sentencing
decision that "[o]ne of the things" that persuaded him to rely on her co-
defendants' testimony was Mitchell's "not testifying to the contrary. 210
He sentenced Mitchell to ten years of imprisonment, and the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit subsequently affirmed her sentence. 211
201 526 U.S. 314 (1999).
202 Id. at 317.
203 Id.
204 Id. at 318.
205 Id.
206 See id. at319 .
207 Id.
208 See id.
209 Id. (quoting Joint Appendix at 98, Mitchell, 526 U.S. 314 (1999) (No. 97-7541)).
210 Id. (quoting Joint Appendix, supra note 209, at 95).
211 Id.
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In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court held that these proceedings
violated Mitchell's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. The Court, in an opinion by Justice Kennedy, rejected
the notion that incrimination is complete once guilt has been adjudi-
cated and held both that the privilege applies to sentencing proceed-
ings and that a defendant does not waive it by pleading guilty.212 The
Court decided the case under Griffin, declaring that a sentencing court
may not draw an adverse inference from a defendant's silence when it
determines facts that relate to the circumstances of the crime.
2 13
The strength of the Court's opinion lies in the weakness of the dis-
tinction between the elemental and sentencing facts of a crime. Al-
though federal and state legislatures have employed this distinction, it
becomes arbitrary when applied to act-related, rather than actor-
related, facts - that is, when it involves impersonal circumstances of
the offense, rather than personal circumstances of the offender. In
such cases, no special significance should attach to the fact that an ag-
gravating factor appears in the sentencing rules, rather than in the
statutory definition of the offense. Such formulations often stem from
drafting convenience rather than from substantive concerns.2 14 Given
this fact and assuming that Griffin is unassailable as precedent, sheer
logic necessitated the majority's outcome. Justice Kennedy explained:
Were we to accept the Government's position, prosecutors could indict
without specifying the quantity of drugs involved, obtain a guilty plea,
and then put the defendant on the stand at sentencing to fill in the drug
quantity. The result would be to enlist the defendant as an instrument in
his or her own condemnation, undermining the long tradition and vital
212 Id. at 325-26.
213 Id. at 327-28. This decision was consistent with Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 462-63
(1981), a capital case that did not set a clear-cut precedent on the issue.
214 These formulations have been used, quite improperly, but often successfully, as a means of
escaping from the reasonable doubt standard with respect to what are only nominally "sentencing
facts." See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 85-86 (1986) (holding that the prosecution need
not meet the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard in proving sentencing factors); United States v.
Shonubi, 895 F. Supp. 460, 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (suggesting that the preponderance-of-the-evidence
standard applies to sentencing factors, although the seriousness of the sentence must be taken into
account). But see Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2362-63 (2000) (finding that statutory
hate-crime enhancement of firearm possession and related offences was an element of these crimes,
rather than just a sentencing factor, and therefore that the prosecution must establish it beyond all
reasonable doubt); Castillo v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2090, 2092 (2000) (holding that, although the
relevant statute defined machine gun possession as a sentence-aggravating factor, it should be in-
terpreted instead as a separate offense that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt): Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 25 1-52 (1999) (interpreting a carjacking statute with
aggravating factors to create different offenses, rather than sentencing elements, and thus requiring
the prosecution to establish those factors beyond all reasonable doubt). See generally Amy D.
Ronner, The Demise of the Reasonable Doubt Standard: The Toxic Watts and Putra Decision, 60 U.
PITT. L. REV. 373 (1999) (tracing the historical development of a lower standard applied in sentenc-
ing hearings); Deborah Young, Fact-Finding at Federal Sentencing: Why the Guidelines Should
Meet the Rules, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 299 (1994) (same).
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principle that criminal proceedings rely on accusations proved by the
Government, not on inquisitions conducted to enhance its own prosecuto-
rial power.2
15
The dissent, written by Justice Scalia,2 16 disagreed with what the
dissenting Justices considered to be an extension of Griffin.217 Accord-
ing to the dissenting Justices, Griffin itself was wrongly decided: it is
one thing to grant a defendant the contempt exemption - with which
the dissenting Justices had no quarrel - it is quite another to supple-
ment this exemption with an evidentiary privilege against natural in-
ferences from silence.21 8 To extend the ambit of Griffin thus presents
an impediment to accurate fact-finding during sentencing in circum-
stances when the traditional rationales for the privilege against self-
incrimination have lost much of their force because the defendant has
voluntarily incriminated herself by pleading guilty.219
Indeed, the logical structure of the majority's opinion emphasizes
its own weakness. This structure would stand only if we left its foun-
dations untouched. However, as explained by Justice Scalia22 ° - and,
more forthrightly, by Justice Thomas221 - there is a problem with the
major premise of the majority's argument: Griffin was not necessarily
a good decision. According to Justice Thomas, Griffin's addition of a
questionable evidentiary privilege to the well-accepted contempt ex-
emption "lacks foundation in the Constitution's text, history, or
logic. '2 22 As indicated, it is difficult to counter this argument within
the bounds of the traditional rationales for the privilege.
The anti-pooling rationale for the privilege more easily resolves this
disagreement. First, it justifies Griffin and therefore fortifies the major
premise of the majority in Mitchell.223 More importantly, under the
anti-pooling rationale, the Mitchell Court is right in its outcome but
wrong in its reasoning. The key to understanding this point is the
economic fallacy committed by Justice Kennedy in the above passage.
According to Justice Kennedy, if defendants were left unprotected by
Griffin at the sentencing stage, then prosecutors could charge them
with crimes without specifying all aggravating factors. 224 A prosecutor
215 Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 325.
216 Justice Thomas joined Justice Scalia's dissent and also dissented separately.
217 Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 337 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
218 Id. at 335-36.
219 See id. at 332.
220 Id. at 331-36.
221 Id. at 341-43 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
222 Id. at 341.
223 By focusing on the elimination of the pooling problem, our justification also differs from Pro-
fessor Stuntz's recent version of the excuse-based rationale. Cf. Stuntz, Self-Incrimination, supra
note 12, at 1261-87.
224 Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 325.
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could then secure a guilty plea and prove the aggravating factors by
enlisting the defendant's self-damaging silence or testimony.2 2 5 This
grim scenario depends on the defendant's entering a guilty plea. In a
regime without Griffin, however, a defendant who is charged with a
general crime and knows that the prosecution is unable to prove its
aggravating specifics would only plead guilty if she were offered an at-
tractive plea bargain. Absent such an offer, a rational guilty defendant
would plead not guilty and then either remain silent (and enjoy the
pre-conviction protection of Griffin) or perjuriously testify to her inno-
cence and thus adversely affect innocent defendants by impugning the
credibility of their truthful testimony. Justice Kennedy's grim scenario
therefore would not materialize. The prosecution could not rely on the
defendant to provide evidence necessary to prove the crime's aggravat-
ing circumstances. Furthermore, absent Griffin, the legal system
would waste judicial resources and promote the pooling of innocents
and criminals. For these reasons, our rationale favors the application
of Griffin at sentencing hearings even in cases in which there is a sus-
tainable distinction between elements of the crime and sentencing
facts.
The application of Griffin at the sentencing stage also creates an
important incentive for defendants to plead guilty. Together with si-
lence, a guilty plea efficiently separates the guilty from the innocent.
In contrast, if it had not applied Griffin to the sentencing stage in ac-
cordance with the dissenting opinions, the Court would have substan-
tially weakened this separation, wasting trial time and other resources.
Thus, while the dissenters argued that Mitchell weakens the crime-
control function of sentencing procedures, the opposite is actually true:
by inducing more defendants to plead guilty, Mitchell increases the ef-
ficacy of the criminal justice machinery.126
, V. TESTABLE IMPLICATIONS
From a legal viewpoint, our most important conclusions concern
the effect of the right to silence on wrongful convictions and, more
225 Id.
226 But see Bradley, Silence, supra note 8o, at 88-89. Professor Bradley distinguishes Griffin
from Mitchell on the basis of the prior-conviction impeachment risk present in the former but not
in the latter. In the Griffin situation, innocent ex-convicts might choose not to testify at trial be-
cause testifying would render them vulnerable to impeachment based on their prior convictions.
Professor Bradley argues that, as such, no penalty in the form of adverse inferences should be as-
sessed to defendants who remain silent in that situation. Id. In contrast, the risk of such im-
peachment is virtually non-existent at the sentencing stagc, and thus, according to Professor Brad-
ley, the adverse inference from silence is warranted in that situation. Id. As explained in the text,
we believe that Griffin and Mitchell should hold the line and that Mitchell is justified by the result-
ing incentives for a guilty defendant: an incentive not to testify perjuriously and an incentive to
enter a guilty plea.
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generally, on the legal system's ability to separate the guilty from the
innocent. These effects are only observable in a small subset of cases,
such as those overturned on appeal. Accordingly, we focus on those
implications of our model that are testable using available data. Those
implications include: (i) the right to silence reduces the conviction rate;
and (2) the right to silence induces guilty suspects to switch from false
exculpatory statements to silence, rather than from confessions to si-
lence.
According to our model, criminals rationally exercise the right to si-
lence to reduce the risk of conviction, which in turn reduces the risk
that innocents are wrongfully convicted. We therefore expect that the
right to silence reduces the proportion of suspects who are convicted.
Opponents of the right similarly assert that it reduces conviction
rates; 227 consequently, they favor the right's abolition, a recommenda-
tion that we reject. By contrast, supporters of the right claim that it
exerts an insignificant effect on the conviction rate.22 8  Our model
casts doubt on this observation but supports the right on the different
grounds advanced above.
One can test our model's prediction that Miranda reduced the con-
viction rate using annual FBI data on crime clearance rates.2 29 In a
study examining the FBI's data, Professors Paul Cassell and Richard
Fowles estimated regression models for a variety of crime categories,
using the clearance rate as the dependent variable. Professors Cassell
and Fowles included a dummy variable (which equals zero before 1966
and one thereafter) to capture Miranda's effect on the clearance rate.
This study showed that this dummy variable was significant at the
o.oi level for serious crimes and was negatively signed:2 30 in other
words, Miranda had significantly reduced the clearance rate. This re-
sult is consistent with the first testable implication of our model (de-
clining conviction rates).
Our model also implies that suspects who exercise the right to si-
lence would otherwise make false exculpatory statements. Our as-
sumption that confessions secure a small (but positive) remission of
227 See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 Nw. U. L.
REV. 387, 484 (1996) (arguing that "[r]oughly 28,000 arrests for serious crimes of violence and
79,00o arrests for property crimes slip through the criminal justice system due to Miranda").
228 See, e.g., Richard A. Leo, The Impact of Miranda Revisited 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
621, 677-78 (1996); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda's Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits and
Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 5OO, 544-47 (1996).
229 These rates are, admittedly, different from conviction rates because the police can clear a
case without securing a conviction. Cassell, supra note 227, at 398-99; Paul G. Cassell & Richard
Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year Perspective on Miranda's Harmful Effects on Law
Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1o55, iO65-66 (1998); see also John J. Donohue III, Did Miranda
Diminish Police Effectiveness?, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1147 (1998) (discussing the Cassell-Fowles the-
sis).
230 Cassell & Fowles, supra note 229, at io82-84.
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sentences implies that suspects confess if, and only if, the evidence
against them is strong; neither exculpatory statements nor resort to the
right to silence allows them to evade conviction. This testable implica-
tion distinguishes our model from other hypotheses in the literature.
The right's opponents, such as Professor Cassell, maintain that it in-
duces suspects to switch from confession to silence,23' while the right's
supporters, such as Professors Stephen Schulhofer 3 2 and Richard
Leo,233 claim that it insignificantly affects the confession rate because
of the police's successful adaptation to the right's requirements.
A middle-ground position also exists. Professor George Thomas
suggests that the right generates two mutually offsetting effects on the
conviction rate. On the one hand, it motivates some guilty suspects to
switch from confession to silence, while on the other hand, it induces
other guilty suspects to switch from silence to false, and ultimately
self-defeating, exculpatory statements in the belief that the existence of
a silence option renders such statements more credible.234
Our second prediction, that the right to silence causes guilty defen-
dants to switch from exculpatory statements to silence, is more diffi-
cult to test because outcomes of interrogation are not reported inde-
pendently. Several early studies considered Miranda's immediate
impact by comparing police files for earlier years with files on interro-
gations conducted after the Miranda decision. According to Professor
Cassell, the best reading of these early data reveals that the right to si-
lence reduced confessions by 16%.23s Professor Schulhofer, however,
argues that an appropriate reading of the early data reveals that
Miranda reduced confessions by no more than 4%.236 In our view -
and that of Professor Thomas 3 7 - the data are too contaminated with
measurement error (including inconsistent classification schemes) to
draw any meaningful conclusions about Miranda's effects. In particu-
lar, because the Supreme Court delivered Miranda without prior
warning, data collection on interrogation outcomes that preceded
Miranda began only after the decision. This fact alone obviously in-
troduces a risk of data contamination.
231 Cassell, supra note 227, at 394.
232 Schulhofer, supra note 228.
233 Leo, supra note 228.
234 See, e.g., George C. Thomas III, Is Miranda a Real-World Failure? A Plea for More (and
Better) Empirical Evidence, 43 UCLA L. REV. 821 (1996) [hereinafter Thomas, Real-World Fail-
ure]; George C. Thomas III, Plain Talk About the Miranda Empirical Debate: A "Steady-State"
Theory of Confessions, 43 UCLA L. REV. 933 (1996).
235 Cassell, supra note 227, at 445. Professor Cassell and Bret Hayman and, separately, Profes-
sor Leo conducted studies of interrogation. See Cassell & Hayman, supra note 6o; Leo, supra note
6o. Cassell and Hayman claim that their estimated confession rate is consistent with rates reported
in early post-Miranda studies. See Cassell & Hayman, supra note 60, at 858.
236 Schulhofer, supra note 228, at 545.
237 Thomas, Real-World Failure, supra note 234, at 826-31.
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In contrast, the British government funded a number of research
studies on interrogation outcomes before introducing the Criminal Jus-
tice and Public Order Act 1994 (CJPOA)2 38 which allows adverse in-
ferences to be drawn from pretrial silence in some circumstances.
2 39
These studies include the Phillips-Brown study, which examined the
interrogations of 1785 suspects, distributed across eight police sta-
tions.240  To the best of our knowledge, the Bucke-Street-Brown
study241 is the only one to use post-I994 data to explore the effect of
the CJPOA. This study describes the interrogations of 1227 suspects
at the same police stations as the Phillips-Brown study and uses the
same classification scheme. The Bucke-Street-Brown study reports
that 6% of suspects did not answer any questions, as compared to io%
pre-CJPOA, and that an additional io% of suspects did not answer
some questions, as compared to 13% pre-CJPOA. 242  Hence, the
CJPOA significantly reduced the percentage of silent suspects and af-
fected primarily suspects with legal representation. 43 Moreover, there
was no significant change in the confession rate. The Bucke-Street-
Brown study describes the results as follows: "[Wlhile suspects may be
talking more to officers during police questioning, it would appear that
they are no more likely to make admissions than in the past. Some of-
ficers described this development as an increase in 'the flannel fac-
tor.'"244
In short, the data suggest that the CJPOA created an incentive to
switch from silence to self-exonerating lies. The Bucke-Street-Brown
study's results are bivariate correlations, indicating that other factors
may have caused the increase in exculpatory statements. There are in-
sufficient data available to estimate a complete model. However, there
are grounds for believing that exogenous variations reinforced the
CJPOA's effects. As noted by David Brown, a comparison of studies
suggests that the proportion of silent suspects increased during the
early 199os, the years before the CJPOA.2 45 This trend was probably
due to the rising proportion of represented suspects in the aftermath of
the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984,246 which strengthened
238 C. 33 (Eng.).
239 Id. § 34.
240 For a survey of research studies conducted before passage of CJPOA, see Roger Leng, The
Right-to-Silence Debate, in SUSPICION AND SILENCE: THE RIGHT TO SILENCE IN CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATIONS 18 (David Morgan & Geoffrey M. Stephenson eds., 1994).
241 TOM BUCKE, ROBERT STREET & DAVID BROWN, THE RIGHT OF SILENCE: THE IMPACT OF
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND PUBLIC ORDER ACT 1994 (2000). We are grateful to Jackie Hodgson
for bringing this study to our attention and to its authors for providing clarifications.
242 Id. at 31.
243 Id. at 30-34.
244 Id. at 34-35.
245 See DAVID BROWN, PACE TEN YEARS ON: A REVIEW OF THE RESEARCH 172-75 ( 997).
246 C. 6o (Eng.).
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suspects' rights to legal advice and representation. According to the
Bucke-Street-Brown study, lawyers typically advised silence prior to
the CJPOA but recommended that suspects provide exculpatory
statements after the CJPOA.2 47 In sum, informal evidence indicates
that the exogenous variable primarily responsible for changes in the
pre-CJPOA silence rate interacted with the new incentives to reduce
the proportion of silent suspects after the CJPOA.
The Bucke-Street-Brown study's conclusion concerning the switch
to false exculpatory statements reinforces the second testable implica-
tion of our model. This conclusion contradicts theories that deny that
Miranda significantly affected interrogations, 248 that predict that
Miranda actually increased the proportion of suspects who make ex-
culpatory statements, 49 or that link Miranda to a decrease in the pro-
portion of confessions. 250 Moreover, other studies echo the conclusions
of the Bucke-Street-Brown study. For example, Senator Arlen Specter
and the Vera Institute both report that suspects interrogated before the
Miranda decision often made false statements, 251 while Professor Cas-
sell and Bret Hayman report that none of the 173 suspects interro-
gated in their post-Miranda sample was "locked ... into a false al-
ibi. ' '25 2 Finally, we note that the Bucke-Street-Brown study's results
mirror the example of Singapore, where the demise of the right to si-
lence correlated with a significant decrease in the number of confes-
sions and an increase in the number of denials. 25 3
VI. CONCLUSION
Miranda's critics assert that criminals are the exclusive beneficiar-
ies of the right to silence, which imposes a social cost in the form of
lost confessions. Moreover, they assert that it is impossible to balance
this cost against any social benefits because innocent suspects choose
to tell the truth under any regime. Consequently, Miranda and its
progeny impede the search for truth and can claim justification only as
an attempt to protect more fundamental values. However, critics since
247 BUCKE, STREET & BROWN, supra note 241, at 24-25.
248 See, e.g., Schulhofer, supra note 228, at 544-45.
249 See, e.g., Thomas, Real-World Failure, supra note 234, at 831.
250 See, e.g., Cassell, supra note 227, at 394.
251 See Controlling Crime Through More Effective Law Enforcement: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 9oth Cong. 199-
2o6 (1967) (statement of Arlen Specter, District Attorney for the City and County of Philadelphia,
PA); Vera Inst. of Justice, Taping Police Interrogations in the 20th Precinct, N.Y.RD. (Apr. 1967)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
252 Cassell & Hayman, supra note 6o, at 869 tbl.4.
253 Alan Khee-Jin Tan, Adverse Inferences and the Right to Silence: Re-examining the Singa-
pore Experience, iggi CRIM. L. REV. 471; Meng Heong Yeo, Diminishing the Right to Silence: The
Singapore Experience, 1983 CRIM. L. REV. 89, 94-95.
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Bentham have characterized these values as incoherent, postulated,
and unsupportable.
We accept the factual claim that guilty suspects alone exercise the
right to silence and that the right therefore imposes some social cost.
Beyond this point, however, we reject the entire line of the critics' ar-
guments. Our disagreement hinges on the crucial, but previously un-
examined, proposition that only guilty suspects benefit from the right
because they alone exercise it. If correct, this proposition indeed pre-
cludes a consequentialist defense of Miranda. Hence, our demonstra-
tion that the critics' argument is false allows us to reinterpret Miranda
jurisprudence along consequentialist lines.
This Article demonstrates that the right to silence helps factfinders
distinguish between factually innocent and guilty suspects and defen-
dants. We arrive at this conclusion by bringing to the fore an impor-
tant feature of the right to silence: a guilty suspect's self-interested re-
sponse to questioning can impose externalities (in the form of wrongful
conviction) on innocent suspects and defendants who. tell the truth but
cannot corroborate their responses. Absent a right to silence, guilty
suspects would make false exculpatory statements if they believed that
their lies might not be exposed. Recognizing guilty suspects' incen-
tives, the factfinder would rationally discount the :probative value of
uncorroborated exculpatory statements, at the expense of some unfor-
tunate innocents who could not corroborate their true exculpatory sto-
ries. By contrast, under the right-to-silence regime, neither pooling nor
the ensuing wrongful convictions materialize: for as Bentham famously
noted, innocents still tell the truth, whereas guilty suspects separate
themselves by rationally exercising the right.
The right to silence only operates in this way in legal systems that
observe the proof-beyond-all-reasonable-doubt requirement for convic-
tion. Guilty suspects choose to exercise their right to silence because
lies told in court or during police interrogation are refutable, whereas
silence may help a guilty defendant obtain an acquittal based on rea-
sonable doubt.
Our argument implies that the revocation of Miranda would in-
crease the conviction rate among both guilty and innocent defendants,
without significantly affecting the confession rate. Miranda's defend-
ers also contend that the right to silence does not significantly affect
confessions, while Miranda's critics claim that the right brings the
conviction rate down by reducing guilty suspects' incentives to confess.
Our argument therefore uniquely explains both empirical evidence that
Miranda reduced the conviction rate and empirical evidence that Brit-
ish legislation that eroded the right to silence increased the number of
exculpatory statements without significantly changing the confession
rate.
This Article demonstrates that the right to silence reduces the
number of wrongful convictions. It also demonstrates that this ration-
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ale for the right outscores its competitors by both justifying and coher-
ently explaining each branch of Fifth Amendment jurisprudence. The
proposed rationale is therefore not only normatively sound, but is also
effective in its descriptive role.
APPENDIX
In this Appendix, we provide and analyze a numerical example of
the model presented in Part 111.254 For the reader's convenience, we
provide a table of the symbols we employ and their definitions at the
end of the Appendix.
Suppose that the suspect met the witness, W, on one of four occa-
sions, which we label 1, 2, 3, and c, and that c is the occasion of the
crime. All circumstantial evidence pertaining to the suspect is encap-
sulated in a set of prior probabilities; p, denotes the prior probability
that the suspect met W on innocent occasion t. We allow p, the prior
probability that the suspect met W on the occasion of the crime, to
take any value between o and i, and for the purposes of this example,
we set P,=(I-P)/4 and p2=p 3 =3(i-p)/8 so the prior probabilities p 1, P2, P3,
and p sum to i.
The suspect is presented to W for identification. W may be able to
exonerate an innocent suspect, but he cannot uniquely identify the
perpetrator of the crime. Faced with a suspect, W either will say, "I
met the suspect on innocent occasion t or at the scene of the crime," or
else will exonerate the suspect unequivocally. The former response
will be referred to as a "t-report." If the suspect is, in fact, the perpe-
trator, then W will make each t-report with probability q,; and if the
suspect met W on innocent occasion t, W will make the t-report with
probability qt, and otherwise will provide an exonerating report.25 5
For expositional convenience, we assume that q,=5/I2 and that
q2=q 3 =7/24. The table below summarizes the likelihood that W will
make each possible report, for each possible occasion on which the
suspect might have met W
254 For a formal presentation of the entire model, see Seidmann, supra note 66.
2ss Given the already postulated number of innocent occasions: q,+q,+q,=i.
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OCCASIONS
I 2 3 C
JI} 7/12 0 0 0
[2} 0 17/24 0 0
f3l 0 0 I /2 0
REPORTS256
, C) 5/12 0 0 5/12
{2, C) 0 7/24 0 7/24
{3, C} 0 0 7/24 7/24
Note that W's report is always reliable in the sense that he never
identifies a suspect he met on innocent occasion t, as a person he met
on innocent occasion t2.
We assume that the suspect knows the circumstantial evidence that
made her a suspect (and thereby the prior probabilities P., P2, P, and
p). The suspect is also assumed to know the occasion on which she
met W. When the suspect responds to the police question, "When did
you meet W?" with the response "I met W on occasion t," her state-
ment will be referred to as a "t-statement"; furthermore, the combina-
tion of a t-report and the t-statement will be called "t-evidence."
After observing all the evidence - the circumstantial evidence, the
witness's report, and the suspect's statement - the jury computes the
probability that the suspect is guilty [or innocent] using Bayes' Rule. 25 7
The jury convicts [acquits] the suspect if this posterior probability ex-
ceeds [falls short of] the fixed level of required proof. The jury is in-
different between conviction and acquittal if this posterior probability
equals the fixed level of required proof. Following John Kaplan, 258 we
set this level to II(I+G), where I denotes the social cost of convicting
an innocent suspect and G denotes the cost of acquitting a guilty sus-
pect. By setting the disutility ratio I/G to 9/I, we set the required
proof threshold to 9/IO.
Finally, our model accommodates the possibility that a suspect
could rationally decide to confess to the crime. We therefore assume
that, while a guilty suspect receives zero utility from conviction after
256 "Reports" refers to sets of occasions on which the witness reports that he may have met the
suspect.
257 According to Bayes' Rule, the posterior probability of guilt, given evidence e, is the product
of the prior probability of guilt (p) and the probability of e if the suspect is guilty, divided by the
sum across occasions (t) of the probability that the suspect met W on occasion t (P,) times the prob-
ability of evidence e when the encounter occurred on occasion t (t=I, 2, 3, c). Formally, prob(t=cle)
= p • prob(elt=c) I 1p, • prob(elt).
258 See John Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process, 20 STAN. L. REV. io65,
1071-75 (968).
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trial, she receives positive utility from confession through reduced pun-
ishment and saved trial expenses. For the purposes of our example,
we assume that the utility from confession is less than 7/24 times the
utility of acquittal.
If the suspect exercises the right to silence, the jury will only use
the report and the circumstantial evidence to form its posterior belief.
If W makes a i-report, by applying Bayes' Rule, the jury will calculate
that the suspect is the criminal with probability 4P/(I +3P). 25 9 After ei-
ther a 2-report or 3-report, the jury will calculate the posterior prob-
ability of guilt as 8p/(3+5P).260  Note, for future reference, that
8P/(3+5P) < 4P/(I+3P). 26 1
We now use these numbers to compute perfect-Bayesian-
equilibrium outcomes as the strength of the circumstantial evidence
varies.2 6 2 At any such equilibrium:
(i) the guilty suspect cannot raise her payoff by changing her
statement, given the statements made by innocent suspects and the
jury's strategy;
(2) all innocent suspects tell the truth, and cannot do better by
making any other statement;
(3) the jury's beliefs satisfy Bayes' Rule whenever the evidence it
observes is realized with positive probability on the equilibrium path;
(4) the jury acquits [convicts] whenever it believes that the suspect
is guilty with probability less than [more than] 9/IO.
A. The Right to Silence Unavailable
We start by describing equilibria that emerge when suspects do not
have a right to silence. In these games, the jury draws an adverse in-
ference from silence as, ex hypothesi, all innocent suspects tell the
truth. The guilty suspect does better by either lying or confessing than
by refusing to answer police questions, so she will never be silent. We
now describe equilibria as p (the strength of the circumstantial evi-
dence) varies.
i. Weak Evidence (p<9/3). - If the guilty suspect makes some
t-statement, the jury will acquit if W makes the corresponding t-report.
The jury's posterior belief that the suspect is guilty will fall short of
the proof threshold, since P<9/I3 implies that 4P/(I+3P) is less than
259 This number is derived from Bayes' Rule by substituting values for p, and q, into the expres-
sion: p • q, / q,(p + p,).
260 This number is derived from Bayes' Rule by substituting values for p., p;, q,, and q. into the
expressions: p • qq,(p + p,) and p • q, /q,(p + P,).
261 This inequality follows directly from our assumption that the suspect may be innocent (that
is, p< I).
262 See generally FUDENBERG & TIROLE, supra note 65, § 8.2, at 324-36 (explaining perfect
Bayesian equilibrium).
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9/IO, and 8p(3+5P)<4P/(I+3P)163 However, the jury will convict if the
guilty suspect's t-statement is inconsistent with W's report. Knowing
that the witness is less likely to contradict a i-statement than either a
2-statement or a 3-statement (as q, equals 5/12, which is greater than
q, and q3, which equal 7/24), the guilty suspect makes a i-statement at
equilibrium. The guilty suspect does not confess under weak evidence
because the premium for confession is low enough that the guilty sus-
pect is better off gambling that W confuses her with suspect 1.264 By
contrast, innocent suspects tell the truth and are always acquitted: the
jury acquits after observing 2-evidence or 3-evidence (as innocents
alone make such statements); and it acquits if W exonerates an inno-
cent suspect or if it observes i-evidence (as P<9/3).
2. Moderate Evidence (9/13<P<9/ro). - Under these circum-
stances, the guilty suspect cannot choose always to make the i-
statement at equilibrium. If she does so, the jury's posterior probabil-
ity of guilt, after observing i-evidence, will exceed 9/IO.265 The guilty
suspect, as a result, would always be convicted, and contrary to equi-
librium criterion (i) above, could do better by unexpectedly making
the 2-statement. Instead, at equilibrium, the guilty suspect makes the
i-statement with probability 9(I-p)/4p and otherwise makes either the
2-statement or the 3-statement, each with probability (13P-9)/8p. 266
The jury, in turn, always acquits after observing either 2-evidence or
3-evidence and acquits with probability 7/IO after observing i-
evidence.
The various probabilities are constructed such that the jury's pos-
terior probability that the suspect is guilty, after observing i-evidence,
is at the level of proof (9/io) that leaves it precisely indifferent between
conviction and acquittal. 267 At the same time, the probability of ac-
263 Note that 4p(0/ +3P) represents the highest probability of guilt that a jury could infer from i-
evidence. It is calculated from Bayes' Rule on the assumption that every guilty suspect makes a i-
statement. The jury must make comparable assumptions to derive posterior beliefs of 8p/(3+5p)
from 2- and 3-evidence.
264 The guilty suspect's payoff if she makes the i-statement is 7/24 (the probability that the wit-
ness makes the i-report) multiplied by the payoff of an innocent verdict. We have assumed, how-
ever, that the premium for confession is less than this value. See supra pp. 5o5-o 6 .
265 Recall that the jury's posterior probability would be 4P/(I+3P), which exceeds g/io whenever
p>9/13.
266 p>9/I3 implies that 9(i-p)/4p<I.
267 At this equilibrium, the jury observes i-evidence when the suspect is guilty [respectively,
suspect i] with probability q, times 9(-p)4p [respectively, with probability q,]. Hence, using
Bayes' Rule, the jury believes that the suspect is guilty with probability 9/Io after observing
i-evidence. The jury is therefore indifferent between acquitting and convicting and also across all
random mixtures between acquittal and conviction; thus, acquitting with probability 7/Io is the
best response to i-evidence. Yet the jury observes 2-evidence when the suspect is guilty [respec-
tively, suspect 2] with probability q, times (i3P-9)8p [respectively, with probability q]. Hence, us-
ing Bayes' Rule, the jury believes that the suspect is guilty with probability (i3P-9)/(iop-6) after
observing 2-evidence; and p<g/io implies that this probability is less than 9/io, so the jury acquits
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quittal is calibrated such that the guilty suspect is indifferent between
making the i-statement, which risks conviction even if W does not
contradict it, and making the 2- or the 3-statements, which W is more
likely to contradict.2 68 Suspects 2 and 3 are always acquitted and
therefore have no incentive not to tell the truth.2 69 Suspect i is con-
victed with probability 1/8 (when W does not exonerate her and the
jury convicts after i-evidence); but she still prefers telling the truth ei-
ther to making another t-statement (because W will assuredly contra-
dict her statement and the jury will convict) or to confessing (as the
premium for confession is low).
3. Strong Evidence (p>9lio). - On the one hand, if the prior
probability of guilt (p) exceeds the fixed level of required proof (9/IO),
the guilty suspect cannot improve on confessing, for W's report is par-
tially informative; thus, there cannot be an equilibrium at which the
guilty suspect expects to reduce the jury's belief that she is guilty by
making a false statement. On the other hand, the jury must expect the
guilty suspect to make each exculpatory statement with positive prob-
ability rather than certainty. Otherwise, the guilty suspect will do bet-
ter by making an unexpected exculpatory statement in the hope that
she will be acquitted if it turns out to be consistent with W's report.
At equilibrium, the guilty suspect confesses with probability (iop-
9)[p, makes statement i with probability 9(I-p)/4p and makes each of
the 2-statement and the 3-statement with probability 27(I-p)/8p. The
jury convicts the guilty suspect with positive probability after observ-
ing any t-evidence (the exact probability depending on the utility
earned by confessing in each case). The jury always convicts the
guilty suspect after observing any statement inconsistent with W's re-
port. In residual cases, the jury acquits the guilty suspect.
The various probabilities are constructed such that the guilty sus-
pect mixes between confession and each exculpatory statement. The
jury's posterior probability that the suspect is guilty after observing
any t-evidence is exactly 9/lO, so the jury is indifferent between the
two possible verdicts; and its likelihood of convicting the guilty suspect
after observing 2-evidence. Identical arguments apply to the jury's beliefs after observing
3-evidence.
268 If the guilty suspect makes the 2-statement [respectively, the 3-statement], then she is acquit-
ted if and only if W makes the 2-report [respectively, the 3-report], an event that occurs with prob-
ability 7/24. If the guilty suspect makes the i-statement, she is only acquitted if W makes the
i-report, an event that occurs with probability q,=5/12. Given the jury's response to i-evidence,
the guilty suspect is acquitted with probability S/12 times 7/10=7/24 when she makes the
I-statement. She is therefore indifferent among making each of the three t-statements and, ipso
facto, across all random mixtures among the t-statements. As the premium for confession is suffi-
ciently low, the guilty suspect's chosen strategy is indeed her best response.
269 W either exonerates suspect 2 or makes the 2-report. At equilibrium, the jury acquits after
either of W's reports, and thus suspect 2 is always acquitted. An identical argument applies to
Suspect 3.
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after observing any t-evidence makes the guilty suspect indifferent be-
tween confessing and making each t-statement. Note that in this sce-
nario innocent suspects are wrongfully convicted with positive prob-
ability when W does not exonerate them.
B. The Right to Silence Available
We now turn to games in which the suspect has a right to silence,
distinguishing between cases according to the strength of the circum-
stantial evidence. Recall that the jury relies solely on W's report if the
suspect exercises the right to silence.
i. Weak Evidence (p<9/13). - If the evidence is weak, the jury
will acquit the suspect after observing any t-evidence. As a silent sus-
pect will invariably be acquitted, a guilty suspect cannot improve on
silence. At the same time, the jury acquits the innocent suspects, as it
draws a favorable inference from their statements. Therefore, these
suspects have no incentive not to tell the truth.
2. Intermediate Evidence (0/3<P<27/35). - If the circumstantial
evidence is intermediate, the jury will acquit after observing either 2-
or 3-evidence and will convict after observing i-evidence2 70 The
guilty suspect will be silent because a jury is more likely to acquit a si-
lent guilty suspect than one making any false statement.2 7 ' Further-
more, the premium for confession is small enough that the guilty sus-
pect is better off remaining silent than confessing. In light of the
guilty suspect's silence, the jury acquits the innocent suspects, as it
draws a favorable inference from their statements. Therefore, these
suspects have no incentive not to make truthful statements.
3. Very Strong Evidence (P>27/35). - Under these circumstances,
the jury will convict after observing any t-evidence. If the guilty sus-
pect is silent, the jury will also assuredly convict her. Therefore, the
guilty suspect is never silent - she confesses in order to secure the
premium for confessing. If the guilty suspect never exercises her right
to silence, she must make the same equilibrium choices that she would
make if the right were unavailable. Correspondingly, the jury must re-
spond to evidence as it would respond to it in the absence of the right,
sometimes convicting innocent suspects. 72 Hence, the right to silence
270 The former assertion follows from P<27/35, while the latter assertion follows from P>9/13.
271 Specifically, the guilty suspect would be acquitted with probability q,+q,=7Ir2 if she were
silent. If she unexpectedly made statement i, then she would be acquitted if and only if W made
the i-report, that is, with probability 5/2. The guilty suspect is therefore more likely to be acquit-
ted if she is silent, so she has no incentive to deviate by making statement i (or any other false
statement).
272 See supra Appendix section A. 3 .
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has no effect on any suspect's choice when the evidence is very strong,
and is therefore irrelevant in that circumstance.2 7 3
Conclusion
We can now use these results to describe how and when the right
to silence affects interrogation outcomes. If the evidence is weak, the
right to silence is advantageous solely to the guilty suspect. Absent the
right, she will make the i-statement, gambling that W confuses her
with suspect i. The jury acquits if W indeed makes the i-report but
convicts the guilty suspect otherwise. By contrast, when the right to
silence is available, the guilty suspect assures her acquittal by exercis-
ing the right. Innocent suspects are acquitted in either instance.
If the evidence is moderate or intermediate (9/13<P<27/35), the
guilty suspect gains from exercising the available right; suspect i also
benefits from the guilty suspect's silence because she is no longer at
risk of wrongful conviction (if W does not exonerate her unequivo-
cally). Finally, the right to silence is immaterial if the evidence is very
strong (P>27/35) because the guilty suspect will not choose to exercise
the right.
SYMBOLS
W = witness
t = any of the four occasions on which the witness
might have met the suspect
c = the criminal occasion
Pt = the probability that W met the suspect on occasion
t, conditional on the circumstantial evidence alone
p = the probability that W met the suspect at the crime
scene, conditional on the circumstantial evidence alone
q, = the probability that W confuses innocent occasion t
with the criminal occasion and vice versa
t-statement = "I met the witness on innocent occasion
t" (made by any of the suspects)
t-report = "I met the suspect either on innocent occa-
sion t or at the scene of the crime" (made by W)
I - the social cost of a wrongful conviction
G - the social cost of a wrongful acquittal
273 This observation is related to a general property of games. If an available strategy is never
chosen at equilibrium, then making that strategy unavailable will not affect equilibrium play.
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